The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted operations in Vietnam from the 1950s to the mid 1970s, before and during the Vietnam War. After the 1954 Geneva Conference, North Vietnam was controlled by communist forces under Ho Chi Minh's leadership. South Vietnam, with the assistance of the U.S., was anti-communist under Ngo Dinh Diem's leadership. The economic and military aid supplied by the U.S. to South Vietnam continued until 1975. The CIA participated in both the political and military aspect of the wars in Indochina. The CIA provided suggestions for political platforms, supported candidates, and instituted the Phoenix Program. It also worked with the ethnic minority Montagnards, Hmong, and Khmer. There are 174 National Intelligence Estimates dealing with Vietnam, issued by the CIA after coordination with the U.S. intelligence community.
Vietnam 1945–1947 Through 1954, Vietnam was part of French Indochina, along with Laos and Cambodia. During World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army occupied Indochina and remained there until 1945, when the Axis powers were defeated. Revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh forces had conducted some guerrilla activity against the Japanese, but on too small a scale to have had any significant role in the defeat of Japan or the removal of Japanese forces from Indochina. Following the war, France began to reoccupy Indochina and reassert its former dominance. Much of this can be traced back to a desire to restore French glory and national pride after the humiliation the nation suffered during the course of World War II. The French also wished to reclaim Indochina to regain control over its valuable rubber plantations, mostly in northeastern Cochinchina (the area north of Saigon) and eastern Cambodia.
During the period of French colonization beginning in the late 19th century, many Vietnamese had experienced abuses and exploitation. French Indochina in World War II underwent significant political changes, and nationalist sentiment intensified. In 1945, the U.S. OSS provided the communist-led Viet Minh with training and weapons to develop local intelligence networks against the Japanese. The Viet Minh downplayed its communist core, outsmarting the OSS, to conceal Ho Chi Minh's ties to international communism while suggesting that the new Vietnamese government wanted to maintain connections with the United States, France, and other Western countries, although in reality he had no such intention and sought an alliance with the Soviet Union.
Vietnam 1950–1954 The US recognized the anticommunist State of Vietnam in February 1950. CIA officers then moved to French Indochina as a part of the legation of the United States in the city of Saigon. After their arrival, CIA involvement expanded to a new large base in Hanoi. The CIA's activities in Vietnam did not grow any further due to the French discouraging CIA activity (the French were still clinging to the idea that they could one day still dominate Vietnam and the U.S. was against this course of action).Bernstein, Marc D. "Ed Lansdale's Black Warfare in 1950s Vietnam." HistoryNet. World History Group, 26 Apr. 2016. Web. 08 May 2017.
The CIA held classified documents which detail the threat of the Viet Cong or the Vietnamese Communists against the French. The CIA feared the loss of control of Vietnam. They wished for the French to remain in power. The six-page document from 1950, explains the position of the Central Intelligence Agency on Indochina. While the Viet Cong was trying to expel France from power in Vietnam, there was also a fear that there would be an intervention from the Chinese Communists. Regardless of this, the CIA knew that losing Vietnam to Communism would place the rest of Southeast Asia at risk.
CIA involvement in Vietnam was discouraged by the French because it was found that the CIA would often bypass them to open channels to Vietnamese nationalists. CIA activity expanded when the Indochina region became three separate states and grew exponentially during the French War in 1953 to 1954 when France was essentially forced to accept American assistance with unconventional warfare activities.
Despite this resilience by the French, CIA intelligence perceived a deteriorating situation in Vietnam. A 1950 CIA intelligence report noted that the threat of Communism in Indochina was rising as rebel attacks on French outposts continued and highlighted the weaknesses of the French. An intelligence report on Indochinese military developments revealed how vulnerable the French military was, due to the fall of the French border holding at Dong Khe, as well as some attacks they had suffered in Tonkin. The report doubted France's ability to hold Indochina much longer if the Viet Minh continued to attack. The authors of the report feared that, "if these attacks [were to] develop into a coordinated, a large-scale Viet Minh offensive, an action which [might] soon be within Viet Minh capabilities, French maintenance of control over Indochina – by means of their own forces alone – [would] be seriously threatened." This document also noted French hesitancy to bolster the Viet Minh, "apparently fearing that such a step would weaken their ability to contain Vietnamese nationalism."
U.S. intelligence community notes how cautious the French were in arming a Vietnamese army. The report further claimed that "French reluctance to expand or strengthen the Vietnamese National Army is indicated by insistence on allocation and distribution of U.S. military aid under French control, failure to make plans for necessary financing, inability of French officials to agree on a course of action or policy, and refusal to expand the local militia." Additionally, the French officially refused to accept help from the U.S. in the form of training Vietnamese troops by U.S. military instructors. There is a suggestion at the end of the report that the French would need to accept American aid to train the Vietnamese army and to supply them, if they wanted to change their policy of arming the Vietnamese.
