Lieutenant General Sir John Dudley Lavarack, (19 December 1885 – 4 December 1957) was an Australian Army officer who was the first Australian-born Governor of Queensland, serving from 1 October 1946 to 4 December 1957.
Early life
Lavarack was born in Kangaroo Point, a suburb of Brisbane in Queensland, on 19 December 1885. He was educated at Brisbane Grammar School, where he excelled in the school's army cadets program.
Military career First World War On 7 August 1905, Lavarack was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Royal Australian Artillery.
In early 1913, he trained as an officer at the Staff College, Camberley in England, and upon the outbreak of the First World War was assigned first to the War Office as a general staff officer, grade 3 (GSO3), then in February 1915 as a brigade major of the 22nd Division artillery. Lavarack's division spent a month in France during September 1915, but was transferred to Salonica in Greece, where it fought in the Balkans Campaign.D. M. Horner, Lavarack, Sir John Dudley (1885–1957), Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 15, Melbourne University Press, 2000, pp 61–63.
In February 1915, Lavarack was assigned to the Australian Imperial Force, but did not join it until July 1916 when he joined the Australian 2nd Division for the Battle of Pozières. He was subsequently assigned as brigade major for the 5th Division, commanding two field artillery batteries during fighting at the Somme and the advance on the Hindenburg Line. In May 1917, his staff college training saw him transferred to 1st Division headquarters, which instigated a lifelong mutual antagonism between Lavarack and his superior at HQ, Thomas Blamey.
By December 1917, Lavarack was a lieutenant colonel and general staff officer, 1st grade, in the Australian 4th Division, and took part in battles at Dernancourt, Villers-Bretonneux, Hamel and Amiens, with Lavarack's hand in planning for the Battle of Hamel setting the stage for several subsequent Australian victories.
Between the wars After the war, Lavarack returned to Australia, where he took up a post at the Royal Military College, Duntroon. In 1926, he was promoted to brevet colonel, and in 1927 attended the Imperial Defence College in London. Back in Australia in 1929, he found himself in heavy debate with fellow IDC student Frederick Shedden over the Australian government's adoption of the "Singapore strategy". Shedden believed that the presence of the British Royal Navy in Singapore would deter any aggression from Japan, whilst Lavarack was sure that Japan would take advantage of Britain's focus on Europe and that Australian ground forces should prepare for a possible invasion.Dennis, Peter: Heading for Disaster? Australia and the Singapore Strategy, Four Corners (Australian Broadcasting Corporation), 16 February 2002. In 1928, Lavarack was ordered to start making plans for a possible war with Japan, which he began with a paper questioning the Singapore Strategy and argued that the Australian Army needed "mobile land forces" to counter a Japanese invasion or raids. In a paper written in 1929, Lavarack predicted that Japan would only attack the British empire if Britain were involved in a major European war, which would put into question the entire assumptions behind the Singapore strategy, namely that the British would be able to move the main battle fleet to Singapore in the event of a Japanese threat.
In January 1933, Lavarack was made commandant of the Royal Military College, Duntroon. On 21 April 1935, with a temporary promotion to major general (later made permanent in June), he was appointed Chief of the General Staff (CGS), the head of the Australian Army. As CGS, Lavarack pulled no punches over what he saw as an over-reliance on the Royal Navy and neglect of Australia's land forces—renewing his argument with Shedden, and causing considerable friction with the Australian government, in particular a number of successive ministers for Defence.
In 1931, Japan seized the Manchuria region of China and throughout the 1930s the Japanese grew increasingly strident in insisting all of the Asia-Pacific region belonged to Japan. Australia's defence strategy was based around the Singapore Strategy, where it was envisioned in the threat of trouble from Japan that Britain would send the majority of the British battle fleet to Singapore, the main British naval base in Asia, to block any Japanese advance into southeast Asia. Lavarack had serious doubts about how practical it would be to activate the Singapore strategy, and wrote in 1935 that his motto was "trust in the navy, but keep your powder dry". He was critical of the Royal Australian Navy as he wrote that with the RAN did "not think it necessary to have any powder of their own, much less keep it dry". Much to the displeasure of several Defence ministers, Lavarack argued that the Australian Army needed a mobile force to defend Australia against a Japanese invasion, an issue which was overruled on. The Minister of Defence, Senator George Pearce, ruled that the Australian Army was to concentrate on coastal defence and build several batteries of coastal artillery at and near major cities such as Sydney, Brisbane, and Fremantle, which was done more to reassure the public than anything else. Lavarck charged that unwillingness of the government to buy anti-aircraft guns negated the coastal artillery batteries as he argued that the Japanese would take out the batteries via air strikes before bringing their ships within range of the coastal artillery. He strongly argued that the best defense for Australia was a highly mobile Army that would be able to meet the Japanese whatever they landed, instead of assuming that the Japanese would land at Sydney, Brisbane and Fremantle. The Australian cabinet believed that the British claims that Singapore was a massive fortress that the Japanese could never take, and as such the Japanese would never attempt an invasion of Australia with the Royal Navy operating out of Singapore. At most, it was felt that the Japanese were only capable of naval raids, and the Imperial Japanese Navy would never send capital ships so far south as long as Singapore held out. By contrast, Lavarack argued that the Australian Army needed more officers trained in staff work; more equipment and that the militia needed more training as he thought that the assumptions behind the Singapore strategy were flawed.
