The policy of the Soviet Union towards the Iran–Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 varied, beginning with a stance of strict neutrality before moving towards massive military support for Iraq in the final phase of the war. The war was inconvenient for the Soviet Union, which had aimed to ally itself with both Iran and Iraq. At the start of the war, the Soviets declared a policy of strict neutrality towards the two countries, while urging a negotiated peace. Iraq had been an ally for decades, and the Soviets had tried to win over Iran as well, but both the pro-Western Shah and later Ayatollah Khomeini rebuffed their offers of friendship. After the Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Republic adopted the slogan "neither East nor West."

In 1982, the war turned in Iran's favor, and Khomeini pledged not to stop the conflict until he had overthrown Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. This prospect was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, which resumed arms sales to Iraq while maintaining an official policy of neutrality. The Soviets also feared that Saddam would potentially become an ally of the West, which at the time also supported his regime in the war. After further Iranian gains in 1986, the Soviet Union massively increased its military aid to Iraq. The Soviets were increasingly afraid that the Iranians were encouraging an Islamic revolution in Central Asia. Soviet aid allowed the Iraqis to mount a massive counteroffensive, which brought the war to an end in August 1988.

Soviet policy towards the Iran–Iraq War According to Mesbahi, Soviet policy fell into three periods:

"Strict neutrality" (1980–1982) The outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War in September 1980 left the Soviets in a quandary, since they aimed to maintain good relations with both countries. The 1979 Iranian revolution had overthrown the Shah, a key American ally in the Middle East. Iran's new anti-American stance presented the USSR with a golden opportunity to win the country over to the Soviet camp. However, the war between Iraq and Iran complicated matters. Iraq had been a close Soviet ally since 1958, and in 1972 the Soviet Union and Iraq signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in which both countries promised to help the other when threatened and to avoid entering hostile alliances against each other.Sajjadpour p.29

Iraq, along with Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), had replaced Egypt as the Soviets' chief ally in the region after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat aligned with the Americans, recognized Israel in 1977, and made a peace treaty in 1979. In 1967, Iraq signed an agreement with the Soviets to supply the nation with oil in exchange for large-scale access to Eastern Bloc arms. The Soviets were unhappy with Iraq's offensive against Iran, although they avoided issuing an official condemnation. They were reluctant to supply Iraq with more arms, but they did allow their Warsaw Pact allies to continue doing so.Sajjadpour pp.31–32Smolanksy p.231

At the same time, the Soviets still attempted to court Iran. They offered to sell arms to the Iranians in a bid for friendship that was rejected by Tehran because of its historic distrust of Russia and the Soviet Union and rejection of communism. Nevertheless, Libya and Syria, which were Soviet allies, sold weapons to the Iranians, presumably with Soviet permission.Sajjadpour pp.32 The Soviets were also to some extent worried about how the West would react if they opted to publicly back either Iraq or Iran. Their attempt to balance their alliance with Iraq and their desire to win over Iran led the Soviets to observe a policy of strict neutrality during the early years of the conflict, while calling for a negotiated peace.This section: Mesbahi pp.74–78

Soviet tilt towards Iraq (1982–1986) However, the Iranians rebuffed Soviet offers of friendship, and by 1982, they also had the upper hand in the war. They decided to push on into Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein. That led to a change in Soviet policy from the summer of 1982. The Soviets did not like the implications of an Iranian victory since they feared that Tehran would go on to export the revolution elsewhere in the world. Although officially still neutral, the Soviets gradually increased economic and military support to Iraq to stop the collapse of Saddam. The Soviets were committed to not letting an ally be overthrown, and support for Iraq also played well with many Arab nations (the Soviets finally established diplomatic relations with Oman and the UAE and an agreement to supply arms to Kuwait).This section: Mesbahi pp. 78–82

In 1983, the Iranians' actions became increasingly anti-Soviet. The authorities cracked down on the Moscow-backed Iranian communist party, Tudeh, and expelled 18 Soviet diplomats. The Soviets were also keen to counterbalance Iraq's increasingly friendly relations with the West by boosting military aid to Saddam. Iraq became "the largest recipient of Soviet-bloc military aid among the countries of the Third World".Sajjadpour p.34 In 1984, Iraq officially established diplomatic relations with the United States. This, combined with the outbreak of the tanker war, an Iranian-Saudi confrontation over oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, opened the worrying prospect for the Soviets of an increased American presence in the region. The Soviets responded with yet more military aid to Saddam.Sajjadpour p.35

Active support for Iraq (1986–1988) In 1986–1987, the Soviet Union definitely turned to supporting Iraq. The war had been bogged down in a stalemate until the Iranians had taken the Faw Peninsula. That, along with other military gains, offered the prospect of an Iraqi collapse. That worrying development pushed the conservative Arab rulers closer to the Americans, whom they saw as their protector. The Soviets did not relish the idea of an increased American military presence in the area. They were also worried about what would happen in Afghanistan, a neighbor of Iran, which they had invaded in 1979 and had been fighting a long war there. Iran had provided support to some of the anti-Soviet Afghan Mujahideen. In March 1987, the Soviets decided to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, but they were concerned that the vacuum would be filled by an "Islamic fundamentalist" regime.

