The Congo, short for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is an equatorial country located in central Africa. As of July 2018, the CIA World Factbook lists the Congo containing over 85 million inhabitants representing over 200 African ethnic groups. French is the country's official language, and Catholics comprise the largest religious group at fifty percent. The Congo was colonized by King Leopold II of Belgium in 1885, and known as Belgian Congo until it gained independence. Both the Soviet Union and United States had kept a close watch on the mineral-rich country until on June 30, 1960, the Congo finally gained independence under the democratically elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Lumumba was a charismatic nationalist who led the only party in parliament with a nationwide base, rather than a regional or ethnic base.

Before the independence of the Congo, the U.S. government attempted to facilitate the election of a pro-western government by identifying and supporting individual pro-U.S. leaders.

After independence, the Central Intelligence Agency plotted to assassinate Lumumba by poisoning him, but the plan was not carried out. Lumumba was eventually killed on January 17, 1961, at the age of thirty-five near Élisabethville, Katanga. Scholars debate whether or not the CIA was involved in Lumumba's murder. The CIA was notably involved in a campaign against Lumumba's successor, which led to his eventual imprisonment and long exile from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The CIA was also a vital part of the United States' efforts to aid Joseph Mobutu, who took control of the Congo in 1965 and renamed the country Zaire and himself Mobutu Sese Seko. The CIA would work heavily with Mobutu, particularly in relation to American support for the National Liberation Front of Angola and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

1960

The independent Republic of the Congo was declared on 30 June 1960, with Joseph Kasa-Vubu as president and Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister. The Republic of the Congo was originally a colony of Leopold II of Belgium that was established in 1885. It shared a name with the neighboring Republic of the Congo to the west, a French colony that also gained independence in 1960; the two were differentiated by also stating the name of the relevant capital city—Congo (Léopoldville) versus Congo (Brazzaville).

From the beginning of the Congo's independence, the CIA was running operations in the country to "...stabilize the government and minimize communist influence in a strategically vital, resource-rich location in central Africa." According to a report regarding the CIA's activities in the Congo from 1960 to 1968, CIA operations "comprised activities dealing with regime change, political action, propaganda, air and marine operations, and arms interdiction, as well as support to a spectacular hostage rescue mission." During the heights of the Cold War in 1960s, Congo was regarded as strategically important to US and Western interests. This was due to its size and natural resources. The Chief of CIA Africa Division in June 1960 said, "If Congo deteriorates and Western influence fades rapidly, the bloc will have a feast and will not need to work very hard for it".

United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower was concerned at activities occurring in postcolonial Africa. During a meeting with senior advisors in August 1960 he stated that he felt Communists succeeded in convincing people worldwide that they were concerned for the common man while portraying the United States as dedicated to supporting outmoded regimes. Newly elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was seen by the United States as a potential communist by Congo station chief Larry Devlin. Devlin ultimately identified him as a target for covert action. Lumumba was a nationalist and claimed neutrality in terms of the Cold War. After the rebellions of the Katanga and South Kasai provinces, Lumumba requested US military support in putting down the rebellion. The Eisenhower administration declined this request while United Nations peacekeepers were deployed in an effort to prevent a full-scale civil war. Given the UN would not help Lumumba put down the rebellion, he requested support from the Soviet Union, which provided him the Congo military with air transportation. The new relationship with the Soviets marked Lumumba as an enemy of the CIA.CIA.gov > The UN instead intervened in the Congo, however was unfit and truly not designed for forceful military or clandestine intelligence support. A CIA report from September 1960 described Lumumba as a "demagogic speaker" who was emotionally convinced it was his duty to unify Congo through a strong central government. This report illustrated the CIA's belief that the Soviet Union was attempting to undercut the United Nations by providing Lumumba aid outside UN channels in exchange for Lumumba being the Soviet's tool. Lumumba continued to maintain that his interests were those of the Congolese majority, and described himself as a nationalist. Classified CIA cables from Leopoldville to the head of the CIA report the view of the CIA (that Lumumba was involved with Communists), as follows:The Embassy and station believed that Congo was experiencing a takeover by the communists. The forces that were working on this were the Soviets communist party. It was difficult to determine what the key influencing factors were in order to see the struggle for power. Even though Lumumba may or may not have been playing the communists in order to gain power and with the Anti-west forces increasing their power, there wasn't enough time to try and avoid the same results as with Cuba.Loch K. Johnson, Strategic Intelligence: Covert Action-Behind the Veils of Secret Foreign Policy (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009).Despite Lumumba's statements, Washington was unconvinced and becoming concerned that he was too close to the Soviets. If left in power, Washington feared Congo would fall into chaos and turn communist. According to a document released by the CIA, many Congolese had traveled to Belgium, in order to make contact with members of the Belgium Communist Party. Though Lumumba was not listed as one of the Congolese in Belgium, it was reported that he had accepted financial support from the Belgium Communist Party. Another CIA document identified around three hundred active Soviet personnel in the Congo. The Soviet personnel included flight crews, medical teams, truck technicians and diplomatic personnel. Based on the document, in July 1960, Lumumba was identified as speaking to a Soviet ambassador in New York and the topic of weapons was discussed. In addition, the report highlighted that two Soviet merchant ships were active in the Congo, both of which contained food and medical supplies. The report also stated that the Soviet Union offered economic aid in exchange for Congolese copper.

