The deep roots of Angola-Cuba relations stretch back to the 15th century, during the dawn of European maritime expansion. Following the arrival of Christopher Columbus in Cuba by October 1492 and the arrival of Portuguese explorer Diogo Cão at the mouth of the Congo River in Angola in 1482, both territories were rapidly absorbed into rival Iberian empires. As the Spanish Empire developed Cuba into a central hub for sugar and tobacco production, it faced a severe labor shortage due to the decimation of the indigenous Taíno population, while Portugal utilized its stronghold in Angola, designated as Portuguese West Africa, as a primary source for human captivity. Between the 15th and 19th centuries, hundreds of thousands of Angolan captives were forcibly marched to the coast, loaded onto slave ships, and transported across the Atlantic into the Spanish colony of Cuba. A vast number of these individuals were brought to the port of Havana. The Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 drew an imaginary line down the centre of the Atlantic Ocean, with the Spanish claimed the Americas to the west, while the Portuguese secured Africa and the Indian Ocean to the east. This forced migration deeply infused Cuban culture, religion, and demographics with Angolan roots—particularly through the preservation of Bantu traditions, language remnants, and religious practices. During the Angolan Civil War, Cuban forces fought alongside the Marxist–Leninist People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government; against the Western-backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) guerrillas who were aided by the South-African army. The present day outcome of the war resulted in the MPLA changing from a Marxist–Leninist party to a multi-party democratic system based on neoliberal principles (the MPLA also dropped the "Labour Party" extension to its name as a clear sign of dropping their communist aspirations). From an economic standpoint, Cuba has lost its preferred status among Angolans and South Africa has become the biggest single investor and trading partner with Angola (outside oil sales).
Pedro Rosso Leal is the current ambassador of Cuba to Angola.
History 1482–19th century
The arrival of Diogo Cão at the Congo River in 1482 and Christopher Columbus landing in Cuba in 1492 set off centuries of transatlantic trade that deeply fused both African and Caribbean histories, because Portugal was the dominant maritime power in Central Africa and Spain held massive Caribbean territories. The connection between Portuguese Angola and Spanish Cuba fundamentally reshaped the culture, demographics, and identity of the Caribbean. The early arrivals in Havana during the late 1500s and early 1600s were frequently classified by Spanish authorities as the Congos, at this time, Havana served primarily as a strategic military naval base and a transit point for the Spanish treasure fleets. By the 19th century, Cuba had become the world’s leading sugar producer, and Havana was a bustling, cosmopolitan metropolis. The abolition of slavery in 1886 shattered the old social order of the Spanish Caribbean. It created a massive population of free Afro-Cubans who, despite their legal freedom, faced systemic racism, economic disenfranchisement, and political exclusion. This collective frustration fueled the final Cuban War of Independence in 1895, led by figures like José Martí and the Afro-Cuban general Antonio Maceo. The year 1898 was a watershed moment for Cuba. As Spain was being ejected from the Americas, Portugal was cementing its "Effective Occupation" of Angola, driven by the pressures of the Berlin Conference (1884–1885). With Spain’s American empire dead, the global spotlight shifted toward Portuguese Africa, of what investigators found was a system that directly echoed the deceptive transitions to freedom seen in Cuba’s patronato. In Angola, the Portuguese implemented the "Regulamentações Sobre o Trabalho de Africanos Nativos" (Regulations on Labor of Native Africans). This framework legally mandated that all "natives" who could not prove they were gainfully employed in European eyes were classified as "vagrants" and forced into labor contracts. Enslaved people were renamed serviçais (contract laborers).
1960s
Cuba's relationship with Angola started in the 1960s as part of the "Second Revolution" movement announced by Fidel Castro. The movement intended to bring Marxism–Leninism to Africa starting primarily in Zaire (today known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo). The failed attempt to make a foothold in the Zaire presented various lessons to Cuba which were used in identifying better candidate nations, leaders and better opportunities for success.
Jonas Savimbi, the future president of UNITA, met with Fidel Castro's ally and revolutionary Che Guevara in 1965. Guevara told his superiors he did not trust Savimbi, and Savimbi possibly presented a danger. This was probably linked to the fact that Savimbi did not have any notable aspirations towards Marxism–Leninism. However, to Cuba's surprise, Agostinho Neto (the then leader of the MPLA) had a very strong Marxist leaning which suited the Cuban agenda. In the 1960s, Cuba mobilized a task force to assist Agostinho Neto to build an army and carry out a campaign against the Portuguese colonial leaders with the intent of gaining independence and installing a Marxist state.