There was also the prospect of the Islamist Revolution spreading to Soviet Central Asia. The "Islamic factor" became a major concern for the Soviet leadership during the last phase of the Iran–Iraq War and led them to boost arms supplies to Iraq. "The decision to give Iraq the military edge was universal. Not only the Soviet Union, but the entire Western alliance, largely financed by conservative Arab states, engaged in the most comprehensive and massive arms transfer in history to a Third World state engaged in conflict (...) The 'Western package' for Iraq, however, paled in comparison with the Soviets'. Between 1986 and 1988, the Soviets delivered to Iraq arms valued at roughly $8.8 to $9.2 billion, comprising more than 2,000 tanks (including 800 T-72s), 300 fighter aircraft, almost 300 surface-to-air missiles (mostly Scud Bs) and thousands of pieces of heavy artillery and armored personnel vehicles."Mesbahi pp.88–89

The massive increase in weaponry allowed Iraq to regain the initiative in the war. At the same time, the Soviet Union continued to press for a ceasefire and offered to mediate. To that end, the Soviets made several economic concessions to Iran and opposed the US reflagging of ships in the Persian Gulf. However, Iran showed little interest in friendship with the Soviets and rejected the communist world and the West. Soviet aid allowed Iraq to begin a renewed offensive against Iran in April 1988, the success of which led to a ceasefire and the end of the war on August 20 of that year.This section: Mesbahi pp.82–94

Support for Iraq At the start of the Iran–Iraq War, Iraq was on the offensive, and the Soviets stopped all overt and most covert arms shipments to Iraq for 18 months. While the Soviets did this partially to maintain the possibility of a rapprochement with Iran, the main reason was likely due to its annoyance with Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, who had refused the Soviets more access to Iraqi ports in exchange for arms, and with Iraq in general for launching a war it found highly inconvenient. Soviet prestige was at stake if its arms were defeated by the Iranians, who were equipped with American weapons sold during the Shah's reign. Hence, the Soviets began to provide spare parts and ammunition. They later replaced complete vehicles and weapons in one-to-one exchanges. France supported Iraq and was its second-largest military supplier, and usually supplied higher-technology equipment than the Soviets.

Motives for policy towards Iraq

When the Iran–Iraq War began, the United Nations (UN) responded with Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire and for all member states to refrain from actions contributing to continuing conflict. A key resolution in 1987 was Resolution 598. The Soviets, opposed to the war, cut off arms exports to both Iran and Iraq, the latter being an ally under a 1972 treaty.

Despite strong policy disagreements with Iraq, the Soviet Union was concerned about the reputation of its weapons, again fearing that an Iranian victory would undermine its army's prestige and turn potential military partners away, so arms deliveries resumed in 1982.

The Iraqi Communist Party, driven from Iraq by the Ba'athist regime, was allowed to broadcast calls for the end of the war from the Soviet Union. That may have been more due to Soviet irritation at the war than a serious attempt to undermine Iraq, since Iran was not seen as pro-Soviet.

Competition with other countries France provided Iraq with extensive support, becoming its second-largest military backer, second only to the Soviets, and its supplies were usually higher-technology equipment than the Soviets'. The competition between France and the Soviet Union as an arms supplier was a continuing issue for Iraq. Iraq approached the French in late 1980 with requests to buy Crotale and Roland surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) to augment their depleted Soviet SAM arsenal.

Soviet training Movement away from Soviet doctrine was also seen in land warfare, where the Iraqis learned to place greater emphasis on training and preparation for complex combined-arms operations. This was seen in the training provided to recruits and the use of large-scale battle rehearsals.

Intelligence support Iraq improvised an AWACS using a British Thompson- CSF Tiger radar on a Soviet Il-76 airframe, a combination called the Baghdad 1.

Cordesman cites Jane's Defence WeeklyJane's Defence Weekly, December 19, 1987, p. 1400 as reporting that the Soviet Union had to reschedule its satellite coverage during the more intense periods of tension between Iran and the West. There have been numerous reports that Iraq received intelligence from third- party countries, especially satellite imagery from the U.S. Jane's article suggests that the Soviets also might have provided imagery.

Air warfare

The Iraqis and the Soviets had different priorities for waging air warfare, shown by how each assigned their best pilots to different aircraft types. This conflicted with Saddam Hussein's strict control of the Iraqi military, but over the course of the war some flexibility did emerge. The Iraqis considered ground attack the most important role and put their best pilots into their French Mirage F-1s rather than Soviet air-superiority fighters and interceptors such as the MiG-25 and MiG-29.

Aircraft