The court-martial of Fitz John Porter (November 25, 1862January 22, 1863) was a major event of the American Civil War. Major General Fitz John Porter was found guilty of disobeying a lawful order and misconduct in front of the enemy, and was removed from command based on internal political machinations of the Union Army. The court-martial was later found to be unjust and overturned, and Porter was reinstated in the United States Army.
Background Porter was a career army officer from a family of famous naval officers, including his cousins David Farragut and David Dixon Porter, the first four-star admirals in the United States Navy. He graduated from West Point in 1845, eighth in his class, and served with great distinction as an artillery officer in the Mexican War.Anders, 1–2. After the war, Porter served in various posts, including a stint as an instructor of artillery at West Point, where he became good friends with both George B. McClellan and William B. Franklin and, eventually, post adjutant for Robert E. Lee.
As tensions increased in 1860, Porter traveled to threatened locations in the South in order to prepare for the upcoming conflict, including Charleston, South Carolina, where he advised Major Robert Anderson be placed in charge of the defenses and that they be consolidated at Fort Sumter.Anders, 2. When war broke out, he initially served on the staff of Major General Robert Patterson, but when his old friend McClellan was asked to take charge of the Army of the Potomac he was transferred to command a division at the new commander's explicit request.
When McClellan took the Army of the Potomac south for the Peninsula Campaign, he reorganized the II, III, and IV Corps to create two new provisional units, the V Corps under Porter, and the VI Corps under Franklin. McClellan trusted his old friends much more than the other corps commanders and wanted subordinates he considered loyal.Snell, Mark A (2002).From First to Last: The Life of Major General William B. Franklin. Fordham University Press. 131. He relied, in particular, on Porter, who often acted as his surrogate on the battlefield during McClellan's frequent absences. One such instance, the Battle of Malvern Hill, especially cemented Porter's reputation as a superb commander on the battlefield.
Porter's command at the Second Battle of Bull Run
After the failure of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign, Porter's corps was one of the corps reassigned to the Army of Virginia under Major General John Pope. Porter shared his commander and friend's dislike for Pope both personally and professionally. As he moved his corps into position at Aquia Creek near Fredericksburg, Porter sent a number of telegrams to Major General Ambrose Burnside complaining about Pope's poor leadership and handling of the army.Anders, 195–99. Burnside, who, along with many others, shared Porter's low opinion of Pope's abilities, forwarded these communications to McClellan, General-in-Chief Henry Halleck, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, and President Abraham Lincoln. Halleck, Stanton, and Lincoln were not pleased, since Pope had been their choice to lead in an attempt to sideline the uncooperative McClellan. The President was especially displeased, since Pope was a personal friend.
On August 27, the left wing of the Army of Northern Virginia under Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson seized Pope's supply depot at Manassas Junction. Pope believed the main Confederate army to be somewhere south of his force and so became panicked and sent a flurry of orders. In a repetitive and unorganized telegram sent to Porter, Pope ordered him to join him at Bristoe Station by morning with his corps, or as much of his corps as he could gather by 1:00 in the morning. He was also to send word to another Union corps commander, Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, to secure Warrenton Junction.
Porter consulted with his divisional commanders, Major General George W. Morell and Brigadier General George Sykes, about the feasibility of marching that evening. Both generals were against the movement, they would later testify, but Porter wanted to go forward. Morrell and Sykes were finally able to convince Porter that the way was too dark and they were too unsure of the location of the Confederate forces in order to move in the dark and the order to move at 1:00 am was disregarded and instead the V Corps moved to Bristoe Station the morning of August 28. By 5:30 that eveningwhen Jackson's men first engaged a division from the corps of Major General Irvin McDowellPorter had moved his men to Greenwich, making him the most westerly located corps commander in the Army of Virginia.Esposito, Map 60.
During the next morning, August 29, Pope's attention was occupied along the unfinished railroad grade that Jackson was using as defense while the Union army assaulted in wave after wave. Meanwhile, Porter, now joined with parts of McDowell's III Corps and the general himself, repulsed an exploratory attack by the Confederate cavalry division under Major General J.E.B. Stuart. Porter and McDowell had no sooner halted their advance when they received an order from Pope, now known as the "Joint Order." Historian John J. Hennessy described the order as a "masterpiece of contradiction and obfuscation that would become the focal point of decades of wrangling." It described the attacks on Jackson's left, which were already underway, but was unclear about what Porter and McDowell were supposed to do. Rather than moving "to" Gainesville and striking Jackson's supposedly unprotected right flank, it described a move "toward" Gainesville and "as soon as communication is established [with the other divisions] the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run to Centreville tonight." Nowhere in the order did Pope explicitly direct Porter and McDowell to attack and he concluded the order with "If any considerable advantages are to be gained from departing from this order it will not be strictly carried out," rendering the document virtually useless as a military order.Hennessy, John J., Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas, University of Oklahoma Press, 1993, , pp. 232–36.
