The 2008 Georgian drone shootdowns refer to a series of military incidents involving Georgian Unmanned aerial vehicles brought down over the breakaway republic of Abkhazia between March and May 2008. The skirmishes were part of a larger context of tensions between Georgia and Russia, eventually leading up to the Russo-Georgian War.
Georgia's drone program was developed in 2007 when the Georgian government purchased dozens of unmanned aircraft from the Israeli Elbit Systems, using the drones to fly over Abkhazia and document Russian military movements in the region. In February and March 2008, as Moscow increased its ties with the separatist region, Georgia intensified its drone surveillance program. The first drone shootdown took place allegedly on March 18 over the Gali district.
According to Abkhaz claims, as many as seven Georgian drones were shot down in five different operations between the Gali and Ochamchire districts of Abkhazia. Georgia only admitted to three incidents, including the April 20 shootdown over the village of Gagida. The latter triggered an investigation by the United Nations that revealed the drone was brought down by a Russian military jet.
The UN accused both Georgia and Russia of violating the 1994 Moscow Ceasefire Agreement that had put an end to the Abkhazia War, Georgia by using drones over the conflict zone and Russia by shooting them down, although Tbilisi argued its surveillance program was justified to observe Russia's own militarization of the region. On May 30, Georgia announced an end to its drone program, but that failed to bring down tensions in the subsequent months.
Background Georgian-Abkhazian conflict
Though originating in the late 1980s, the conflict between Georgia and its breakaway region of Abkhazia seemingly devolved following the 2006 Kodori crisis, when the Georgian central government reestablished its control over the warlord-held Kodori Gorge in northeastern Abkhazia, leading to accusations by separatist Abkhaz forces of a Georgian militarization of the region. Tensions escalated in September 2007 with the Bokhundjara incident, when a clash between Abkhaz troops and Georgian police caused the death of two Russian military advisers working with the separatists.
Mikheil Saakashvili, the staunchly pro-Western President of Georgia in office since the 2003 Rose Revolution, is inaugurated for a second term on January 20, 2008, promising during his inauguration speech the "peaceful reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia," a pledge that comes after a campaign promise to return to Abkhazia Georgian IDPs displaced during the 1993 ethnic cleansing. In response, Russia, which had been providing de facto support to Abkhaz separatists, called on Tbilisi to sign a Treaty of Non-Use of Force with Abkhazia, even though the Saakashvili administration refused to sign any treaty with separatist forces.
On February 26, a breakthrough was announced by President Saakashvili, who claimed having reached a deal with Russia to open a joint checkpoint on the Psou river, at the Abkhaz section of the Georgian-Russian border. However, Russia rapidly denied having reached a deal and tensions increased thereafter. The same day, Abkhazia announced military exercises, while a Georgian journalist was arrested by Abkhaz forces on the ceasefire line, before being tortured in Sokhumi. On February 29, Abkhaz de facto President Sergei Baghapsh announced a partial mobilization of his troops. And on March 6, Russia formally withdrew from a 1996 Abkhazia embargo treaty. At a Georgian National Security Council meeting held in response, Mikheil Saakashvili stated that Georgia would have a "zero tolerance policy" towards the militarization of Abkhazia.
In later analytical documents, the Georgian government would describe the March 6 decision by Russia to be the start of the prelude of the Russia-Georgia War,IIFFMCG, Vol. III (2009), p. 18. while both Tbilisi and the Bush Administration in the United States warned at the time that the lifting of sanctions on Abkhazia was an excuse by Russia to deliver military hardware to the region. Russian officials at the time linked the Kremlin's policy towards Abkhazia to a response of Georgia's attempt to join NATO. On March 14, Abkhaz officials announced it would reject any attempted negotiations with the Georgian government as long as its troops remained stationed in the Kodori Gorge. Days later, President Saakashvili travelled to New York City to present a new peace plan to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, before announcing a proposal to create a joint Abkhaz-Georgian police force in the ethnically-Georgian district of Gali in Abkhazia.
On April 16, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an executive order legalizing relations between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia. A day later, Georgian intelligence noted the arrival of 300 Russian soldiers at a military base in Ochamchire, which Western powers called an "escalation". According to Abkhaz reports provided to the European Union's Fact-Finding Mission following the Russia-Georgia War (IIFFMCG), this decision by Putin provided an excuse for Georgian intelligence activities to increase in southern Abkhazia, especially in the Gali and Tkvarcheli regions, where Tbilisi looked for possible troops deployment routes, fording sites across the Enguri river, and preparedness levels. Part of that intelligence activity included drone flights to "methodically collect intelligence data, monitor key strategic facilities, and obtain information pertaining to the deployment of the Abkhaz Armed Forces."IIFFMCG, Vol. II (2009), p. 195. Saakashvili later told The New York Times that Russia had secretly expanded military aid to Abkhazia, staging aircraft inside the region and assigning trainers to Abkhaz ground units.
