The United States Marine Corps's Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, formerly Company, was a Marine Corps special operations capable forces of United States Marine and Hospital corpsman that performed clandestine operation preliminary pre–D-Day amphibious reconnaissance of planned beachheads and their littoral area within uncharted enemy territory for the joint-Navy/Marine force commanders of the Pacific Fleet during World War II. Often accompanied by Navy Underwater Demolition Teams and the early division recon companies, these amphibious recon platoons performed more reconnaissance missions (over 150) than any other single recon unit during the Pacific War.Bruce F. Meyers, Swift, Silent, and Deadly: Marine Amphibious Reconnaissance in the Pacific, 1942–1945, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004).
They are amongst the patriarch lineage of the Force Reconnaissance companies which still continue providing force-level reconnaissance for the latter Fleet Marine Force. Their countless efforts have contributed to the success of the joint-Marines/Army maritime landing forces assigned under the Navy fleet commanders during the island-hopping campaigns of the numerous atolls in the Pacific.
Their trademark of amphibious warfare techniques utilized insertion methods under the cover of darkness by rubber boats, patrol torpedo boats, Catalina flying boats, converted high speed destroyer transport ships, or APDs, and submarines for troop transports.Chief of Naval Operations, Dictionary of American Fighting Ships, Vols 1–7 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1968). These Marines applied skills in topographic and hydrographic surveys by charting and measuring water depths, submerged coral heads, and terrain inland; taking photographs and soil samples for permeability for amphibious tractors and landing craft parties.
Their assignments included artillery observer, clandestine operation, commando style raids in difficult to reach terrain (e.g. coastal, mountain forest), long-range penetration, military intelligence gathering, and reconnoitering or scouting a planned or potential landing site. These teams also evaluated the beaches looking for exits off the hostile beaches inland, for contingency measures if the Marine landing force were to necessitate a retreat. Most importantly, they compromised the locations of enemy forces, their strengths and weakness, and other importance in the follow-up of an amphibious assault.
Early history The United States' earliest doctrine in amphibious reconnaissance was introduced by naval intelligence officer Major Dion Williams, who divided preliminary reconnaissance between those concerned with the sea to the shoreline to be conducted by the naval beach demolition units, and those concerned with the beach and adjacent land, the recon Marines. Technical expertise was required in surveying, cartography, and recording observations, as well the ability to interpret various types of hydrographic and topological data from previous surveys.
Dion Williams stated— "In order to prepare intelligent plans for the attack or defense of a harbor or bay, it is necessary to have at hand a comprehensive description of the hydrographic features and accurate charts showing the depths of water at all points, the reefs, rocks, shoals, and peculiar currents which constitute dangers to navigation, and the tributary streams and channels which may form avenues of attack or furnish anchorages for a portion of the floating defenses or auxiliaries of the defenders."Dion Williams, USMC, Naval Reconnaissance, Instructions for the Reconnaissance of Bays, Harbors and Adjacent Country, (Wash, D.C.: GPO (1906).
American naval doctrine of 1927 continued to emphasize reconnaissance for planning as well as reconnaissance to verify the soundness of formulated plans and reconnaissance during the last phases.The Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, F.T.P. 155 dtd 1927, (Wash, D.C.: GPO, 1936). This three-stage concept of intelligence gathering remained in effect throughout World War II when the V Amphibious Corps directive listed the following phases of reconnaissance:
Prior to the completion of operation plans for landing, information is sought for preparation of plans in sufficient time prior to the operation to avoid the loss of secrecy which may be incurred by reconnaissance executed shortly prior to an attack. Between completion of plans for the landing and the actual embarkation of a landing force, further information necessary for the execution of the plan is collected such as late data on the enemy's strength arid dispositions. During the last days prior to Zero-D-Day or further information is sought of the enemy's dispositions and strength as well as movement of his reserves.V Amphibious Corps, Corps Training Memorandum Number 26-44, Reconnaissance in Amphibious Operations, dtd March 28, 1944; HistDiv, HQMC, Archives 62A-2086, Carton 20, File "Reconnaissance."
Early reconnaissance activities were generally confined to surveys of various ports, uncharted islands and contiguous waters performed by officers qualified in survey technique. Some nautical charts to this date of infrequently encountered areas and islands still bear annotations indicating they were compiled by officers of various American ships. The duty of an intelligence officer aboard American ships was usually filled by the senior Marine Corps officer aboard.
The most profound war prophet that lived was perhaps Lt. Colonel Earl H. Ellis. Ellis was a United States Marine Corps Intelligence Officer, and author of Operations Plan 712: Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, which became the basis for the American campaign of amphibious assault that defeated the Japanese in World War II. Ellis' prophetic study helped establish his reputation among the forefront of naval theorists and strategists of the era in amphibious warfare, foreseeing the eminent attack from Japan leading to the island-hopping campaigns in Central Pacific twenty years before the United States entered World War II. He is sometimes credited in being the 'first' recon Marine in the United States due to a secretive spy mission in the Pacific, reporting the build-up of Japanese naval forces.
