Samuel Alexander Adams (June 14, 1934 – October 10, 1988), known as Sam Adams, was an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He is best known for his role in discovering that during the mid-1960s American military intelligence had underestimated the number of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army soldiers. Although his opinion was challenged, he pushed the case for a higher troop count. The issue under debate was called the Order of Battle (O/B). His efforts in 1967 met strong and persistent opposition from the Army (here MACV) which, in the short-term, prevailed against him.
Following his testimony for the defense during the 1973 prosecution of Pentagon Papers whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg, Adams resigned from the CIA. In 1975 his critical article on Vietnam War intelligence was published in Harper's. He then testified about the Viet Cong O/B before a Congressional committee that was investigating the CIA. In 1982 Adams was a consultant for a CBS News television documentary called The Uncounted Enemy. He was subsequently named as a co-defendant in the Westmoreland v. CBS civil trial for libel, which was successfully defended. When he died, he was writing a book about the O/B dispute, which was published posthumously several years later.
Family and education Although he was born in Bridgeport, Connecticut, Adams was born into the prominent Adams family of Massachusetts. His father, Pierpont 'Pete' Adams, was a stockbroker and member of the New York Stock Exchange. Sam Adams attended St. Mark's School in Southborough, Massachusetts. He graduated in European history from Harvard College, class of 1955. After two years in the Navy, he attended Harvard Law School, then worked for a while in banking.Krebs (1988), ¶ 6.Randolph (1985), ¶¶ 13–15.Adams (1994), pp. 24, 110-11 (his father).
Career in the CIA From 1963 to 1973 Sam Adams served in the CIA, mostly at its headquarters in Langley, Virginia. About the intelligence agency, he said, "I found to my astonishment that I really loved the place."Randolph (1985), ¶ 19.
Africa division Starting as an intelligence analyst at the Congo desk, in the CIA's new Africa Division, he read everything and talked to everybody, and "quickly became one of Washington's reigning authorities on the Congo". He wrote on its economy, but it was political turbulence in the newly independent state that drew world attention, including Cuban under Che.Sinclair (1995), §1: ¶¶ 5–9 ("reigning authorities" quote, Cubans, Simba invasion)."Krebs (1988), ¶ 7 (Congo economy). Adams later commented that "the Congo's problem" was "being both rich and weak at the same time."Adams (1994), at p. 4 (quote).
Especially, it was for his coverage of the Simba rebellion that Adams won commendations. Although at first greeted with 'snickers' from intelligence agents at State, he successfully predicted the crisis appointment of Moise Tshombe by Joseph Kasavubu, then President of Congo. He briefed a high-level CIA conclave about the Simba and their invasion of the Congo from the east. The Simba reached Kisangani (then called Stanleyville), which prompted an intervention to rescue hostages. Tshombe was cheered "wherever he went". Adams won the esteem of analysts at CIA. As he later recalled, "It was terrific ... one of the high points of my life."Powers (1979), pp. 138–140 (Simba), 139 (Adams).Randolph (1985), ¶¶ 21–23 ("terrific" quote from Adams, 'snickers').Adams (1994), pp. 1–24; pp. 11–12, 17, quote at 20 (Kasavubu, Tshombe); pp. 14–17 (briefs DCI McCone, DDI Cline, DDP Helms, 30 others).Powers (1979), p. 139, Adams at CIA conclave re Simba.
Far East division In 1965 Adams transferred to the Vietnam desk, Southeast Asia Branch of the Far East Division.Ranelagh (1978), p. 455 (CIA organization). He read as background then-recent books by Võ Nguyên Giáp on the north's view of its earlier victory, People's War, People's Army, Bernard Fall on the French defeat, Street without Joy, and Joseph Buttinger's history of Vietnam, Smaller Dragon. His branch chief, Edward Hauck, when asked told Adams that the Vietnamese communists would probably outlast the Americans and, after 10 or 20 years, win the war.Adams (1994), p. 28 (books). pp. 26–27 (Ed Hauck, cf. p. 32).
Viet Cong motivation In the role of a "generalist" and "roving analyst", Adams was assigned to study the Viet Cong. Its motivation and morale were his first objectives. Following his procedure per the Congo, he began assembling biographies of Viet Cong operatives, but stopped when told the names were all fake. He also netted little by reading captured documents in translation. He drew welcome information, however, out of statistics compiled in Saigon from the files of Chieu Hoi (South Vietnam's defector program).Adams (1994), pp. 23, 26, 28 (roving analyst, VC morale), pp. 28–29 (VC names are aliases), pp. 33–34 (captured documents), pp. 33–34 (statistics, Chieu Hoi).Hiam (2006), pp. 52–55, 100, 125 (Chieu Hoi).Tucker (2000), pp. 69–70, "Chiêu Hôi (Open Arms) Program".
Adams found VC defections per year were 10,000, and thus a 5% defection rate which was high, and rising. The statistics also showed an increase in VC killed, paralleling the higher defections. This information would counter the general CIA pessimism about the war. Yet feedback within his CIA office was ambiguous, noncommittal, cautious; they knew well enough the widespread evidence of the Viet Cong's growing success in the field, of its confidence and morale. His report "Viet Cong Morale: Possible Indicator of Downward Drift" was published, but with caveats in footnotes and distributed only within the CIA.Adams (1994), pp. 34–35, 46 (10,000 defectors, 5% rate, statistics), p. 36 (his report), pp. 36, 37, 38 (VC success, CIA pessimism), pp. 26–27, 62 (CIA pessimism).Hiam (2006), pp. 47–48, 51–52, 73 (defections). "South Vietnam was awash in escaped Viet Cong recruits" (p. 73).