According to an NSC declassified briefing from July 1960, the remaining Belgian occupied bases were assisting in keeping order in the Congo. One of the most important provinces was the Katanga as it was the richest and supplied, "two-thirds of total value of Congo's mineral production-all Congo's copper (7% of world production), cobalt (60% world production), manganese, zinc, cadmium, germanium, and uranium." Belgium troops had pulled back on two bases except in Katanga. It is said that the unwillingness from the Belgian government to withdraw from their bases was in hopes that Lumumba would eventually be willing to negotiate for semi-autonomous provinces. In another declassified report, it was said that even after August 30, (Belgian troops withdrawal date) the Belgians were planning on keeping their presence in the form of "technicians."

In August 1960, to then-CIA director Allen Dulles, "We conclude that [Lumumba's] removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this should be a high priority of our covert action". Dulles later rescinded his statement in 1962, admitting, "I think that we overrated the Soviet danger, let's say, in the Congo". Some scholars speculate that Allen Dulles was a "reluctant assassin", citing his hesitance to implement the mandate of President Eisenhower. Dulles seemed too reluctant, though he had just ordered the assassination plan of Fidel Castro and would go on to approve another assassination program. However, Dulles’ nebulous beliefs about the nature of Soviet influence in the Congo is discernible from several reports Dulles generated concerning communist subversion around the world. In a report from June 2, 1961, just several months after the assassination of Lumumba, Dulles emphasized the CIA's “Bloc policy” which denoted all nations pulled into the Soviet orbit. Dulles believed that the destruction of the “system of colonialism” was the first step to defeat the “Free World.”Allen Dulles. "Foreign Policy Report: On Understanding and Coping with Communist Bloc Policy in West Africa" accessed from the Allen W. Dulles Papers https://findingaids.princeton.edu/collections/MC019.09/c034 The overestimation of Soviet influence in the Congo was not solely a result of intelligence collections, but stemmed from the wider belief that all nations who were even remotely associated with the Soviet Union or China would fall to Communism. The Congo was another piece of the wall against Communism and the CIA was determined to ensure Western loyalty. In the report Dulles stated, “It requires little imagination to perceive the strategic damage to the Western position should the [Communist] Bloc obtain a major foothold on the African continent. As a small example, it is fair to say that the success of our Congo policy to date is in large measure due to the inability of the Bloc to [get supplies in and out of the Congo].” Any hesitation to assassinate leaders, like Lumumba, was overridden by a wider policy for the African subcontinent. The Congo was simply another nation that the CIA could not afford to lose in the wider game of the Cold War. As a result, hesitation in any decisions became moot once those decision went into effect.

Congo scholars and US officials expressed their doubts that Soviets were a threat to Lumumba. According to Foreign Affairs, CIA intervention was based on "an over-hyped analysis of the communist threat". According to scholars Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick, Lumumba was portrayed as a proud nationalist and Pan-Africanist in CIA and State Department analyses, striving for neutrality in the Cold War. Agency heads as well as President Eisenhower, however, "disregarded this intelligence".

The initial plan to remove Lumumba would start with Congo's then-president, Joseph Kasavubu, to dissolve the government after a vote of no confidence from two opposition senators, subsidized by the CIA and Belgian intelligence officials. One of the senators would then replace Lumumba as the new prime minister. Attempts to remove Lumumba through street demonstrations, labor movements, and propaganda were funded by the CIA.

However, two days before the vote was to be held, Kasa-Vubu fired Lumumba, who responded with his refusal to withdraw from the government and continued domination of parliament.

Later in his term, which lasted only 10 weeks, the CIA began to orchestrate plans for Lumumba's assassination. The CIA's program was focused on removing Lumumba, but not only through the option of assassination. A declassified CIA document details how a redacted individual was instructed to assassinate Lumumba via poison. There is no evidence that the CIA ever attempted to follow through on the plan to poison Lumumba.