The Battle of Isandlwana (alternative spelling: Isandhlwana) on 22 January 1879 was the second major encounter in the Anglo-Zulu War between the British Empire and the Zulu Kingdom – the Battle of Nyezane having been fought and won earlier on the same day by Colonel Pearson's Coastal Column. Eleven days after the British invaded the Zulu Kingdom in Southern Africa, a Zulu force of some 20,000 warriors attacked a portion of the British main column consisting of approximately 1,800 British, colonial and native troops with approximately 350 civilians.Knight (2002), p. 49, Knight gives a total of 1,768 combat troops, not including wagon drivers and other civilians, of which there were some 350, Colenso, p. 263 The Zulus were equipped mainly with the traditional assegai iron spears and cow-hide shields,Christon I. Archer World History of Warfare, Univ of Nebraska Pr, 2008, , p. 462 "They had a national army of 25,000 men equipped with cowhide shields, assegais and clubs." but also had a number of muskets and antiquated rifles.Smith-Dorrien, Chapter 1B "It was a marvellous sight, line upon line of men in slightly extended order, one behind the other, firing as they came along, for a few of them had firearms, bearing all before them." eyewitness account, emphasis addedIan Knight, Angus McBride Zulu 1816–1906, Osprey Publishing, 1995, , p. 25
The British and colonial troops were armed with the modern Martini–Henry breechloading rifle and two 7-pounder mountain guns deployed as field guns, as well as a Hale rocket battery. The Zulus had a vast disadvantage in weapons technology,Doyle, p. 118: "It was here ... the British Army suffered its worst ever defeat at the hands of a technologically inferior indigenous force." (emphasis added) but they greatly outnumbered the British and ultimately overwhelmed them,Morris, pp. 366–67 killing over 1,300 troops, including all those out on the forward firing line. The British were unprepared for the attack from the large Zulu contingent, which had moved quickly, and were attacked along the flanks by the Zulus using their traditional 'horns and chest of the buffalo' formation. The Zulu army suffered anywhere from 1,000 to 3,000 killed.Ian Knight Rorke's Drift 1879 Osprey Publishing, 1996, .
The battle was a victory for the Zulus and caused the defeat of the first British invasion of Zululand.Thompson, p. 75 "Thus ended the first British invasion of Zululand." Knight (2003), p. 27 Map titled: "First invasion of Zululand". The British Army had suffered its worst defeat against an indigenous foe equipped with vastly inferior military technology. Isandlwana resulted in the British taking a much more aggressive approach in the Anglo-Zulu War, leading to a heavily reinforced second invasion,Morris, pp. 498–511, Chapter 'The Second Invasion' and the destruction of King Cetshwayo's hopes of a negotiated peace.Spiers, p. 42, "... reports of the annihilation ... prompted the Cabinet to send reinforcements and galvanized interest in the war." Ian Knight, Zulu War, Osprey, 2004, p. 11, "The home government, embarrassed by Isandlwana, sought to restore British honour by despatching more reinforcements ..."
Background Following the scheme by which Lord Carnarvon had brought about the Confederation of Canada through the 1867 British North America Act, it was thought that a similar plan might succeed in South Africa and in 1877 Sir Henry Bartle Frere was appointed as High Commissioner for Southern Africa to instigate the scheme.Knight, Zulu War 1879, 2004, pp. 8, 15, 17, 68. Similarly, Lock & Quantrill, Zulu Victory, 2002, p. 23 and Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism: 1890–1902 (2nd ed. 1950) pp. 67–100. Some of the obstacles to such a plan were the presence of the independent states of the South African Republic and the Kingdom of Zululand, both of which the British Empire would attempt to overcome by force of arms.Knight (1992, 2002), p. 8.
Bartle Frere, on his own initiative, without the approval of the British governmentSpiers, p. 41Ian Knight, Zulu War, Osprey, 2004, p. 9, "By late 1878 Frere had manipulated a diplomatic crisis with the Zulus ..." and with the intent of instigating a war with the Zulu, had presented an ultimatum to the Zulu king Cetshwayo on 11 December 1878 with which the Zulu king could not possibly comply.Colenso, pp. 261–62, "the terms ... are evidently such as he (Cetshwayo) may not improbably refuse, even at the risk of war ... to preclude you from incurring the delay ... involved in consulting Her Majesty's Government upon a subject of so much importance as the terms ..." Also: Ian Knight, Zulu War, Osprey, 2004, p. 11, "... an ultimatum with which, Frere knew, they could not possibly comply." Doyle, p. 118, "... an impossible ultimatum ...". When the ultimatum expired a month later, Bartle Frere ordered Lord Chelmsford to proceed with an invasion of Zululand, for which plans had already been made.Morris, pp. 291–92
Prelude
Lord Chelmsford, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces during the war, initially planned a five-pronged invasion of Zululand consisting of over 16,500 troops in five columns and designed to encircle the Zulu army and force it to fight as he was concerned that the Zulus would avoid battle, slip around the British and over the Tugela, and strike at Natal. Lord Chelmsford settled on three invading columns with the main centre column, now consisting of some 7,800 men, under his direct command. The centre column comprised No. 3 Column, commanded by Colonel Richard Thomas Glyn, and Colonel Anthony Durnford's No. 2 Column.Colenso, pp. 263–64 gives 7,800: 1,752 Imperial and Colonial troops and 6,054 Native Contingent and 377 Conductors and Drivers for the No. 2 Column under Durnford and the No. 3 Column under Glyn which made up Chelmsford's Main Column. The strength of the entire invasion force is given as a total of 16,506 for the five columns: 6,669 Imperial and Colonial troops; 9,035 troops in the Native Contingent; 802 Drivers, etc. Chelmsford moved his troops from Pietermaritzburg to a forward camp at Helpmekaar, past Greytown. On 9 January 1879 they moved to Rorke's Drift, and early on 11 January commenced crossing the Buffalo River into Zululand.
