Operation Soberanía

Operación Soberanía (Operation Sovereignty) was a planned Argentine military invasion of territory disputed with Chile, and ultimately possibly of Chile itself, due to the Beagle conflict. The invasion was initiated on 22 December 1978 but was halted after a few hours and Argentine forces retreated from the conflict zone without a fight. Whether the Argentine infantry actually crossed the border into Chile has not been established. Argentine sources insist that they crossed the border.: …Yo de esto hablé una vez con un teniente coronel que era jefe de un regimiento en la cordillera y que cuenta que sus patrullas cruzaron la frontera y entraron en Chile… (Transl.:«I spoke once about this with a colonel-lieutenant who was a detachment chief in the mountains, and he told me that his patrols crossed the border and entered Chile…»)Beagle: historia secreta de la guerra que no fue in Argentine newspaper "La Nación" on 12 August 1996, stored in "Base de Datos SER en el 2000", retrieved on 30 August 2008: …«No restaba mucho tiempo: las primeras patrullas de infantería del Ejército pisaban ya suelo chileno…

In 1971, Chile and Argentina had agreed to binding arbitration by an international tribunal, under the auspices of the British Government, to settle the boundary dispute. On 22 May 1977 the British Government announced the decision, which awarded the Picton, Nueva and Lennox islands to Chile.

On 25 January 1978 Argentina rejected the decision and attempted to militarily coerce Chile into negotiating a division of the islands that would produce a boundary consistent with Argentine claims.David R. Mares, Natural Gas Pipelines in the Southern Cone , Mai 2004, Working Paper #29, p. 9, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Energy Forum, retrieved on 26 August 2008Alejandro Luis Corbacho, Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts, p. 6, retrieved 26 August 2008:«When it became clear that the Chileans wanted full acceptance of the [Court of Arbitration] resolution, the Argentine position hardened, and Argentina began to challenge the Chilean commitment to defend the territory»During a summit in Puerto Montt in February 1978 President of Argentina Jorge Videla threatened, See General Juan E. Gugliamelli: "Cuestión del Beagle. Negociación directa o diálogo de armas", (Spanish Language) compiled from articles in magazine "Estrategia", Buenos Aires Nr:49/50, January–February 1978: «… las negociaciones directas constituyen la única vía pacífica para solucionar el conflicto …» (Transl.:«…the direct negotiations are the only peaceful manner to resolve the conflict …»)Rubén Madrid Murúa, "La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978", p. 55: «Al no llegar a un acuerdo entre ambos países, comienza durante las diversas negociaciones, la tercera fase de su maniobra, pasando a una estrategia de la disuasión directa, efectuando para lo anterior actitudes de amedrentamiento, desplazamientos de fuerzas y aumento sistemático de las violaciones a los espacios aéreos y marítimos chilenos.»: (Transl.:«As the two nations didn't agree [to change the award], the third phase of the [Argentine] plan began, coming to a strategy of direct dissuasion, with intimidation, strong-arm tactics and a systematic air and maritime Chilean space violations»)

Date, objective and name of the operation According to Argentine sources, after the Argentine repudiation of the arbitration award in January 1978, the invasion plans were given different names depending on the planning level and phase.Website Histamar, Preludios de Acción Militar Conjunta, Una operación conjunta planificada durante el conflicto de 1978 por la soberanía de las islas del canal Beagle, by Alberto Gianola Otamendi, retrieved on 21 November 2012 Also, the targets of the invasion changed according to the political situation and to information about the Chilean defense: the target being first only the Picton, Nueva and Lennox islands, then the "little" Evout, Hoorn, Deceit and Barnevelt islands, then both groups of islands. Finally, on Friday 15 December 1978 Argentina's President Jorge Videla signed the order to invade on 21 December 1978 at 04:30 as the beginning of the invasion, but it was postponed to the next day because of the bad weather conditions in the landing zone.

