The Air Resupply And Communications Service (ARCS) is an inactive United States Air Force organization. It was assigned to Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. Established during the Korean War, the mission of ARCS was providing the Air Force an unconventional warfare capability during the 1950s. It was inactivated in 1954, but elements continued to operate until the reactivation of air commando units by the Kennedy Administration in 1962.
Mission
The mission of ARCS was: Introducing, evacuating and supplying guerrilla-type units in enemy occupied territory. Storing and packaging psychological warfare propaganda materials and storing and packing supplies used by guerrilla-type personnel. Housing, supplying, administering, training and briefing guerilla-type personnel. Composing and reproducing psychological warfare propaganda. Composing and transmitting by radio, psychological warfare propaganda. Providing and maintaining communications circuits and communications security for the transmission and reception of intelligence material and for the analysis of such intelligence material. Perform such other functions as may be assigned.
History Background During World War II unconventional warfare was carried out in every major combat theater by the United States. Clandestine operations, ranging from leaflet dropping to parachuting OSS agents inside enemy-controlled territory, to "Air Commando" units in the China-Burma-India Theater played an essential role in securing victory against Nazi Germany and the Japanese Empire. With the demobilization of the armed forces after the war, most of this capability was lost as the Air Force concentrated on the acquisition of jet aircraft and trying to maintain combat ready forces with austere budgets.
With the outbreak of the Cold War it became apparent to US leadership that the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin could not be appeased, persuaded, or otherwise convinced to respect the territorial rights of its neighbor nations. The United States Air Force (USAF) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been created by the National Security Act of 1947 and activated a short time later.Thigpen, Jerry L. (2001). The Praetorian STARShip: The Untold Story of the Combat Talon. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press.
Strategists in the Pentagon reasoned that the next war would be fought and won (or lost) in the minds of those fighting it. Subsequently, the Psychological Warfare Division was established at the Air Staff in February 1948. By definition psychological warfare in 1948 was synonymous with special operations as defined during World War II. The new Psychological Warfare Division (also known as PW) division immediately set about to develop plans to fight this "new" type of warfare, which came to be known as psychological warfare, or PSYWAR for short.
In 1950 Air Staff/PW created special operations wings devoted to the PSYWAR mission to support United States objectives in the Cold War. All Air Commando-designated units had been inactivated after World War II, however the Korean War underscored the need for a substantial Air Force unconventional warfare capability. Despite the urgency of the war, it took eight months before the Air Resupply and Communications Service (ARCS) was activated by HQ USAF at Andrews AFB, Maryland on 23 February 1951. Assigned to Military Air Transport Service (MATS) the plan called for three flying wings, equipped with a mixture of B-29 Superfortress bombers, twin-engine SA-16 amphibians, C-119 and C-54 transports and H-19 helicopters to be established to perform the psychological warfare and unconventional warfare missions.Trest, Warren A., "Air Commando One: Heinie Aderholt And America's Secret Air Wars", Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, D.C., London, 2000, Library of Congress card number 99-053643, , page 53. Although MATS was the official parent command of ARCS, operations were directed from the Pentagon Psychological Warfare Division, Directorate of Plans, HQ, USAF.
MATS established ARCS Wings as follows: The 580th and 582d Air Resupply and Communications Wings were established to support operations throughout the Middle East, as well as Western and Soviet-Controlled Europe, and the Soviet Union. Both were activated at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. The 580th in 1951 and the 582d a year later. After activation and training, both were deployed overseas; the 580th to Wheelus Air Base, Libya, and the 582s to RAF Molesworth, England. The 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing was activated at Mountain Home AFB in July 1951 and deployed to Clark Air Base, Philippines shortly afterwards. Its mission was PSYWAR operations in Korea.
Equipment Assigned to an Air Resupply Wing were 12 specially modified B-29 heavy bombers, four C-119 heavy transports, four SA-16 amphibians, and four H-19A helicopters. All aircraft were new, except for the B-29s, which had been pulled from USAF storage at Warner Robins AFB, Georgia. Five other non-flying squadrons were assigned to support the wing's operations by providing maintenance, cargo airdrop rigging, long-range communications, and PSYWAR/leaflet production. One unique squadron was devoted to preparing guerrilla-type personnel for insertion into enemy occupied territory.
Extensive modifications were required for the B-29 Superfortress to enable it to perform the special operations mission. All turrets, except the tail turret, were removed from the aircraft, leaving the aircraft unarmed and incapable of self-defense. A parachutist's exit was made where the belly gun turret was originally located. Resupply bundles were mounted on bomb racks inside the bomb bay, thus allowing the bundles to be dropped like bombs over the drop zone. Aircraft were painted black, and a crude HTR-13 obstruction-warning radar was installed to warn the crew of approaching terrain. The major flaw in the B-29 employed in the special operations role, however, was that it had been designed for high-altitude precision bombing, not low-level airdrop. Over the drop zone at drop airspeed, the aircraft was near its stall speed and was difficult to maneuver.
