The Krulak–Mendenhall mission was a fact-finding expedition dispatched by the Kennedy administration to South Vietnam in early September 1963. The stated purpose of the expedition was to investigate the progress of the war by the South Vietnamese regime and its US military advisers against the Viet Cong insurgency. The mission was led by Victor Krulak and Joseph Mendenhall. Krulak was a major general in the United States Marine Corps, while Mendenhall was a senior Foreign Service Officer experienced in dealing with Vietnamese affairs. Civil unrest gripped South Vietnam as Buddhist demonstrations against the religious discrimination of President Ngô Đình Diệm's Catholic regime escalated. Following the raids on Buddhist pagodas on August 21 that left a death toll ranging up to a few hundred, the US had authorized investigations into a possible coup through a cable to US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.
The four-day whirlwind trip was launched on September 6, 1963, the same day as a National Security Council (NSC) meeting, and came in the wake of increasingly strained relations between the United States and South Vietnam. In their submissions to the NSC, Krulak presented an optimistic report on the progress of the war, while Mendenhall presented a bleak picture of military failure and public discontent. Krulak disregarded the popular support for the Viet Cong, feeling that the Vietnamese soldiers' efforts in the field would not be affected by the public's unease with Diệm's policies. Mendenhall focused on gauging the sentiment of urban Vietnamese and concluded that Diệm's policies increased the possibility of religious civil war, and were causing the South Vietnamese to believe that life under the Viet Cong would improve the quality of their lives. The divergent reports led US president John F. Kennedy to ask his two advisers "You two did visit the same country, didn't you?"
The inconclusive report was the subject of bitter and personal debate among Kennedy's senior advisers. Various courses of action towards Vietnam were discussed, such as fostering a regime change or taking a series of selective measures designed to cripple the influence of Ngô Đình Nhu, Diệm's brother and chief political adviser. Nhu and his wife Madame Ngô Đình Nhu were seen as the major causes of the political problems in South Vietnam. The inconclusive result of Krulak and Mendenhall's expedition resulted in a follow-up mission, the McNamara–Taylor mission.
Background
After the Huế Phật Đản shootings on May 8, civil unrest broke out in South Vietnam. Nine Buddhists were shot by the Roman Catholic regime of President Ngô Đình Diệm after defying a government ban on the flying of Buddhist flags on Vesak, the birthday of Gautama Buddha and marching in an anti-government protest.Jacobs, pp. 142–143. Following the shootings, Buddhist leaders began to lobby Diệm for religious equality and compensation and justice for the families of the victims. With Diệm remaining recalcitrant, the protests escalated.Jacobs, pp. 144–145. The self-immolation of Buddhist monk Thích Quảng Đức at a busy Saigon intersection became a public relations disaster for the Diệm regime, as photos of the event made front-page headlines worldwide and became a symbol of Diệm's policies.Jacobs, pp. 147–149. As protests continued, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Special Forces loyal to Diệm's brother Ngô Đình Nhu conducted the Xá Lợi Pagoda raids on August 21, leaving a death toll estimated to be up to several hundred and causing extensive damage under the declaration of martial law. Universities and high schools were closed amid mass pro-Buddhist protests. In the meantime, the fight against the Viet Cong insurgency had begun to lose intensity amid rumors of sectarian infighting amongst ARVN troops.Jacobs, pp. 152–154. This was compounded by the plotting of a coup by various ARVN officers, which distracted attention from the insurgency. After the pagoda raids, the Kennedy administration sent Cable 243 to the US Embassy, Saigon, ordering an exploration of alternative leadership possibilities.Jacobs, pp. 160–163.
Initiation and expedition
At the end of the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on September 6, it was agreed that the priority was to obtain more information on the situation in Vietnam. US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed sending Marine Corps Major General Victor Krulak on an immediate fact-finding trip. The NSC agreed that Joseph Mendenhall—a Foreign Service Officer with Vietnam experience—would accompany him and the pair began the mission later that day.
On their return trip to Washington, D.C., Krulak and Mendenhall brought John Mecklin back from Saigon to report. Mecklin was the United States Information Service (USIS) director. The State Department sent the Saigon embassy a detailed cable containing questions about Vietnamese public opinion across all strata of society. In Krulak's words, the objective was to observe "the effect of recent events upon the attitudes of the Vietnamese in general, and upon the war effort against the Viet Cong".
In a four-day trip, the two men traveled throughout Vietnam before returning to Washington to file their reports. Krulak visited 10 locations in all four Corps zones of the ARVN and spoke with US ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the head of US forces in Vietnam General Paul Harkins and his staff, 87 US advisors and 22 ARVN officers. Mendenhall went to Saigon, Huế, Da Nang and several other provincial cities, talking primarily to Vietnamese friends. Their estimates of the situation were the opposite. Mecklin wrote afterwards that it "was a remarkable assignment, to travel twenty-four thousand miles and assess a situation as complex as Vietnam and return in just four days. It was a symptom of the state the US Government was in". The mission was marked by the tension between its leaders. Mendenhall and Krulak intensely disliked one another, speaking to each other only when necessary. Mecklin and Krulak became embroiled in a dispute during the return flight. Krulak disapproved of Mecklin's decision to bring television footage that had been censored by the Diệm regime back to the US, believing the action was a violation of sovereignty. After a long and bitter argument aboard the aircraft, Krulak called upon Mecklin to leave the film in Alaska during a refueling stop at Elmendorf Air Force Base, further suggesting that the USIS director remain with the film in Alaska.Jones, pp. 356–357.Tucker, p. 263.
Report and debriefing
The NSC reconvened on the morning of September 10 to hear the delegation's reports. Mendenhall had experience in Vietnamese affairs, having served under the previous US ambassador Elbridge Durbrow. Durbrow had urged Diệm on a number of occasions to implement political reform. Krulak was a Marine known for his belief in using military action to achieve foreign affairs objectives. His temperament earned him the nickname "Brute", which originated from his wrestling career at the Naval Academy. The Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric noted that Mendenhall was regarded "with great suspicion on the Virginia side of the river [the Pentagon, headquarters of the Defense Department]", whereas Krulak was "universally liked and trusted in the Pentagon, both on the civilian and military side".Jones, p. 357.
The backgrounds of Krulak and Mendenhall were reflected in their opposite analyses of the war. Krulak gave a highly optimistic analysis of military progress and discounted the effect of the Buddhist crisis on the ARVN's fight against the Viet Cong. His conclusion was that "[t]he shooting war is still going ahead at an impressive pace. It has been affected adversely by the political crisis, but the impact is not great."
Krulak asserted that a substantial amount of fighting was still required, particularly in the Mekong Delta, which was regarded as the Viet Cong's strongest region. Krulak asserted that all levels of the ARVN officer corps were conscious of the Buddhist crisis but he believed that most had not allowed religious beliefs to negatively affect their internal military relationships to a substantial degree. He believed that the ARVN officers were obedient and could be expected to carry out any order they regarded as lawful. Krulak further asserted that the political crisis had not significantly damaged bilateral military ties. Moving along to the Vietnamese view of their leaders, Krulak predicted that there was dissatisfaction among the officers, which he believed was mainly directed at Ngô Đình Nhu, the younger brother of Diệm who was widely seen as the power behind the regime.Jacobs, pp. 86–87.Jacobs, pp. 111–112.Tucker, p. 290.Karnow, pp. 246, 250. Krulak believed that most officers wanted to see the back of Nhu but that few were willing to resort to a coup. Krulak reported that three US advisers strongly criticized the Nhus and advocated the pair's departure from South Vietnam to avoid a public relations disaster at the United Nations. Krulak felt that these problems were outweighed by what he believed to be a successful military effort and that the war would be won irrespective of the political leadership. He predicted that the ARVN had little ability to facilitate an improvement in governance and felt that they would not flex whatever muscle they had. Krulak optimistically concluded,
Mendenhall disagreed and argued that the anti-Diệm sentiment had reached a level where the collapse of civilian rule was possible. He reported a "reign of terror" in Saigon, Huế and Da Nang, observing that the popular hatred usually reserved for the Nhus had spread to the generally respected Diệm. Mendenhall asserted that many Vietnamese had come to believe that life under Diệm worse than being ruled by the Viet Cong. Mendenhall thought that a civil war on religious grounds was possible. He predicted that the war could only be won with a regime change, otherwise South Vietnam would collapse into sectarian infighting or a massive communist offensive. The contradictory nature of the reports prompted Kennedy's famous query, "You two did visit the same country, didn't you?"
Debate Krulak attempted to explain the contrasting assessments by pointing out that Mendenhall had surveyed urban areas, while he ventured into the countryside "where the war is". Krulak asserted that political issues in Saigon would not hamper military progress, stating "We can stagger through to win the war with Nhu remaining in control." Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman asserted that the difference between the contrasting reports "was the difference between a military and a political view". During the debate over the differences in outlook, Mendenhall asserted that Saigon had suffered "a virtually complete breakdown" following the pagoda raids. Mendenhall reported that Vietnamese public servants feared being seen with Americans. He recalled one visit when he had to remain quiet while his Vietnamese host crept around the room, searching for hidden microphones. Mendenhall asserted that "Saigon was heavy with an atmosphere of fear and hate" and that the people feared Diệm more than the Viet Cong. He reported many public servants no longer slept at home due to a fear of midnight arrests by Nhu's secret police. Many officials had recently spent the bulk of their day negotiating the release of their children, who had been incarcerated for participating in pro-Buddhist protests. Mendenhall asserted that internal turmoil was now a higher priority than the war against the communists.