The Dnieper–Carpathian Operation (Russian: Днепровско-Карпатская операция), known on the German side as the Defensive battles in Southern Ukraine and west of KievOKH, Generalstab des Heeres/Op. Abt. (III), 8.10.44. Betr.: Schlacht- und Gefechtsbezeichnungen für die Kämpfe im Osten von Januar bis Juni 1944. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA-MA) RH 15/314, fol. 92. (German: Abwehrschlachten in der Südukraine und westlich Kiew), was a strategic offensive executed in right-bank, southern, and western Ukraine by the Soviet 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, along with the 2nd Belorussian Front, against the German Army Group South, most of Army Group A and parts of Army Group Center. Fought from late December 1943 to early May 1944,Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, p. 393Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 265 this campaign in the southern sector was the focal point of the entire 1944 winter-spring campaign on the Eastern Front. This was the only offensive in which all six Soviet tank armies participated at the same time, while 22 out of the 30 panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions available to the Germans on the Eastern Front in late 1943 were stationed in Ukraine.Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 14.
Consisting of a series of linked operations, the offensive aimed to split Army Group South and clear Axis forces from Ukrainian territories west of the Dnieper. It was one of the largest offensives of World War II, spanning a 1,200 km (745 mi) front to a depth of 450 km (280 mi) and involving almost 3,500,000 troops from both sidesГрылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 264 In the course of it, 20 Wehrmacht divisions were either destroyed or rendered combat-ineffective, while all the rest were severely depleted.Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, pp. 279-280.62nd, 82nd, 123rd, 125th, 167th, 387th Infantry Divisions, Korpsabteilung B, 143rd, 147th Reserve Infantry Divisions, 5th Luftwaffe Field Division, were disbanded.
1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler", 6th, 9th, 11th, 19th, 25th Panzer Divisions, 16th Panzergrenadier Division, 2nd Parachute Division, 34th, 198th Infantry Divisions were withdrawn from the front and sent to the West for a refit.
As cited in Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, pp. 279-280. Even worse were material losses, with thousands of armoured vehicles, motor vehicles and artillery lost, principally through abandonment in the spring mud.Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 220. According to German General Kurt von Tippelskirch, this was the biggest Wehrmacht defeat since Stalingrad.Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 255. The offensive split Army Group South north and south of the Carpathian Mountains. The northern portion was pushed into Galicia and renamed Army Group North Ukraine, while the southern portion retreated into Romania and became Army Group South Ukraine, effective 5 April 1944, though little of Ukraine remained in German hands. During this advance, the Red Army reached the pre-invasion June 1941 Soviet borders for the first time.Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 171. The defeat prompted Hitler to dismiss Army Group South commander Erich von Manstein, and Army Group A commander Ewald von Kleist, replaced by Walther Model and Ferdinand Schörner respectively, ending Manstein's career.
To save the southern sector from collapse, the German command transferred eight divisions in the winter of 1943-44Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 279. and another 26 German divisions as reinforcements that springGregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 227. from across occupied Europe and other Eastern Front army groups. This amounted to 34 divisions, over 350,000 troopsGregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 227. and at least 1,200 armoured vehicles.Jentz, T., L. Panzertruppen 2: The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Force. Schiffer Publishing, 1996, p. 117, 130. Note: this is only for January 1944 period. According to Jentz (p. 130), in January 1944 Army Group South received I./Pz. Rgt. 26, which arrived from the West with fresh 76 Panthers. Furthermore, in late December 1943 (p. 117), 16. Panzer Division arrived from Italy to Army Group Center with 152 tanks and assault guns and was almost immediately transferred to Army Group South in response to the start of the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive on 24 December 1943.Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 227, 229. Note: this is for March–April 1944, in response to the second stage of the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive. During this period, the Germans "brought at least 853 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns with them" (p. 227), as shown in the list of reinforcements and known replacements (p. 229). However, Liedtke's numbers for the given period are incomplete. The other reinforcements and replacements that arrived during this period are mentioned in another work.Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, p. 196, 270, 359. Reinforcements and replacements that arrived in March–April 1944, which are not mentioned in Liedtke's work, are the following: 653. Schwere Panzerjager Abteilung that arrived from Austria in April 1944 with 31 Ferdinand's (p. 359); 506. Schwere Panzer Abteilung that returned to service in April 1944 after being refitted with 45 new Tigers; 40 new Panzer IV's that arrived near Chernovtsy for the 1. Panzer Division in March 1944 (p. 196).As shown already, these armored reinforcements between January–April 1944 amounted to approximately 1,200 armored vehicles. However, it is certain that the actual number was higher, since the specific number of replacements for each panzer division belonging to Army Group South is unknown. Consequently, this offensive played a key role in influencing the future successes of the Allied Normandy landings and the Soviet Operation Bagration, as German forces in France and Army Group Centre were critically weakened by the transfers.Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 238. During the Kamenets-Podolsky pocket crisis, OB West was deprived of 45,827 troopsGregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, pp. 227-228. and 363 armored vehicles on 6 June 1944.Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 235. Meanwhile, Army Group Center was stripped of 125,380 troopsGregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 228. and 552 armoured vehicles on 22 June 1944.Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 233. Additionally, as the Red Army approached the borders of Hungary and Romania, both countries mobilized and committed a combined total of 25 divisions.
The Soviet success convinced the German command that the southern sector would host the main Soviet 1944 summer offensive. Consequently, southern forces—especially the panzer divisions—received priority reinforcements. This expectation was driven by the new front line, which created a westward-protruding "Ukrainian Balcony" and left Army Group Centre in an exposed, eastward-facing "Belorussian Balcony".Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Eastern Front 1943-1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 497-98. This layout, combined with the weakening of Army Group Centre during the Polesskoe offensive, had catastrophic consequences for the Germans during Operation Bagration.Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 230
Background Following the autumn 1943 Battle of the Dnieper, which secured Left-bank or eastern Ukraine and isolated the German 17th Army in Crimea, the Red Army established and expanded several bridgeheads on the right bank. These positions served as the launching pads for the subsequent Dnieper–Carpathian Offensive.Pimlott, p. 251
One of these bridgeheads centered around Kiev was up to 240 km wide and 120 km deep, and was occupied by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 19. The other, in the region of Cherkasy, Znamenka, and Dnepropetrovsk, was up to 350 km wide and 30 to 100 km deep, and was occupied by troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts. Meanwhile, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front reached the lower reaches of the Dnieper in the Kakhovka-Tsyurupinsk sector, and had cut off the German 17th Army stationed in the Crimean peninsula, while also seizing a bridgehead on the southern coast of Sivash.
Forces involved and their plans
Axis After a heavy defeat in the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, the German forces adopted a posture of strategic defense. The main line of the strategic behavior of the German forces on the Soviet-German front was stubborn defense in order to keep the occupied lines.Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 17. Plans for stubborn defense on the Soviet-German front were determined by political and, most importantly, economic factors.
By holding the lines in Ukraine, the German High Command, Hitler foremost, hoped to prevent the German allies, namely Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria, from leaving the Axis military-political bloc. German General Kurt von Tippelskirch wrote the following:
The most important reason for holding the right-bank Ukraine was economic. The control of Ukraine allowed the German leadership to export food and important strategic raw materials to Germany. In their calculations for stubborn defense, the Germans attached particular importance to the retention of the right-bank Ukraine and Crimea with their rich food resources, manganese production centers around Nikopol, iron ore production centers around Krivoy Rog and Kerch, as well as the Black Sea basin with first-class seaports.