Second World War In 1938, British officer Lieutenant General Ernest Squires was appointed Inspector-General of the Australian Military Forces. Lavarack and Squires worked together to prepare Australia for war, and by the time Lavarack returned from a tour of Britain, the Second World War had begun. During the debates about the proper defence policy to be followed, Blamey won the favor of the government by praising "the efficacy of their plans", which was a more congenial argument for the government than Lavarack's stark warnings that Australia was exposed to an invasion. One of the few ministers in the cabinet, the former prime minister Billy Hughes was now serving as minister for external affairs stated at a meeting of the Council of Defence "...whether anyone could show that Singapore was impregnable or could be made so. If it proved vulnerable, and we were relying upon Singapore to keep the enemy at a distance, we were certainly living in a fool's paradise". At a meeting in February 1938 of the Council of Defense, Blamey stated it was "reasonable to assume an invasion was unlikely" while Lavarack argued that Japan was "prepared to take risks" and an invasion was possible. At another meeting of the Council of Defence in March 1939, Blamey and Lavarack clashed again about whatever Japan would make raids upon the Australian coast or launch an invasion along with debates just how ready the Militia was for war. Shedden, the Defence Secretary much preferred Blamey's views to Lavarack's, and in 1939 used his considerable influence to ensure that Blamey had command of the 2nd Australian Imperial Force.
With Squires replacing him as CGS, Lavarack was promoted to lieutenant general and made General Officer Commanding Southern Command. In 1940, Lavarack was considered to command 6th Division, but Thomas Blamey, now the commander of I Corps, refused his appointment, citing "defects of character". Lavarack instead took command of the newly formed 7th Division, also accepting a demotion to major general which was almost certainly instigated by Blamey. Blamey and Lavarack strongly disliked each other. In 1925, Blamey was serving as the commissioner of the Victoria State Police, and a scandal erupted when during a police raid on a Fitzroy brothel his badge was found on the premises. Blamey always insisted that his badge had been stolen, but Lavarack expressed the viewpoint that the reason why Blamey's badge was found in a brothel was because Blamey had been visiting the brothel. The British commander-in-chief in the Middle East, General Sir Archibald Wavell, had selected the 7th Division under Lavarack to be the first Australian division to go to Greece, which caused a notable dispute between Wavell vs. Blamey who insisted that the 6th Australian division to be the first to go to Greece as he claimed that the 6th Division was the one most ready to face the Wehrmacht. As Blamey was the senior Australian general in the Middle East, Wavell bowed to his wishes to have the 6th Division be the first to go to Greece, though many believed that the real reason for Blamey's objections was that he disliked Lavarack.
In 1941, Wavell ordered Lavarack to Tobruk, where his units were successful in repelling Erwin Rommel's forces. At the beginning of April 1941, Lavarack was supervising the embarkation of the 7th Division at Alexandria upon ships intended to take his division to Greece, when Wavell ordered him to stop the embarkation and send the 7th Division to the Western Desert, where the Afrikakorps had advancing rapidly. At a conference in Cairo on 6 April 1941, Wavell decided if the Australians could hold Tobruk, the advance of the Afrikakorps towards Alexandria could be stopped as Rommel would need the port of Tobruk to bring in supplies to continue his advance. As the 9th Australian Division was the force selected to hold Tobruk, Wavell thought it best to have an Australian general in command in the Western Desert and chose Laverack. On 7 April 1941, Wavell informed Lavarack that the 2nd British Armoured Division had lost most of its tanks and the 9th Australian Division had been ordered back to Tobruk. On 8 April, Wavell and Lavarack visited Tobruk to meet General Leslie Morshead, the GOC of the 9th Australian Division. Lavarack reported to Wavell that the Tobruk had enough supplies to withstand a siege for at least four months; that morale was high among the Australian troops; and the defensive works around Tobruk could withstand a siege. Wavell like Morshead preferred to hold the inner defensive line around Tobruk, known as the Blue Line, but Lavarack chose the longer 28-mile long outer defensive line known as the Red Line under the grounds it was the stronger line. Wavell requested Lavarack take command of the Western Desert Force, but he was once again confounded by Blamey, who insisted that he was unsuitable for high command. After further successes in the Syria-Lebanon campaign, Lavarack was re-promoted to lieutenant general, and took over Blamey's role as commander of I Corps, with Blamey now deputy commander-in-chief in the Middle East.