The Palaiologan army refers to the military forces of the Byzantine Empire under the rule of the Palaiologos dynasty, from the late 13th century to its final collapse in the mid-15th century. The army was a direct continuation of the forces of the Empire of Nicaea, which itself was a fractured component of the formidable Komnenian army of the 12th century. Under the first Palaiologan emperor, Michael VIII, the army's role took an increasingly offensive role whilst the naval forces of the empire, weakened since the days of Andronikos I Komnenos, were boosted to include thousands of skilled sailors and some 80 ships. Due to the lack of land to support the army, the empire required the use of large numbers of mercenaries.
After Andronikos II took to the throne in 1282, the army fell apart and the Byzantines suffered regular defeats at the hands of their eastern opponents, although they would continue to enjoy success against the Latin territories in Greece. By c. 1350 the Empire's inefficient fiscal organization and incompetent central government made raising troops and the supplies to maintain them a near-impossible task, and the Empire came to rely upon troops provided by Serbs, Bulgarians, Venetians, Latins, Genoese and Turks to fight the civil wars that lasted for the greater part of the 14th century, with the latter foe being the most successful in establishing a foothold in Thrace. By the time the civil war had ended, the Turks had cut off Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, from the surrounding land and in 1453 the last decisive battle was fought by the Palaiologan army when the capital was stormed and sacked, falling on 29 May.
Structure of the army
Size and organization
The Byzantine army continued to use the same military terms with regards to numbers of troops and officers as did the Komnenian army. However, there were fewer territories to raise troops from. In Anatolia, the local support for the Ottoman conquerors grew daily, whilst in Greece the ravaging by the Crusader states, by Serbia, by Bulgaria, and earlier on by the Angevin Empire ended the region's prominence as a source of Byzantine levies. After 1204, no single Byzantine field army numbered more than 5,000 men.M. Decker, The Byzantine Art of War, 40 Around 1261, the central army consisted of 6,000 men, while the number of total field troops never exceeded 10,000 men.I. Heath, Byzantine Armies: AD 1118–1461, 14W. Treadgold, A History of the Byzantine State and Society, 819 The total number of troops under Michael VIII was about 20,000 men; the mobile force numbered 15,000 men, while the town garrisons totaled 5,000 men. However, under Andronicus II the more professional elements of the army was demobilized in favor of poorly trained and cheaper militia soldiers. The Emperor decreased the entire army's strength to 4,000 men by 1320, and a year later the Empire's standing army dropped to only 3,000 cavalry.W. Treadgold, A Concise History of Byzantium, 224 Even though the Empire had shrunk considerably by the time of Andronicus III's reign, he succeeded in assembling an army of 4,000 men for his campaign against the Ottomans.J. Norwich, Byzantium: The Decline and Fall, 285 By 1453, the Byzantine army had fallen to a regular garrison of 1,500 men in Constantinople.I. Heath, Byzantine Armies: AD 1118–1461, 36 With a supreme effort, Constantine XI succeeded in assembling a garrison of 7,000 men (included 2,000 foreigners) to defend the city against the Ottoman army.D. Nicolle, Constantinople 1453: The end of Byzantium, 33
Byzantine troops continued to consist of cavalry, infantry and archers. Since Trebizond had broken away, Cumans and Turks were used for cavalry and missile units. In the Palaiologan era, the main term for a standing regiment was the allagion.
Palace and imperial guard units included the Varangian Guard, the Paramonai, Mourtatoi, Tzakones and Vardariotai. The Varangians, also often referred to as "axe-bearers", were the most prominent and probably most numerous. Founded in the 11th century they initially consisted of Scandinavians, although Englishmen soon came to dominate.M. Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204–1453, pp. 272-273 By 1204 they numbered up to 5.000 men.R. Scheel, Skandinavien und Byzanz. Bedingungen und Konsequenzen mittelalterlicher Kulturbeziehungen, p. 250" After 1204 some Varangians served the Latin Emperor, while there is little evidence for Varangians in the Nicaean Empire until the mid-13th century. By the Palaiologan reconquest of Constantinople they were well-established.R. Scheel, Skandinavien und Byzanz. Bedingungen und Konsequenzen mittelalterlicher Kulturbeziehungen, pp. 257–259" Unlike in the past they did not participate in open battles, but served as personal guards of the emperors, the imperial treasure as well as prisons. They are attested as late as the turn of the 15th century, with the last possible mention dating to 1404. The Paramonai are an obscure division of native origin only attested in the 13th and early 14th centuries, apparently being divided into a mounted and a dismounted division. The Mourtatoi, the offspring of Turkish and Greek intermarriages, fought as dismounted archers and were not exclusively palace guards. The Tzakones were lightly armed troops partially recruited from Morea that also served as marines. Finally, the Vardariotai had a policing function rather than being an actually military unit.M. Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204–1453, pp. 273-281
Mercenaries
After Constantinople was retaken, Michael VIII army's continuous campaigning in Greece ensured that the Nicaean army, an offshoot of the expensive but effective Komnenian army remained in play. Under Andronicus II however, the army was reduced to destructively low numbers – mercenary troops were disbanded to save money and to lower taxes upon the disgruntled population. Instead the use of poorly equipped and ill-disciplined militia soldiers saw the replacement of the vitally important expert soldiers. The results were obvious; Byzantine losses in Asia Minor occurred primarily under Andronicus II.
