HMS Sheffield was a and the second Royal Navy ship to be named after the city of Sheffield in Yorkshire. Commissioned on 16 February 1975 the Sheffield was part of the Task Force 317 sent to the Falkland Islands during the Falklands War. She was struck and heavily damaged by an Exocet air-launched anti-ship missile from an Argentine Super Étendard aircraft on 4 May 1982 and foundered while under tow on 10 May 1982.
Design
The first of the Type 42 class, Sheffield, was initially fitted with the odd-looking "Mickey Mouse" ears on her funnel tops which were in fact exhaust deflectors – "Loxton bends" – for the Rolls-Royce Olympus TM3B gas turbines, to guide the high-temperature exhaust efflux sidewards and minimise damage to overhead aerials. As this provided a prominent target for then-new infrared homing missiles, only Sheffield and the next two in the class, the Argentinian Hércules and Santísima Trinidad, had these 'ears'. Sheffield was the only one of her class to not be fitted with STWS II triple anti-submarine torpedo tubes.
Construction
Ordered in 1968 Sheffield was laid down on 15 January 1970 and built by Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering at Barrow-in-Furness. An explosion during construction killed two dockyard workers and damaged a section of hull which was replaced with a section from an identical ship, , being built for the Argentine Navy. Sheffield was launched on 10 June 1971 by Queen Elizabeth IIA Rip in Time for Sheffield Navy News, April 2007 and was estimated to have cost £23,200,000 to build.Hansard: HC Deb 23 October 1989 vol 158 cc357-8W 357W Question to the Secretary of State for Defence regarding warship costs, 23 October 1989.Marriott, Leo Modern Combat Ships 3, Type 42, pub Ian Allan, 1985, . p. 15.Moore, John Jane's Fighting Ships, 1982–83, pub Jane's Publishing Co Ltd, 1982, . p. 553.
As the first of her class of Royal Navy destroyers, Sheffield spent her first years trying out the new systems and the Sea Dart missile system, particularly as the intended Sea Dart trials ship, , suffered serious fires and problems with its steam systems restricting its use in the late 1970s. It was not until 1980 that Sheffield became effective, with Sea Dart and partial installation of electronic warfare Abbey Hill systems.A. Preston. Sea Combat off the Falklands. Willow Collins (1982) London, p. 112 Following a refit in the early 1980s, significant design issues with the ship's Type 909 radar (which was responsible for control and targeting of the Sea Dart missiles) were identified. The ship lacked an electronic countermeasures (ECM) jammer.
Service history
In June 1981 she participated in Exercise Roebuck, following which she fired five Sea Dart missiles. Following participation in Exercise Ocean Safari she sailed in November 1981 to undertake patrols in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.
She was undergoing maintenance at Mombasa when Captain James Salt took over command on 26 January 1982. Both Salt (whose most recent service had been in submarines) and his second in command (who had been an anti-submarine helicopter observer) had little or no relevant experience in surface ships and little experience in air defence.
In March 1982 the ship transited north through the Suez Canal to participate in Exercise Spring Train, which was held in the Atlantic Ocean.
Departs for the Falklands
In response to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands, Sheffield was ordered on 2 April 1982 to join the task force being assembled to retake the islands. Ammunition and supplies were loaded, loose fittings stowed, and unnecessary memorabilia disembarked. All carpets were removed except for those on Deck 1 and above (which subsequently caught fire when she was hit). To avoid her being mistaken for the Argentine Hércules and Santísima Trinidad, a vertical black marking was painted on the funnel and down to the side to her waterline to aid recognition.
Departing for the South Atlantic on 2 April, Sheffield reached Ascension Island on 14 April, accompanied by , , , to be later joined by . They joined other vessels of the Task Force 317 and commenced operations in the Total Exclusion Zone around the Falklands on 1 May 1982.
It was British policy that any Royal Navy vessel that suspected itself to be under missile attack turn toward the threat, accelerate to maximum speed and fire chaff to prevent the ship being caught defenceless. The codeword used to start this procedure was 'handbrake', which had to be broadcast once the signal of the Super E Agave radar of Super Étendard aircraft was picked up. Within the task force, the threat from the Type 209 submarine was seen as a higher priority than the threat from the air. Following the sinking of , Captain Salt had ordered the ship to change course every 90 seconds to counter any potential Argentine submarine threat.BBC Radio 4. The Reunion. HMS Sheffield. 14.57–16.00. Last broadcast 9.00 am 20 April 2012. Retrieved 16 October 2017.
Sinking
Argentine attack
Sheffield was first detected by an Argentine Naval Aviation Lockheed SP-2H Neptune (2-P-112) patrol aircraft at 07:50 on 4 May 1982. The Neptune kept the British ships under surveillance, verifying Sheffields position again at 08:14 and 08:43. Two Argentine Navy Super Étendards, both armed with AM39 Exocets, took off from Río Grande naval air base at 09:45 and met with an Argentine Air Force KC-130H Hercules tanker to refuel at 10:00. The two aircraft were 3-A-202, piloted by mission commander Capitán de Fragata (Lieutenant Commander) Augusto Bedacarratz, and 3-A-203, piloted by Teniente (Lieutenant) Armando Mayora.
