Hong Chengchou (; 1593–1665), courtesy name Yanyan and art name Hengjiu, was a Chinese official who served under the Ming and Qing dynasties. He was born in present-day Liangshan Village, Yingdu Town, Fujian Province, China. After obtaining the position of a jinshi (進士; successful candidate) in the imperial examination in 1616 during the reign of the Wanli Emperor, he joined the civil service of the Ming Empire and served as an official in Shaanxi. During the reign of the Chongzhen Emperor (r. 1627–1644), he was promoted to Supreme Commander of Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Huguang, and Sichuan; Minister of War, and later on, Governor-General of Jiliao (薊遼; an area which included parts of present-day Shandong, Hebei and Tianjin).
In 1642, Hong surrendered and defected to the Manchu-led Qing Empire after his defeat at the Battle of Song-Jin. He became one of the Qing Empire's leading Han Chinese scholar-politicians, and one of the architects of the Manchu conquest of China. While he was in office, he encouraged the Manchu rulers to adopt Han Chinese culture and provided advice to the Qing government on how to consolidate its control over the former territories of the fallen Ming Empire, as well as having an active role in the conquest of South China. Apart from Dorgon and Fan Wencheng (), Hong was regarded as one of the most influential politicians in the early Qing dynasty, but his legacy became controversial for his defection to the Qing Empire and for his suppression of the Southern Ming dynasty (a short-lived state formed by remnants of the fallen Ming Empire).
Early life and service under the Ming Dynasty Early service under the Ming Dynasty against the peasant rebellions
When he was young and preparing for his future career as an official, he was strictly tutored by a man called Zhang Xianmo, who likely introduced him to the study of military classics, something that would become important later in his career. When he received the jinshi degree in 1616, he was made an official of the Ministry of Justice in the capital, where he remained for six years. During the 1620s he rapidly ascended in the administrative hierarchy, until he was transferred to Shaanxi in 1627 as Administration Vice Commissioner in charge of the Tax Intendant Circuit, although he became embroiled in the suppression of the ongoing rebellions in the province.
In 1629 he became formally assigned to the military administration of the province, and displayed promising skills dealing with a number of rebel attacks. Because of his performance, he was named Assistant Censor-in-Chief and Grand Coordinator of Yansui in late 1629, and achieved a number of successes in the field against Wang Jiayin and one of the future major rebels, Zhang Xiangzhong, pacifying most of Yansui. He was eventually made Supreme Commander of the Three Border Regions in 1631 to substitute Yang He, who was repeatedly found to not be up to the task. In 1632, he and one of the most able Ming field commanders, Cao Wenzhao, killed several bandit leaders, including Ke Tianfei, Lighted Lamp and Heaven-Disturbing Monkey. In the following years he scored even more successes, either destroying or forcing to flee from Shaanxi every major rebel group.
In 1634, with rebellions on the rise once more, the court felt it needed Hong's services as a field commander, and Chen Qiyu was appointed Supreme Commander of Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Huguang and Sichuan instead. Hong, along with Cao Wenzhao and He Renlong, bottled up several large groups of rebels at Chexiang Gorge in summer of 1634, including major figures like Li Zicheng, Zhang Xianzhong or Gao Yingxiang. However, Chen Qiyu's subordinates were bribed by the rebels and they convinced Chen to accept their surrender instead of massacring them. Soon after, they rebelled again and continued their activities. After this debacle Chen Qiyu was demoted and Hong Chengchou appointed to his position, giving him command over all military forces in the area affected by the rebellions. Hong Chengchou adopted the following strategy: We should have an effective plan to deal with the rebels. We went to Honan and the rebels fled to Shensi. When we arrived in Shensi, the rebels again ran off to Hupei and Honan. The situation is such that we trap ourselves on the roads and all the countryside is ruined. The emperor promulgated a strict edict setting a time limit to wipe out the rebels. Now, we will demarcate an area to hold and defend and thus restrict the movement of the rebels. I will personally lead the troops to engage them directly until there is not one left.Fundamentally, Hong deployed troops in strategic passes and along the Han River to contain the rebels in one area, while a field force engaged and eliminated them. While Hong's deployment was considered as excellent and he was able to obtain various military victories over the rebels in the field, including defeating numerous times and finally killing Gao Yingxiang in 1636, these continued their activities in 1635 and 1636. In particular, 1635 was very eventful for the rebels as they sacked Fengyang, where the founder of the Ming dynasty was buried, and other towns. However, strict time limits set by the emperor Chongzhen forced Hong and the Ming forces to be more aggressive and reckless to make faster progress, which eventually caused casualties and able officers like Cao Wenzhao were killed in ambushes. Ming forces in the area were pretty limited in comparison with the number of rebel groups and the area they had to cover: only 42,000 were available, of which most were on garrison duties, leaving some 6,000 men for field operations.