In 1302 the center of military expenditure shifted back again towards mercenaries, notably the Catalan Company, but after their leader was murdered the company returned to Thrace and Greece where they overthrew the Crusader Duchy of Athens and seriously undermined Greek rule so that on both sides of the Bosporus the Empire suffered. Even so, mercenaries continued to be used after Andronicus II's reign. Ironically Andronicus' successor's policy of using many foreign fighters worsened Byzantium's fortunes in the same way that Andronicus had done so with their disbandment. The use of Serbs, Bulgarians and Turks of Aydın and of the Ottomans opened Byzantium up to more foreign incursions. The deployment of up to 20,000 Turkish soldiers from the Ottoman realm to assist her nominal Greek ally only eased future conquests of the area.
Since Byzantium became increasingly incapable in raising a "loyal" Greek army, foreigners such as the Knights of Rhodes, Venetians, Genoans and Italians were added to Byzantium's fighting forces. Since the Imperial treasury was bankrupt after c 1350, these foreign fighters fought only for political reasons and often in civil wars, rather than to strengthen Byzantium's position.
From about the mid-14th and especially the turn of the 15th century Albanian migrants began to enter the Morea. This migration was encouraged by the Despots themselves, who settled the Albanians as smallholders in depopulated areas. They were recruited as light cavalry called stratiots (stratiōtai) who, by the 15th century, numbered several thousand men. They were organized in small bands and were used for infiltration or skirmishing operations. After the collapse of the Despotate many stratiots, now composed of both Albanians and Greeks, were employed by Venice.Nicholas C.J. Pappas "Stradioti: A Balkan Military Diaspora in Early Modern Europe" in Military Diasporas: Building of Empire in the Middle East and Europe (550 BCE-1500 CE)
Strategy and tactics
The Byzantine Empire's main strategy aimed to make maximum use of an often outnumbered army. The key behind this approach was the use of border fortifications that would impede an invading force long enough for the main Imperial army to march in to its relief. One example of this occurred on May 1281 when Tarchaneiotes was sent by Michael VIII to relieve the fort town of Berat, and succeeded in driving Charles of the House of the Angevins away. Nonetheless, this strategy was not in touch with the military situation of the day – forts and castles became increasingly less useful for defense and more so as a residence. In particular were Crusader forts, Byzantiums' major opponent in the west. These forts played little role in helping the Crusaders hold on to their territories and the battle was often decided on an open field; the castle of Thebes was lost twice, first by Crusaders and then by the Catalans in 20 years without a siege. What may have contributed to the relegation of castles in war was that the Crusaders in Greece were desperately short of manpower and therefore the destruction of their army on the field left their castles defenceless – as was seen in Constantinople in 1261, where only a skeleton force was left to defend the Capital due to the Latin Empire's lack of manpower.
Reconnaissance and ambushing enemy columns remained a favorite Byzantine tactic. At the Battle of Pelekanos, the Ottomans were successfully spied upon by the opposing Byzantine troops. Prudence remained an admirable virtue (as can be seen by John Cantacuzenus' advice to withdraw from Pelekanos).
More serious shortcomings in Byzantine strategy occurred in Asia Minor, particularly against the Ottoman Turks who would raid Byzantine lands and then retreat before any serious resistance could counter. The local population endured heavy burdens in providing officials with food and matériel, but such burdens were too difficult to bear, as the ravages of warfare were brought home by the Ottomans and their ghazi followers. At Magnesia, Nicomedia and Pelekanos the Byzantines suffered serious defeats at the hands of the Turks; since there were few troops to spare, the Empire was brought one step closer to peril with each defeat. After the Imperial army suffered defeat in Asia Minor, Andronikos III saw Anatolia as a lost cause and began reorganizing the Byzantine fleet; as a result the Aegean remained an effective defense against Turkish incursions until Gallipoli was at last captured by the Turks in 1354. From then on, the Byzantine military engaged in small scale warfare against its weak Crusader opponents, mixing in diplomacy and subterfuge, often exploiting civil conflict amongst their Ottoman opponents. In the Peloponnese, territory continued to be re-conquered by the Byzantines against the weak crusaders until the mid 15th century, when the Byzantine enclave in Morea was finally conquered by the Ottomans.
Alliance with the Mongols
Until 1269 the Turks conquered the southern coast of the theme of Mylasa and Melanoudion in Caria as far west as the Cnidian Peninsula,Clive Foss (1988), Strobilos and Related Sites, p. 150 while the northern part of the theme likely followed soon after.Dimitri Korobeĭnikov (2014), Byzantium and the Turks in the Thirteenth Century, p. 251 This territory eventually came to constitute the Beylik of Menteshe.Dimitri Korobeĭnikov (2016), The Formation of the Turkish Principalities in the Boundary Zone: From the Emirate of Denizli to the Beylik of Menteshe (1256-1302), pp. 65–66 Around the same time the Turks also encroached on the port towns of Paphlagonia.Dimitri Korobeĭnikov (2014), Byzantium and the Turks in the Thirteenth Century, p. 246