In the two weeks leading up to the attack, Argentinian pilots had been practising tactics against their own ships, including Type 42 destroyers of the same class as Sheffield, and therefore knew the radar horizon, detection distances, and reaction times of the ship radar, as well as the optimal procedure to programme the Exocet missile for a successful attack profile. The technique they used is known colloquially as "Pecking the Lobes", in reference to the aircraft probing the side lobes of the emitting radar using the radar warning receiver. The aircraft could avoid detection by avoiding the main lobe of the emitting radar.
At 10:35, the Neptune climbed to and detected one large and two medium-sized contacts. A few minutes later, the Neptune updated the Super Étendards with the positions. Flying at very low altitude, at approximately 10:50 both Super Étendards climbed to to verify these contacts, but failed to locate them and returned to low altitude. They later climbed again and after a few seconds of scanning, the targets appeared on their radar screens.
Both pilots loaded the coordinates into their weapons systems, returned to low level, and after last minute checks, each launched an AM39 Exocet missile at 11:04 while away from their targets. The Super Étendards did not need to refuel again from the KC-130, which had been waiting, and landed at Río Grande at 12:04.
Supporting the mission were an Argentine Air Force Learjet 35 as a decoy and two IAI Daggers as the KC-130 escorts.
On Sheffield
At approximately 10:00 on 4 May, Sheffield was at defence watches (second degree readiness), the southernmost of three Type 42 destroyers (the others being HMS Glasgow and HMS Coventry operating as a forward anti-aircraft picket to the west of the main task force which were south-east of the Falklands. The weather was fair and the sea calm with a 2-metre swell. , which was with the main task force, was responsible for Anti-Air Warfare Coordination (AAWC). Sheffield had relieved her sister ship Coventry as the latter was having technical trouble with her Type 965 radar.The Battle for the Falklands, Max Hastings & Simon Jenkins, Pan Grand Strategy, 1983
Prior to the attack, Sheffields radar operators had been experiencing difficulty distinguishing Mirage and Super Étendard aircraft, and the destroyer may have lacked effective IFF or radar jamming.A. Preston. Sea Combat off the Falklands. Willis Collin. (1982), Despite intelligence briefings that identified an Exocet attack by Super Étendards as possible, Sheffield had assessed the Exocet threat as overrated for the previous two days, and disregarded another as a false alarm.
As the Type 965 could not detect low-flying aircraft, the two incoming enemy aircraft were not detected flying at . The two planes were detected at a distance of only by the UAA1, a radar warning receiver. This was then confirmed by the 965M long range aircraft warning radar of Glasgow when the aircraft popped up to above sea-level for a radar check at .Report of Board of Inquiry at HMS Nelson 7 June 1982 into loss of HMS Sheffield, May 1982, Released by CIC Fleet Northwood, Sept 1982 The Glasgow immediately went to action stations, and communicated the warning codeword 'Handbrake' by UHF and HF to all task force ships. The radar contacts were also seen by Invincible, which directed Sea Harriers on combat patrol to investigate, but they detected nothing. The AAWC on Invincible declared the radar contacts as false and left the Air Warning at yellow, instead of raising it to red.
In response to Glasgows warning, an order to stand to was issued to the crews of the 4.5 inch gun, Sea Dart and 20 mm guns. The aircraft were detected on the forward Type 909 radar but not on the aft set. Sheffields UAA1 sensor was then blocked by an unauthorised transmission by the ship's satellite communications systems (SCOT). No information was received via data link from Glasgow. Seven seconds later, the first Exocet missile was fired, in response to which Glasgow fired its chaff. Onboard Sheffield, it was not until smoke from the missile was sighted by lookouts that the crew realised they were under attack. The bridge officers did not call the captain to the bridge, made no call to action stations, made no evasive measures, and made no effort to prepare the 4.5-inch gun, the Sea Dart missiles, or order chaff to be fired. The antiair warfare officer was called to the operations room by the principal warfare officer, arriving just before the first missile hit.
Two Exocets had been launched, the second missile being sighted by Yarmouth and missing Sheffield, splashing into the sea off her port beam.Narrative of the attack , page 6 The Exocet that struck Sheffield hit her on the starboard side at deck level 2, travelling through the junior ratings' scullery and breaching the Forward Auxiliary Machinery Room/Forward Engine Room bulkhead above the waterline, creating a hole in the hull roughly by . Contemporary accounts suggested that the missile failed to explode, despite disabling the ship's electrical distribution systems and breaching the pressurised sea water fire main. The damage to the fire system severely hampered any firefighting response and eventually doomed the ship to be consumed by the fire.
At the time of the hit, the captain was off duty in his cabin after having previously visited the operations room, while Sheffields anti-air warfare officer (AAWO) was in the wardroom chatting to the stewards, and his assistant was in the heads. Sheffield and Coventry were chatting over UHF and communications ceased until an unidentified message was heard flatly stating, "Sheffield is hit."
Response The flagship, , dispatched the escorts HMS Arrow and to investigate, and a helicopter was launched. Confusion reigned until Sheffields Lynx helicopter unexpectedly landed aboard Hermes carrying the air operations officer and operations officer, confirming the strike.