The backbone of the British force under Lord Chelmsford consisted of twelve regular infantry companies: six each of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, the 24th Regiment of Foot (which was subsequently renamed the South Wales Borderers). These were regarded as hardened and reliable troops.The 24th Foot was an historically hard-fighting if hard-luck regiment. In 1741 it suffered heavy casualties at Cartagena; during the Seven Years' War it surrendered to the French at the Siege of Minorca in 1756 and was present at the defeat in the Battle of Saint Cast; it was surrendered at Saratoga by Burgoyne in 1777; it was captured at sea by the French in 1810; it suffered over 50 percent casualties at the Battle of Chillianwalla in 1846. Its depot was moved to Brecon in Wales in 1873 and so, by 1879, about 30% of the recruits were Welsh. In addition, there were approximately 2,500 local African auxiliaries of the Natal Native Contingent, many of whom were exiled or refugee Zulu. They were led by European officers, but were considered generally of poor quality by the British as they were prohibited from using their traditional fighting technique and inadequately trained in the European method as well as being indifferently armed. Also, there were some irregular colonial cavalry units, and a detachment of artillery consisting of six field guns and several Congreve rockets. cite is only for the Congreve rocket battery Adding on wagon drivers, camp followers and servants, there were around 4,700 men in the No. 3 Column,Colenso, pp. 263: 1,747 Imperial and Colonial Troops; 2,566 Native Contingent; 293 Drivers and around 3,100 men in the No. 2 Column that composed the main centre column. Colonel Anthony Durnford took charge of No. 2 Column with orders to stay on the defensive near the Middle Drift of the Tugela River. Because of the urgency required to accomplish their scheme, Bartle Frere and Chelmsford began the invasion during the rainy season. This had the consequence of slowing the British advance to a crawl.Colenso, pp. 264–66, 273, Chelmsford, 16 January: "No.3 Column cannot move forward eight miles ... for at least four days ..."
The Zulu army, while a product of a warrior culture, was essentially a militia force which could be called out in time of national danger.Ian Knight, Alan Perry. Rorke's Drift 1879 Pinned like rats in a hole, Osprey, 1996, , p. 11, "they were a part-time citizen army, and were armed primarily with traditional weapons." It had a very limited logistical capacity and could only stay in the field a few weeks before the troops would be obliged to return to their civilian duties.Ian Knight, Adam Hook, British Fortifications in Zululand 1879, Osprey, 2005, , p. 8 Zulu warriors were armed primarily with assegai thrusting spears, known in Zulu as iklwa, knobkierrie clubs, some throwing spears and shields made of cowhide.History of Warfare, by Christon I. Archer University of Nebraska Press, 2002, , p. 462 "They had a national army of twenty-five thousand men equipped with cowhide shields, assegais and clubs. Lock, p. 62, John Shepstone, Acting Secretary for Native Affairs at the time on the Zulu army – "Equipment: Each man carries his shield and assegais, and a kaross or blanket if he possesses one, he may also have a war dress of monkey skins or ox tails, this is all." The Zulu warrior, his regiment and the army drilled in the personal and tactical use and coordination of this weapons system. Some Zulus also had old muskets and antiquated rifles stockpiled, a relatively few of which were carried by Zulu impi. However, their marksmanship was very poor, quality and supply of powder and shot dreadful, maintenance non-existent and attitude towards firearms summed up in the observation that: "The generality of Zulu warriors, however, would not have firearms – the arms of a coward, as they said, for they enable the poltroon to kill the brave without awaiting his attack."Bourquin, S..Military History Journal, V. 4, No. 4, The Zulu Military Organization, South African Military History Society, , Dec. 1978 The British had timed the invasion to coincide with the harvest, intending to catch the Zulu warrior-farmers dispersed. Fortunately for Cetshwayo, the Zulu army had already begun to assemble at Ulundi, as it did every year for the First Fruits ceremony when all warriors were duty-bound to report to their regimental barracks near Ulundi.Colenso, p. 294
Cetshwayo sent the 24,000 strong main Zulu impi from near present-day Ulundi, on 17 January, across the White Umfolozi River with the following command to his warriors: "March slowly, attack at dawn and eat up the red soldiers."