A B-29 was assigned to the 580th ARCW conducted trials at Eglin AFB, Florida, during the summer of 1951 to determine if the aircraft could be used to extract personnel utilizing the prototype Personnel Pickup Ground Station extraction system. The test aircraft was modified with a opening in place of the aft-belly turret and with an elongated tailhook at the rear of the aircraft. The system was similar to the one adopted in 1952 by Fifth Air Force for the C-47s of the Special Air Missions detachment in South Korea. The tests proved technically feasible, but the project was dropped for the B-29 aircraft due to aircraft size and safety considerations of flying it so close to the ground.
Korean War Detachment 2, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron
Beginning in the fall of 1950, two organizations began conducting "Special Air Missions" in South Korea shortly after the invasion of the South by North Korea. The Far East Air Forces 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, 315th Air Division flew C-47 Skytrain transports, based out of whatever front line airstrip its aircraft found itself at the end of each day. Within the squadron was an innocuously named "Detachment 2", whose mission was to perform unconventional warfare missions. Following the September 1950 breakout from the Pusan Perimeter, the detachment moved north to Seoul's Kimpo Airport (K-14). From there, Detachment 2's aircraft would soon become active far behind enemy lines as far north as Manchuria. Det. 2 supported Far East Command (FECOM) Technical Intelligence, Fifth Air Force, the CIA, and varied United States and South Korean irregular partisan units. Seldom numbering more than half-a-dozen C-47s, Det. 2's pilots coordinated and flew special operations missions for all these individual groups. One of the more hazardous missions carried out by Det. 2. was long-range low-level penetration missions to insert Korean partisans at night behind communist lines.
Flying single-aircraft, 8-hour missions in Korea's mountains, the Detachment became proficient in night operations. To ensure maximum communications and operations security for their missions, FECOM Intelligence gave the code-name "Rabbits" to these highly valued HUMINT agents. They knew that once dropped behind enemy lines, there was only one way back, to walk. Behind the lines, Rabbits used SCR-300 infantry radios to request resupply and to relay intelligence through Det 2 aircraft flying overhead with a long co-axian reception antennae trailing behind the aircraft. It worked, assuming that anti-aircraft fire, weather, or a collision with fog-shrouded mountains had not terminated the mission.
Special female agents were also dropped with orders to attach themselves to the highest Chinese or North Korean officer and travel with him as far as possible toward the front lines. Unarmed, even without radios, their survival was totally dependent on their individual ability to deceive enemy officers they were sent out to approach. These female agents proved remarkably effective. Once near the lines, they would allow themselves to be captured by Allied forces. From detention camps, a pre-arranged signal from them would lead to their release and immediate debriefing of intelligence gathered during their mission. Approximately 1,000 Rabbits were dropped into enemy territory between September 1950 and June 1951. Amazingly, more than 70 percent returned to friendly territory, providing key intelligence into North Korean activities.
Det 2. also developed a C-47 "Bomber". The unit modified some of its aircraft with container racks and bomb shackles and slung two 75-gallon napalm bombs under the transport's belly. Once the Rabbit was dropped by parachute, the "bomber" crews were free to take the war to the enemy. With the aid of moonlight, Det. 2 crews soon became adept at locating truck convoys moving south under cover of darkness to avoid allied airstrikes. By attacking at extremely low altitudes, their accuracy against convoys was phenomenal. From these attacks, it was learned that communist commanders were ordered to avoid detection at all costs, even after being fired upon. Thus the convoy attacks were usually met without any response. Many of these missions were flown by Major (later Brigadier General) Harry C. Aderholt.Trest, Warren A., "Air Commando One: Heinie Aderholt And America's Secret Air Wars", Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, D.C., London, 2000, Library of Congress card number 99-053643, , pages 30-50.
The November 1950 Communist Chinese intervention into the Korean War was first detected by Det. 2 aircraft, when it saw thousands of troops, trucks, on the ground in Manchuria, on the Chinese side of the Yalu River. This intelligence, however, was not taken seriously and, as history shows, the massive Chinese attack took the UN Command in Korea by surprise. Also, Det 2's "bomber" operations were ordered to be immediately shut down when UN headquarters was made aware of a plan to attack the headquarters of the Soviet Advisory staff in North Korea. As UN forces retreated south during the Chinese attack, contact was lost between the two armies. The order came down from FECOM Intelligence to find the Chinese. In response, Det. 2 parachuted an early warning line of Rabbits at various distances along an east–west axis across the Korean peninsula. Due to various constraints with the SCR-300 radios and the mountainous terrain, the agents were given smoke grenades. At the same time the C-47s were painted with large black and white stripes under the wings for identification purposes. A system was developed that if the Chinese had crossed a point near a Rabbit, red smoke was put out, green if South Korean troops were near the agent, yellow if no one had crossed the areas. Crude, but effective, the system worked.