While in Vietnam, Adams got advice from a senior analyst.George W. Allen, author of None so Blind (2001), later Adams' boss at CIA.Adams (1994), p. 44 (Allen).Cf., Hiam (2006), p. 54 (Allen). Accordingly, he inquired about VC desertions. A Rand Corporation office in Saigon was doing similar VC investigations; it was headed by Leon Gouré. He told Adams that VC deserters were seven times the number of VC defectors. This surprised and puzzled Adams, considering the math. Such a combined loss rate per year (10,000 defectors + 70,000 deserters), in addition to VC annual casualties (reported at 150,000), would severely reduce the Viet Cong's overall strength (which MACV's O/B put at 280,000). Yet the VC did not seem to be losing the war.Adams (1994), pp. 44, 46, 59 (VC deserters), pp. 46, 59, 63 (ratio of Gouré), pp. 36, 39, 44 (George Allen).Hiam (2006), pp. 52, 54–55 (desertion numbers and ratios to defection, O/B numbers).
While doing this perplexing research, Adams discovered that in the provinces the ARVN's count of the VC guerrillas and militia was often much higher than MACV's, e.g., in Long An province it was 2000 instead of 160. He got permission to "look into enemy manpower".Adams (1994), pp. 56–57, 58 (VC numbers for Long An), p. 63 (MACV's O/B numbers for VC), p.64 (permission).Powers (1979), pp. 214–215 (trail of Adams from VC desertion to VC O/B).
MACV's Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) in Saigon had been publishing annotated versions of captured documents in its bulletins. "Bulletin 689" contained a single three-page document, "Recapitulated Report on the People's Warfare Movement from Bình Định Province". It listed VC troop counts for several types of guerrillas and militias, which all together totaled 50,244. In MACV's country-wide O/B for VC, of the 280,000 grand total, only 100,000 were guerrillas or militia. Adams asked, "Why should Bình Định—one of forty-four provinces–have half of them?"Adams (1994), p. 64 (MACV bulletins), pp. 65–66, 67 (Buelliten 689), p. 66 (quote). Adams writes, "For the rest of the day I galloped around CIA headquarters like Paul Revere, ballooing about Viet Cong guerrillas" (p. 67).Hiam (2006), pp. 75–76, 259, 262 (Bulletin 689).
Order of Battle
Adams’ assignment in motivation led to his work in estimating the number of VC guerrillas. From his research into captured enemy documents and other sources, he "concluded that previous estimates had undercounted the communists by hundreds of thousands. The implications were astounding."Theoharis (2005), p. 233 (quote). If the Viet Cong enemy combatant count was higher, it implied that the prospects for a South Vietnamese military victory were dimmed. It questioned American claims of progress on the battlefield. It would be "politically disastrous" for the U.S. government. This numbers dispute became known in military terms as the Order of Battle (O/B) controversy.Powers (1978), pp. 213–219.Ford (1998), pp. 89–90 (Sam Adams), 87 ("disastrous" quote).
His findings, at first ignored, then challenged, after a heated struggle were not adopted. MACV forcefully insisted on its lower numbers, and the CIA in 1967, due to the domestic political environment, reluctantly agreed. Following the Tet Offensive in early 1968, however, the controversy was revisited. The numbers of enemy combatants were raised to a higher count, more in accord with Adams' original conclusions.Ranelagh (1986), pp. 455–471, at pp. 462–463, 465 (Adams and numbers after Tet).Theoharis (2005), p. 233.See below, "Order of Battle controversy".
Challenging the CIA By then, Adams had resigned his Vietnam post and was doing CIA analysis of neighboring Cambodia. Yet he persisted in advancing the higher count of Viet Cong in the 'Order of Battle' controversy, despite the institutional fallout between CIA and MACV. He claimed that the CIA had compromised its integrity. He filed formal charges against DCI Richard Helms. He became notorious to many in the agency, and acquired a general reputation as a "gadfly, pariah and nemesis."Andersen (1994), p. 1.Cf. Helms (2003), pp. 326–328.Powers (1978), pp. 221–222 (files charges).Ranelagh (1986), pp. 469–470 (Adams bitter as wrong numbers lost lives).
In 1969 Adams, fearing that his opponents would destroy them, secretly removed CIA files and documents which would support his case. He buried them in the woods near his farm in rural Virginia. His 1973 testimony in federal court,At the Ellsberg espionage trial, see section below. where he restated his position on the 'Order of Battle' numbers, caused consternation at CIA. Following this trial, he retired from the agency.Krebs (1988).
In the media, and testimony Outside the CIA Adams continued to advance the issues stemming from the 'Order of Battle' controversy. In particular, the tailoring of 'pure' intelligence in order to fit the political agenda of its primary consumers: the American government, and its chief executive.
Trial of Ellsberg and Russo Adams appeared as a defense witness at the 1973 trial of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo. The case involved their role in the unauthorized publication of the top secret Pentagon Papers, a 47-volume, government-produced, secret history of the Vietnam War. The prosecution alleged felony violations of the Espionage Act of 1917, and of signed secrecy agreements. The charges involved disclosure of government secrets, yet not to foreign powers, but to American newspapers.Ellsberg (2002), pp. 303 (secrecy agreements), 304 ("thousands of pages of top secret documents"), 429–430 (criminal prosecution, Espionage Act).
Adams testified concerning the military's false numbers for Viet Cong combatants. The undercounting had been deliberately adopted by the American intelligence community as official. His testimony was offered to show that supposed 'secret information' in the text of the Pentagon Papers contained in reality many fictions.Randolph (1985) ¶36. Adams volunteered to testify that "the numbers Ellsberg was being tried for leaking were false anyway."