The Attack-class submarine was a planned class of French-designed submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), expected to enter service in the early 2030s with construction extending until 2050.Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, pp. 91–92 The project, which would have replaced the s, began in 2007 as the Future Submarine program. In 2020 it was estimated to cost A$90 billion and would have been the largest and most complex defence acquisition project in Australian history.

Australia's unique operating environment (including significant variations in ocean climate and conditions) and rejection of nuclear marine propulsion had led it to operate the Collins-class, the world's largest diesel-electric submarines, capable of transiting the long distances from to their deployment areas. In the early phases of the project, four design options were identified: purchase a military off-the-shelf (MOTS) design, modify a MOTS design for Australian conditions, design an evolution of the Collins class, or create a new design.

In 2009, the Australian Government's defence white paper announced that a new class of twelve submarines would be built.2009 defence white paper, p. 70. The selected design was to be built at the ASC Pty Ltd shipyard in South Australia, but, if a company other than ASC was selected to build the submarines, they would be granted access to the government-owned facility. Early plans suggested the first submarine would be completed before 2025. However, there were significant delays in the project and by the end of 2014, operational capabilities had still not been defined. In February 2015 the Abbott government announced a competitive evaluation process between competing Japanese, French, and German designs. On 26 April 2016, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced the Shortfin Barracuda, a conventionally-powered variant of the Barracuda-class nuclear submarine by French firm DCNS (now Naval Group), as the winner.

On 16 September 2021, Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced the cancellation of the contract with Naval Group and the creation of AUKUS, a trilateral security pact between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, that will help Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines: This article contains quotations from this source, which is available under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Licence. the SSN-AUKUS, expected to enter service in the early 2040s.

Background Australian diesel-electric submarines operate in a wide range of geographic and oceanographic conditions, from the cold Southern Ocean to the tropics of the Coral, Arafura, and Timor Seas – requiring the submarines to handle significant variances in temperature, salinity, density, and climate. Australian submarines provide a deterrent towards military aggression against Australia by patrolling the waters of Australia and nearby nations; in addition, they gather intelligence through the interception of electronic communications by foreign nations and assist in the deployment and retrieval of special forces operatives. Because RAN submarines operate from , Australian submarines have to transit long distances to reach some of their potential patrol areas. This requirement for range and endurance resulted in the 1980s design incorporating a large fuel load, large engines and sufficient batteries to transit these long distances; technological improvements since then have enabled smaller diesel-electric submarines such as the German Type 214 submarine and Dutch to achieve similar range and endurance as the Collins class. It has also been noted that the transit distances Australian submarines travel could be reduced by operating the submarines from in Darwin, rather than HMAS Stirling in Western Australia.

The Collins class were the first diesel-electric submarines specifically designed for Australian conditions of long transit distances and diverse sea states, and thus represent an 'orphan' design with no evolved design to replace them. The submarines were enlarged and heavily modified versions of Swedish shipbuilder Kockums' .Dennis et al., The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 138Woolner, Procuring Change, p. 7 Built during the 1990s and 2000s, the Collins-class submarines have a predicted operational life of around 30 years, with the lead boat due to be decommissioned around 2025.Coleman, More problems with Collins class submarinesStewart, Defence to reach new depths

Project history The Submarine Institute of Australia released a report in July 2007 arguing that planning for the next generation of Australian submarines had to begin soon if they were to be replaced by the 2020s. In December 2007, a month after coming into office, Minister for Defence Joel Fitzgibbon announced that planning for the Collins-class replacement (designated SEA 1000) had commenced. The SEA 1000 project office was established within the Defence Materiel Organisation in October 2008, and was being jointly administered with Defence's Capability Development Group.ABC News, 4.6m for next generation submarine study In February 2009, Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt was appointed as project head.