Pope launched another assault on Jackson, believing that Porter and McDowell would be attacking Jackson's right-flank at any moment. But Brigadier General John Buford had arrived from Thoroughfare Gap to report that Major General James Longstreet's wing of the Army of Northern Virginia had broken out of the Shenandoah Valley and was on its way to the battlefield. In fact, by noon, the first units of Longstreet's corps were already taking up positions guarding Jackson's right. McDowell, the senior commander, decided to not move the two corps to Gainesville and attack, but, for unknown reasons, did not forward Buford's report to Pope.
At 4:30 pm, Pope, frustrated that no attack was occurring on Jackson's right flank and still unaware of Longstreet's presence, despite numerous reports of a large Confederate force forming west of his position, sent an explicit order to attack by way of his nephew. But his nephew became lost and was unable to deliver the message until 6:30 pm. Even had the message been on time, it was impossible for Porter to both move forward and attack Jackson's right flank and maintain contact with Brigadier General John F. Reynolds's division of McDowell's corps. To attack would place the V Corps on one side of Longstreet's Corps and Reynolds on the other. Porter again ignored Pope's orders and Pope again assumed Porter was attacking and launched a costly attack on Jackson's left flank. During the attack, McDowell finally delivered Buford's report to Pope, who then had to acknowledge that Longstreet was on the battlefield. When the attack failed, Pope sent explicit orders to Porter to march his corps to the main battlefield and meet with him personally. Porter did so, but sent one of his brigades to Centreville.
That night Pope convened his generals and they argued about the Confederates' intentions. Pope insisted that Longstreet had arrived only to help cover Jackson's retreat. Porter maintained that Jackson was still well-entrenched and determined to fight, but McDowell claimed to be unable to find evidence that Jackson's corps was holding position. Pope ordered another large-scale assault on Jackson the next day, with Porter's corps leading the attack.
On the morning of August 30, Porter organized his corps for the assault, but it took them two hours to organize and begin advancing. Some of Porter's men had to cross 600 yards of open pasture land, the final 150 yards of which were steeply uphill, to attack a strong position behind the unfinished railroad; others had only 300 yards to traverse, but were required to perform a complex right wheel maneuver under fire to hit the Confederate position squarely in its front. They experienced devastating fire from Confederate batteries and then withering volleys from the infantrymen in the line. Nevertheless, they were able to break the Confederate line, but Confederate reinforcements drove them back. In what was arguably the most famous incident of the battle, some Confederate brigades fired so much that they ran out of ammunition and resorted to throwing large rocks. To support Jackson's exhausted defense, Longstreet's artillery added to the barrage against Union reinforcements attempting to move in, cutting them to pieces.Hennessy, pp. 339–57
As the V Corps fell back, Longstreet launched a counterattack, sweeping Pope's whole army back and threatening to rout it. A bold defensive by several brigades on Chinn Ridge, then of Henry Hill, was all that enabled the Union to stabilize the situation and retreat from Manassas in an orderly fashion.
Court-martial After the battle, Pope was relieved of command and his corps were merged into McClellan's Army of the Potomac. Pope was sent to Minnesota to command U.S. forces in the Dakota War of 1862, but kept up a correspondence with his allies in Washington. McClellan, meanwhile, led his army to a victory over the Army of Northern Virginia at the Battle of Antietam, but failed to rout them, in part because he was too nervous to commit Porter's V Corps to battle after the general is said to have warned him, "Remember, General, I command the last reserve of the last Army of the Republic." In the weeks following the battle, McClellan failed to take any decisive action and Lee's army slipped back into Virginia to regroup and fight again. On November 5, McClellan was ordered to hand over his command to Burnside. Three weeks later, on November 25, without the protection of his friend as commander of the army, Porter was arrested and relieved of command."Farewell Order from Gen. Porter," New York Times, Nov 13, 1862. Fitz John Porter's farewell order to the V Corps
Charges Porter was charged with two violations of the Articles of War for his actions during the Second Battle of Bull Run, Article IX, disobeying a lawful order, and Article LII, misbehavior in front of the enemy. Both charges contained specifications, examples when Porter allegedly committed the offense. The two charges were serious and a conviction could result in anything from expulsion from the army to execution. Due to the rules of courts-martial, charges were filed not by Pope himself, but by Brigadier General B.S. Roberts, the Inspector-General of the Army of Virginia.
First charge: disobeying a lawful order Specification 1: disobeying Pope's order on the night of August 27 to move to Bristoe Station at 1:00 am Specification 2: disobeying Pope's order on the morning of August 29 to move the V Corps towards Gainesville Specification 3: disobeying Pope's order on the afternoon of August 29 to attack Jackson's right flank Specification 4: disobeying Pope's further order on the evening of August 29 to commence an attack on Jackson's right flank immediately