Rising Russo-Georgian tensions Tensions between Georgia and the Russian Federation had existed ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The pro-Western orientation of the Saakashvili administration following the Rose Revolution heightened those tensions, while Tbilisi and Moscow navigated through several diplomatic crises, most notably the 2006 espionage scandal. In 2007, Russia was accused by Tbilisi of two airborne attacks on Georgian positions in Abkhazia, leading to Georgia calling for an internationalization of the Russian peacekeeping force in the conflict zone.
The issue of Kosovo's independence contributed to a worsening of ties, with the Kremlin declaring in early 2008 that the recognition of Kosovo by Western powers would "set an international precedent", hinting at Russia's own relations with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the eve of Kosovo's declaration of independence, President Saakashvili called on Russian President Vladimir Putin "not to play with fire". Despite a war of words, a summit of Saakashvili and Putin was held in Moscow on February 21 and tentative deals were announced to lower tensions. A potential détente was however prevented by Russia's decision to unilaterally withdraw from the CIS embargo on Abkhazia on March 6, as well as Georgia's commitment to seek NATO membership at the April Bucharest Summit. On May 3, Saakashvili used the term "occupation" for the first time to describe Russia's military presence in Abkhazia.
Georgian drone program
Georgia incorporated the use of Unmanned aerial vehicles within its internal security apparatus since at least 2007, when the Georgian Ministry of Defense signed a contract with the Israeli military manufacturer Elbit Systems (although Abkhaz authorities alleged the manufacturing of the drones started in 2006). Though the details of the contract were never confirmed, reports from the shot drones revealed them to be Elbit Hermes 450 models. The deployment of the UAVs by Georgia's Defense and Interior Ministries dates back to August 2007, though they were first mentioned in October during a press conference by Abkhaz de facto President Sergei Baghapsh, who threatened to shoot down any drone flying over the region. In November, Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili confirmed Georgia's acquisition of Israeli-made drones during an interview with The Jamestown Foundation, although President Saakashvili refused to comment on his minister's comments. The Georgian Ministry of Defense first confirmed its possession of drones when denying the March 18 shoot-down.
On April 22, two days after a Georgian drone was shot down by a Russian military jet, Mikheil Saakashvili discussed the extent of Georgia's drone program in an interview with The New York Times, confirming the purchase of 40 Israeli-made UAVs. Reports by Sokhumi claimed those drones carried optical infrared and laser sensors, and data transfer systems capable of transmitting images in real time to command and control centers on the ground, were designed to carry out surveillance, patrolling, reconnaissance, and fire adjustment missions, and were capable of detecting any movement from a distance of 25 km, reading registration plates, transmitting photographs of passengers, and identifying weapons.IIFFMCG, Vol III, p. 550. Abkhazian authorities noted at least 16 cases of UAV flights over the region between August 2007 and March 2008.
Georgian reconnaissance flights over Abkhazia reportedly increased following Russia's withdrawal from the CIS embargo treaty and its subsequent opening of diplomatic ties with the separatist republics in March 2008. Georgian military experts believed that the key task of the Georgian drones was to confirm the deployment of Buk missile systems in Abkhazia, while Tbilisi stated its use of drones was to engage in reconnaissance of Russian and Abkhaz military movements.IIFFMCG, Vol II, p. 200. Georgian Interior Ministry spokesperson Shota Utiashvili confirmed in May that the drones were "conducting reconnaissance of the Abkhaz territory to identify where the Russian and Abkhaz armed forces and military hardware are concentrated." Drone footage released on May 12 by the MIA showed what Tbilisi claimed to be movement and deployment of Russian troops and military equipment within the region. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) reported several drone flights over the Kodori Gorge, but could not confirm if those UAVs were of Russian or Georgian origin.IIFFMCG, Vol II, p. 200-201. Sokhumi continuously condemned drone flights over Abkhazia, claiming they were used to draw up maps for a potential Georgian attack scenario. A UNOMIG investigation found the Georgian drone flights to be in violation of the 1994 Moscow Ceasefire Agreement that banned military hardware, including for reconnaissance purposes, from the region. Even though the same investigation confirmed that illegal Russian military aid to Abkhaz separatists, Georgia suspended its drone flights over Abkhazia on May 30.
Several reports of Georgian drone flights over Abkhazia were made by separatist authorities in 2009, although Tbilisi vehemently denied them and independent reports could not confirm those allegations.
Journalist Nicholas Clayton later called the Russia-Georgia war "the world's first two-sided drone war", with Georgia's UAV capabilities surpassing Russia's outdated, Soviet-era fleet, with its Elbit Hermes 450 fleet inspired by the US-made General Atomics MQ-1 Predator. Georgia's advantage ended in 2009 when Israel started manufacturing drones for Russia.