2009 defence white paper The 2009 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 white paper confirmed the replacement project, and announced that the submarine fleet would be increased to twelve vessels.Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, pp. 70–1Future Force, in Australian Warship, p. 24 Reasons for this included the growing quantity and sophistication of Asian-Pacific naval forces (particularly submarine forces), the need to sustain submarine operations in any conflict, and the greater deterrent an increased submarine force would provide.Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, pgs. 38, 64, 70–1

Originally, the planned timeline called for concept work to start in 2009, preliminary designs to be established between 2011 and 2013, then detailed design work completed in time for construction to start in 2016.Kerr, Sea 1000 This was to ensure that the new class would be in service before the Collins class began decommissioning in 2025. However, meetings between Moffitt and the National Security Committee to clarify concept details and intended capabilities scheduled for November 2009 did not go ahead until March 2012. On 3 May 2012, the Australian government announced funding for the initial design phase.Offices of the Prime Minister, Minister for Defence, and Minister for Defence Materiel, Next stage of future submarine project announced The initial phase would encompass studies to select the new submarines' design, Defence Science and Technology Organisation projects to establish parameters for propulsion, combat system, and stealth capabilities, along with initiating programs to develop the required industry skills for the actual construction. Under the 2012 revised timeline, the preliminary phase would conclude in 2013, with 'first pass approval' to be done by early 2014, and 'second pass approval' in 2017. The best case prediction for seeing the first new submarine enter service, made in 2012, was "after 2030". Some of the slow pace and lack of decision making has been attributed to politicians fearing being held responsible for a repeat of the problems experienced by the Collins class during their construction and early career.McDonald & Snow, Submarines no longer all at sea

In September 2013, Rear Admiral Greg Sammut AO was appointed as Head Future Submarine Program.Rear Admiral Gregory Sammut, Official Biography (RAN), accessed 2021-09-19

Speculation of a Sōryū class decision

Although the German Type 214 submarine has comparable range and endurance to the Collins class, and superior range and endurance compared to the Sōryū class, throughout 2014 there was increasing speculation that a Japanese design had been pre-selected as the Collins-class replacement, leading to criticism that the Japanese submarines did not have the range or endurance that Australia required.

A September 2012 weapons technology swap deal and a July 2014 agreement on the sharing of defence technology were seen as preliminary steps towards Australian-Japanese collaboration on a submarine design, or towards integrating technologies like the Sōryūs Kockums-designed air-independent propulsion Stirling engines and research into incorporating the Japanese boats' hydrodynamic capabilities into a potential SEA 1000 design. Captcha must be solved. Advantages in such a deal between the nations include the attention that securing the SEA 1000 project would bring to Japanese arms manufacturers (particularly after loosening of defence export restrictions in 2014), the provision of a proven high-end submarine design to the Australian military, and improved relations, both directly and as mutual allies of the United States of America. However, it has been noted that cooperation on such a major defence project would be high risk due to Japan's lack of previous arms export experience, and any deal could negatively impact on both nations' relations with China. The close personal relationship between the then-Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe was also cited as a factor in the likeliness of such a deal, although with the caveat that a change in government in either nation would compromise any potential deal for construction, or the ongoing maintenance support of the submarines: the Australian Labor Party has a greater interest in supporting local shipbuilding than Abbott's Coalition government, while a souring of China-Japan relations is something the Democratic Party of Japan is less likely to risk than the Liberal Democratic government led by Abe.Nicholson & Wallace, Home-built submarines deemed too expensive, too riskyHardy, After Collins: Australia's submarine replacement programmeKerr, Analysis: European yards face Soryu-shaped hurdle to replacing Collins class

By November 2014, initial capabilities had not been decided on, and recommendations were to be made throughout 2015.Kerr, Submarine chief: Canberra to get recommendations in next 12 months In December 2014, the Australian Coalition government ruled out using a tender process to identify a new submarine design, blaming the limited time left before the Collins class were scheduled to begin leaving service.Owens, Joe Hockey rules out open tender for new submarines Although there was speculation at the time that the Australian government would purchase directly from Japanese shipbuilders, in January 2015, Defence Minister Kevin Andrews stated that the government was still considering the options offered by European shipbuilders: ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems of Germany, Saab of Sweden, and a partnership of the French companies Thales and DCNS.Scott & Reynolds, Australia gingerly mulls Japanese submarine offerAustralian Broadcasting Corporation, Defence Minister promises 'conservative' approach to submarines following tour of ASC

In mid-December 2015, the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force allowed a journalist from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) to tour the newest of the class, , at its base at Yokoska and speak to the commanding officer, Commander Takehiko Hirama, and several other personnel.'The characteristic is secrecy': Behind the scenes on Japan's state-of-the-art submarine, Matthew Carney, ABC News Online, 14 December 2015

2015 policy announcements