In 1637, Yang Sichang became Minister of War and convinced the emperor to follow his agenda to deal with the rebels. Showing animosity for Hong, he convinced the emperor to establish unrealistic time limits for his campaigns, demoting Hong and his subordinates when they failed to adjust to those limits. However, in early 1638 Hong Chengchou was able to surprise Li Zicheng in the Shaanxi-Sichuan border and dealt him a heavy defeat. Betting on the poor quality of his Sichuanese contingent, Chengchou put them in the center of his line. As expected, they withdrew under the rebel attack, and pulled Li's troops down the center, at which point Chengchou's crack Shaanxi troops in reserve attacked the now exposed rebels and caused the collapse of Li's army. In summer of 1638 Hong renewed the pressure on Li, and hotly pursued him. Guessing that he was trying to flee through Tong Pass, Hong contacted Sun Chuanting, who established a three-pronged ambush. Li's army was trapped and destroyed, and he escaped with just 17 followers, remaining mostly inactive and hiding in the mountains of Shaanxi for the rest of 1638. That same year, Zhang Xianzhong surrendered to Xiong Wencan.
With the rebellions apparently under control and dealing with the aftermath of the 1638 Manchu raid, the court decided to place Hong Chengchou in charge of military affairs in the Northeast, along with some of his officers like Cao Bianjiao. Sun Chuanting vehemently opposed the transfer on the grounds that the rebellions could spread once again, and he was imprisoned. Hong Chengchou would now face the Manchus and their emperor, Hong Taiji.
Service in the Northeastern Theatre
Hong Chengchou arrived in Liaodong in 1639, and immediately started implementing measures to improve the readiness of Ming defenses in the area. Soon after his arrival, he wrote a military treatise compiling various military classics and Qi Jiguang's Jixiao Xinshu, as well as adding his own commentary related to the situation on Liaodong and his own plans for the region. He also carried out an inspection of the troops in the frontier, and, after witnessing their poor shape, he decided to create an elite corps of 10.000 soldiers stationed in two newly created training bases on strategic locations, to serve as a reserve that could be used as a rapid deployment force.
In addition, he tightened up military discipline, and centralised local military power in the hands of regional commanders, thereby simplifying chains of command, and allowing all troops, including officer's retainers (jiading), to be placed under those regional commanders during emergencies. The security of food supply lines was also improved, with Hong taking a role in selecting the routes used and the escorts. Thus, the amount of food convoys lost to marauding parties of Manchu cavalrymen was greatly diminished. Hong also reaffirmed the importance of firearms in fighting the Manchu, as many officers had done before, and he requested to be supplied with more small arms, Western-style cannon and artillery experts. Finally, in the autumn of 1639 he started promoting local weapon factories to keep a steady supply line instead of depending on the court. A Bureau of Military Equipment was opened in Kaipingwei to produce armor, a Bureau of Firearms was opened in Guzhi to produce three-eyed guns, and a Bureau of Gunpowder was established at Jizhou to produce gunpowder. Meanwhile, Jirgalang led attacks in the Song-Jin region during summer and autumn of 1639, but the Qing failed to make headway.
The Qing established first advanced positions at Yizhou, setting up military farms to supply their troops. In spring of 1640, Hong Taiji was presented with four plans on how to deal with the Ming in the following years, and eventually decided to try to finally capture the Songshan-Jinzhou-Shanhaiguan corridor and consolidate definitively in Liaodong. More skirmishes were fought in the first half of 1640. In a clash near Ningyuan, cannon and arrow fire caused many casualties to Qing forces. Hong Chengchou moved northwards to Ningyuan in June, and the Qing finally invested Jinzhou and started working on fortified positions. During the rest of 1640 and early 1641, the Qing kept probing Ming defenses but were generally repulsed, although the siege of Jinzhou continued. Hong Chengchou resolved to resupply Jinzhou and reduce the logistical strain on his forces, so he took two measures. First, he was successful in delivering extensive food supplies, enough for five or six more months, into Jinzhou, and some time later he slipped in even more supplies. Second, he redeployed three fifths of his reinforcements back to Shanhaiguan, while at the same time deceiving the Qing into thinking that he was actually receiving more reinforcements.