Fleet Landing Exercises
During the Fleet Landing Exercises in the Caribbean in the late 1920s, Marines aboard the Navy vessels and submarines developed the joint-Navy/Marines' amphibious tactics. Most of the practiced beachhead landings amalgamated into what is known today as the Fleet Marine Force from the different types of units that became necessary for the Marine Corps to project itself to shore for the seizure of littoral areas of the world. Prior to the establishment of the United States Marine Corps' first division-sized organization, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet approved the training plan for the Fleet Marine Force in 1934 along the shores of Culebra, Vieques and Puerto Rico in a series of Fleet Landing Exercises, or FLEXs. Initially in the beginning of the exercises, the Marines and their equipment were transported by two US Navy battleships, the and Wyoming (BB-32), and one Navy transport ship, the . They made their beach landings from fifty-foot whaleboats, climbing down cargo nets hung over the sides while biplanes provided smoke screens. A-frames were built to lower cargo and heavy equipment into the whaleboats, such as artillery pieces and tactical vehicles.
As each year, the FLEX has made improvements and modifications, the Fleet Marine Force Headquarters were moved to San Diego, California, in 1936. By 1938, submarines from Submarine Squadron 11 were used for practice in covertly disembarking small, recon landing teams of Marines onto the beaches, providing intelligence of their opposing team during the exercises. By movement under darkness of the night, they paddled their aircraft-type rubber boats, deflating them once on shore and re-inflating them to rendezvous back to the submarine at an appointed location.W.H. McKelvy, Jr., CO Company F, 2nd Battalion 5th Marines, "Report of Operations during Puerto Rico Campaign, 2–3 March 1938. The Navy converted 'four-stacker' destroyer ships by removing two of the stacks and its boilers to provide spacious room for the Marines and their equipment. These modified ships were vintage old destroyers from the early 1920s, reclassified as high speed destroyer-transports, or APDs. By early World War II, the newer, faster and more modern class of destroyer escorts were substituted as an updated version class of APDs, which were later used extensively by the recon Marines and the Underwater Demolition Teams. Initially the recon teams paddled to shore until later, outboard motors were added. Plus, "Higgins Boats" and other modified landing crafts were introduced, towing the rubber crafts closer to shore.
Due to all the trial and error from the FLEXs, the 'Fleet Training Publication 167' was adopted as a proven doctrine for landing operations. Amphibious reconnaissance was expanded to include location of enemy defenses and their positions, its troops' strengths, weapons and obstacles. It also covered topography, hydrography and the ever-so important beach exits to permit the landing crafts to get off the beaches. Most of the material in the FTP 167 were also introduced and included in the 'Landing Force Manual': "... directed effort by personnel landed from seaward by any means to collect the information on a coastal area required for the planning and conduct of amphibious operations... a landing conducted by minor elements, involving stealth rather than force of arms for the purpose of securing information, followed by a planned withdrawal."
Organization
Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet
In December 1941, a joint-Army/Marine unit, the Observer Group, was formed as a specialized small-scale amphibious raiding party to conduct reconnaissance of the beachheads of Europe and North Africa, with Captain James Logan Jones as the commanding officer of the Observer Group. Jones's Group (Observer Group) was the first unit to be specifically trained as an amphibious reconnaissance asset in the United States military. By January 7, 1943, the Commanding General of Amphibious Corps, Major General Holland M. Smith disbanded the Observer Group and activated the Amphibious Reconnaissance Company, Expeditionary (Corps) Troops, Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet (ACPF), at Camp Elliott in California.
The new structure, however, still remained small as a company-size element as it consisted of a headquarters and service platoon and four reconnaissance platoons. Each of the recon platoons were commanded by a lieutenant and consisted of two six-man squads. These platoons were tailored with appropriate military attire and equipment for the amphibious patrol, which included light-weight armament, tennis shoes or other noiseless shoes, and no insignia worn on clothing. Other mission-essential equipment were knives, rope, and adhesive tape. The Table of Equipment (T/E) was only that which was essential and can be easily disposed. The total Company consisted of six officers and 92 enlisted Marines.Table of Organization, D-817, promulgated by Commandant of the Marine Corps ltr 2385-60, AO-246-vah, 21 December 1942.
One of the training areas used by the Company included the northernmost section of Camp Pendleton, Tent Camp 3, an area which not only provided excellent terrain for training, but a messing facility as well. This illegally constructed mess hall had been erected by the previous ACPF's XO, Jimmy Roosevelt (the son of the late president Franklin D. Roosevelt). When discovered by the higher echelon later, it almost cost James Jones a court-martial until it was disclosed that Jimmy Roosevelt had built it and the charges were dropped.