During 1953–1954, the involvement of the CIA increased when the French finally accepted U.S. assistance with the unconventional (guerrilla) warfare tactics they faced, as the French were facing large and costly losses at the hands of what would become the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese forces. The primary aid initially offered by the U.S. was military aid in supplying military hardware and training of the Vietnamese army; the scope of U.S. aid to the French was greatly expanded during and after the Eisenhower administration. Without aid from the United States, there would be little practical effect from this ostensible change in French policy.
There was a reestablishment of a covert action section in Saigon Station. There was also unilateral covert action which was suspended in 1953 under State Department pressure. This was due to the French exposing paramilitary operations against the Vietminh in Ha Noi that the agency did not previously clear with them.
The CIA's mission in Saigon was to directly assess the nationalist politicians.Sanitized text released in 2009. URL=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB284/1-CIA_AND_THE_GENERALS.pdf The primary cause and motivation behind the intervention of the U.S. and CIA through 1954 was to gather intelligence and provide interpretations of the events that occurred in Indochina through an American perspective. Outside of North Vietnam, the agency's broad span of activities reached into almost every aspect of the Indochina war. The agency conducted several paramilitary programs and conducted a full-scale war in Laos and South Vietnam.
Following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, the United States anticipated the expansion of Communism in Vietnam and Southeast Asia as a whole, if they should sit aloof and keep to the French resilience of not needing their support.Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., CIA and The General: Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam (CIA Declassified History, Approved for released, February 2009), pp.1 The CIA became convinced that without any action the southern part of Vietnam would fall to the communist control just as the North had been captured by the communist forces. The CIA without the approval of the State, supported Diem to step up a strong foothold in the Vietnamese region in the same year. The CIA's support for Diem could be traced to 1952, through an established relationship with his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu.Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., CIA and The General: Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam (CIA Declassified History, Approved for released, February 2009), pp. 21 to 31. The move by the CIA was purposely aimed to wean the southern part from the Communist-controlled north through the 17th parallel. In order to prevent the North Communist military from gaining control over the entire Vietnamese region, the CIA and Diem's Special Forces established the rural self-defense units to mark the beginning of American counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam. For the immediate nine years, the CIA will continue to work closely with Ngo Dinh Nhu to aid Diem in establishing national political institutions in South Vietnam.Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., CIA and The General: Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam (CIA Declassified History, Approved for released, February 2009), pp. 1
Vietnam 1954 In 1954, the CIA would remain consistent in its activities in Vietnam. The CIA's expansion included various stations throughout Vietnam and Laos. A station was also located in Cambodia, but relations with that country were broken off in 1963 and reinstated only during the 1970s. The CIA stations, though initially used solely for gathering intelligence and providing interpretations of events in Indochina, came to gain as much importance as the U.S. embassy in its scale of political relations with the South Vietnamese government due to its broad range of activities. The CIA stations in Vietnam were also responsible for conducting a full-scale war in Laos at that time in addition to South Vietnam paramilitary operations.
In 1961, the U.S. government entrusted the CIA with irregular operations in Laos with the intent of negotiated settlement. In Vietnam, U.S. Army Special Forces teams were engaged in tribal programs similar to the one with Vang Pao. However, the CIA was in operation control because any deployment of Vietnam-based units to or across the Laotian border would be clandestine. The CIA was instructed by Washington to make decisions and which indigenous elements would participate.
Another key event that occurred in 1954 was the creation of the Geneva Accords. Signed by France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and three Associated States of Indochina including Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Accords addressed the issue of what to do with Vietnam since the Viet Minh had ended colonial rule in the north. Although the United States had agreed to respect the Accords, it would not sign them because the U.S. government disagreed with the provision that split Vietnam at the 17th parallel."Geneva Conference begins." History.com. A&E Television Networks, n.d. Web. 08 May 2017. These Accords would come to play a major role in the United States' decision to interfere with the situation in Vietnam. The U.S. government had provided the French with logistical support in their mission to defeat the Viet Minh. It was only a matter of time, however, before the French needed military support as well. Essentially, the Geneva Accords forced the United States to decide if it was willing to provide such assistance. As historian Thomas L. Ahern Jr stated, "In the end, the importance of halting Communism overshadowed the risks, and the United States embarked on its 21-year effort to create in South Vietnam a permanent barrier to Communist expansion in Southeast Asia."
Covert action