1975 In 1975, in response to the demands of the Carnation Revolution, Portugal decided to pull out of its African colonies. By this time Cuba had already infiltrated and commenced large scale activities in the Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. Of these African colonies, Angola has vast amounts of oil and an abundance of other natural resources. Given that the 1970s became the awakening of the oil age and knowing that Angola's large oil reserves would serve well to make it a rich and strong backer of a Marxist expansion, Cuba focused on primarily supporting Angolan Marxist rebel movements over the liberation movements of other Portuguese colonies, thus beginning the special relationship between Cuba and Angola.
Portugal set Angola's independence date for 11 November 1975. Three prominent liberation movements contended for the role of leading the newly formed independent country, namely: UNITA, FNLA and the MPLA. Each of the three movements received foreign assistance, UNITA from Western countries, FNLA from China (and later from the West) and MPLA from the Soviets and Cuba. Although many exhaustive attempts were made (by Portugal) to get the three movements to agree to a peaceful democratic system of power sharing (with multi-party democracy), the specter of being the sole ruler of Angola seemed to undermine any peaceful solution. Cuba added to the failure of the Alvor Accord (to bring the three parties together) by inducing MPLA to believe that with Cuba's backing they could dominate any military confrontation and win Angola's rule.
With the failure of the Alvor Accord, the stage was set for a high-noon shoot-out among the three parties in a win-all competition. The victor would become the leader of Angola. It seemed a foregone conclusion that the party which held control over Luanda (the capital city) on 11 November 1975 would be recognized as the governing party. This put the MPLA (who had a base following in Luanda) at a natural advantage. The other two parties then sought foreign military assistance to take on the Cuban-backed MPLA and make an attempt to gain control of Luanda.
Castro dismissed the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) and the Air Force between August 20 and September 5 so they could put all their energy into planning and orchestrating Cuba's invasion of Angola. The Soviets, aware of Castro's plans, opposed Castro's invasion plans (as the Soviets correctly believed the Cubans could set off greater discord in the cold war détente) but stood by him. Castro asked Leonid Brezhnev for staff officers to train People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) fighters and transportation for Cuban soldiers, requests the USSR ignored. The Soviets did send military advisers to council MPLA leaders in Brazzaville. The Cuban government gave the MPLA 12,000 M-52 rifles from Czechoslovakia, 133 RPGs from Bulgaria, mortars, light artillery, and machine guns.
Cuba's leaders appointed Raúl Diaz Argüelles as commander of the Cuban Military Mission in Angola. Argüelles, subordinate to General Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, the First Deputy Minister of the FAR, traveled with 480 soldiers from Cuba to Lisbon, Portugal and then to Luanda. They escaped detection, arriving on August 21, by posing as tourists. None of them carried weapons. Many carried luggage packed with cash.
The intense effort by the Cubans made the MPLA the leading military power. Seeing the mass of Soviet-made military weapons arriving in Angola (destined for Cuban forces and MPLA cadres), Savimbi made a desperate appeal to the West for assistance. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been tracking the communist build-up in Angola and understood the gravity of the situation. Although the CIA wanted to intervene in a large scale, the US laws (Clark Amendment) severely restricted the CIA intervention in undeclared wars. The CIA attempted to circumvent their own legislation and employed a limited number of mercenaries engaged in Angola. The CIA also turned to South Africa (at the time an apartheid state) for assistance in response to the Cuban build-up. South Africa had invested in the Caluque Hydro Scheme in Southern Angola (which fed into Namibia) and had a natural fear of the effects of instability in Angola – thus South Africa initially sent troops to protect the Hydro Scheme (and later intervened in the civil war).
The government of the Soviet Union, well aware of South African activity in southern Angola, flew Cuban soldiers into Luanda one week before November 11, the declared date of independence. While Cuban officers led the mission and provided the bulk of the troop force, 60 Soviet officers in the Congo joined the Cubans on November 12. The Soviet leadership expressly forbade the Cubans from intervening in Angola's civil war, focusing the mission on containing South Africa. Cuba ignored Soviet pleas and undertook a full large-scale invasion with a staggering 35,000 troops landing in Angola at the peak of their invasion.
In 1975 and 1976 most foreign forces, with the exception of Cuba, withdrew. The last elements of the Portuguese military withdrew in 1975. The US found themselves in a political impasse with internal government support and discord over the Angola issue (of which Cuba and the USSR took advantage). Eventually in February 1976 the Tunney Amendment passed forbidding the US from participating in Angola. Without US official support the South African military commenced their withdrawal in February 1976. On the other hand, Cuba's troop force in Angola increased from 5,500 in December 1975 to 11,000 in February 1976. FNLA forces were crushed by Operation Carlota, a joint Cuban–Angolan attack on Huambo on January 30, 1976. By mid-November, the Huambo government had gained control over southern Angola and began pushing north.
1977