Military imbalance At the time of the crisis, the Argentine military was substantially larger than that of Chile; in addition, the Chilean regime was more politically isolated and had suffered deteriorating relations with its main suppliers of arms. The Chilean military, however, had the advantage of defending difficult terrain, as well as being a more professional force,Kristina Mani, "Democratization and Strategic Thinking: What the Military in Argentina and Chile Learned in the 1990s", Columbia University, p. 7: ...that Chile had a significant defender’s advantage, given the professional quality of Chilean troops and well-developed supply and communications lines.Michael A. Morris, "The Strait of Magellan", Clemson University, South Carolina, USA, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 160: "Chile, nevertheless, benefits from considerable advantages in the far south, including good ports, control over the Strait of Magellan, as well as the Fuegian and Patagonian channels, branching off laterally from the strait, which gives Chile geographical and logistical advantages in the Drake Passage."Karl Hernekamp , "Der argentinisch-chilenisch Grenzstreit am Beagle-Kanal", p. 84: "Umgekehrt hätte für Chile positiv zu Buche geschlagen die von militärischen Fachleuten als allgemein höher bewertete Kampfkraft der chilenischen Streitkräfte." (translation: "On the other hand, in accordance with the military experts, Chile was benefited of the higher combat strength of the armed forces")The reputation built upon professionalism of the Chilean armed forces impressed the observer since the end of the War of the Pacific. On 5 November 1900, 78 years prior, in a similar strained situation, Julio de Arellano, Minister Plenipotentiary of Spain in Buenos Aires informed to his government in Madrid about the danger of a war between Chile and Argentina. About the strength of the forces told: La Républica Argentina es, sin duda, el estado más rico de Sud América, su marina es más fuerte en número y en calidad de buques que la de Chile, posee elementos de guerra para armar un ejército de 300.000 hombres y en sus arsenales y depósitos militares, se ha gastado y se gasta sin reparar en cifras con tal de que se hayen provistos de armamento de último modelo; pero en este país se carece de homogeneidad de población que caracteriza a Chile ... donde es unánime la exaltación patriótica y donde ha podido formarse un Ejército, que los oficiales alemanes proclaman comparable en su organización y cualidades al mejor de Europa (See Pedro Santos Martínez, "Documentos Diplomáticos sobre historia argentina, 1850–1954"), Tomo V: 1890–1909. Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Históricas "Cuyo", Mendoza, 2002, , pág. 124, documento nr.:368 while decades of intervention by the Argentine armed forces in day-to-day politics had degraded their professional skills.Interview with General Martin Balza for the Chilean newspaper La Tercera on 21 December 2001: "Estoy convencido [that Chile would have won the war], por razones que he expuesto en mis libros "Dejo constancia" (2001) y "Malvinas, gesta e incompetencia" (2003). Ahí expreso cuál era la situación de las Fuerzas Armadas, fundamentalmente del Ejército, en 1982.... [En 1978] Chile estaba en unas inmejorables condiciones, porque la defensa es muy fuerte, sobre todo cuando se puede actuar mediante la dinámica propia, que no margina reacciones ofensivas dentro de la concepción defensiva."

There was considerable international condemnation of the Chilean regime's human rights record, with the United States expressing particular concern after Orlando Letelier's 1976 assassination in Washington D.C., though the U.S. had helped to install the Pinochet administration initially. The United States banned the export of weapons to Chile through the Kennedy Amendment, later International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976."Published Airpower Journal", Spring 1999, "US Arms Transfer Policy for Latin America Lifting the Ban on Fighter Aircraft" , Dr. Frank O. Mora, Lt. Col. Antonio L. Palá, USAF: «The 1976 Arms Export Control Act, proposed by Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.), began to limit presidential ability to transfer weapons to other nations by giving the United States Congress veto power over sales and extending the notification period to 30 days. Against the wishes of the Ford administration, several countries were placed under even tighter restrictions based on their human rights records. Such was the case with Chile in 1976 under Public Law 94-329. This legislation, commonly referred to as the Kennedy Amendment, prohibited security assistance, military training, and arms sales to Gen Augusto Pinochet’s repressive military regime in Chile» cited from US Code, vol. 22, sec. 2370 (1976). in Argentine newspaper "La Nacion" on 27 August 2009. (retrieved 27 August 2009): La enmienda impedía vender armas a Chile hasta que se verificaran tres condiciones: un progreso significativo en el respeto de los derechos humanos en ese país; garantías de que la dictadura de Pinochet no encubriría a terroristas internacionales y que, por lo tanto, iba a juzgar a los implicados en el asesinato de Letelier, y que la venta del armamento fuera de interés nacional para Estados Unidos. 16 Northrop F-5's were delivered to Chile before the embargo took effect, but they arrived without any armament."Chileans Try an Air Force Their Way". The New York Times, 9 July 1988: «When the embargo took effect, the Chilean Air Force had just taken delivery of 16 Northrup-built F-5s…» In 1980 Chile was excluded from UNITAS joint naval maneuvers because of human rights violations.UNITAS. globalsecurity.orgMichael Morris, «The Strait of Magellan», published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 1989, p. 128 Germany,Der Spiegel on 6 March 1978: «… seit 1974 verhalf Bonn zudem den Streitkräften fast aller südamerikanischen Meeresanrainer (Ausnahme: Chile) zu stärkerer Seetüchtigkeit…» (Transl.:«since 1974 Bonn [Germany] strengthened the navies of all South American coastal states (exception: Chile)») AustriaHistoria general de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina by Andrés Cisneros y Carlos Escudé in cema : «… en el mismo mes de junio de 1981, la Argentina adquirió 57 tanques austríacos, operación que generó los recelos del lado chileno, pues en 1980 el mismo país proveedor de esos tanques les negó a los militares trasandinos la compra de 100 unidades …» (Transl.:«on juni 1981 Argentina bought 57 austrian tanks, this operation arouse suspicion on the Chilean side because 1980 Austria refused to sell 100 tanks to Chile») and the United Kingdom"The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964: To Secure Our Rightful Share", Mark Phythian, published by Manchester University Press, 2000, , , 352 pp., (pp. 105 ff). The UK signed contracts prior to the Coup d'État for delivery of 7 Hawker Hunter aircraft, two s ( and ), two s (O'Brien and Hyatt), spare parts and the overhaul of Hawker Hunter turbines. The James Callaghan government delivered the vessels, submarines and planes behind schedule and the aero-engines and the submarine spare parts were "blacked" by the unions until October 1978 as they were removed from the East Kilbride plant by a combination of police, haulage contractors, sheriff's officers and Chilean representatives: