Operation Medak Pocket (), officially called by Croatians Operation Pocket-93 (Operacija Džep-93) was a military operation undertaken by the Croatian Army between 9 – 17 September 1993, in which a salient reaching the south suburbs of Gospić, in the south-central Lika region of Croatia then under the control of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina, was attacked by Croatian forces. The pocket was named after the village of Medak.
The Croatian offensive temporarily succeeded in expelling rebel Serb forces from the pocket after several days of fighting. However, the operation ended in controversy due to a confrontation between the Croatian Army and United Nations peacekeepers as well as accusations of serious Croatian war crimes against local Serb civilians. Although the outcome of the battle against the Serbs was a tactical victory for the Croatians, it became a serious political liability for the Croatian government and international political pressure forced a withdrawal to the previous ceasefire lines. The area was eventually secured by UN troops.
According to UN and Canadian sources, UNPROFOR personnel and Croatian troops exchanged heavy fire, eventually resulting in the Canadian troops driving off a Croatian assault. In Canada, the battle was considered to be one of the most severe battles fought by the Canadian Forces since the Korean War.
Background By March 1991, tensions between Croats and Serbs escalated into the Croatian War of Independence. Following a referendum on independence that was largely boycotted by Croatian Serbs, the Croatian parliament officially adopted independence on 25 June. The Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) declared its intention to secede from Croatia and join the Republic of Serbia while the Government of Croatia declared it a rebellion. Between August 1991 and February 1992, the RSK initiated an ethnic cleansing campaign to drive out the Croat and non-Serb population from RSK-held territory, eventually expelling as many as 250,000 people according to Human Rights Watch.
Much of the interior of the Lika region of southern Croatia was captured by the forces of the RSK and the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) during 1991. In Lika, almost all of the Croatian population in the Serb-held area was killed, expelled or forced to seek refuge in government-held areas, while the Serbs continued shelling of the Croatian city of Gospić throughout the year from their positions. A ceasefire was agreed in the January 1992 Sarajevo Agreement and a United Nations peacekeeping force UNPROFOR was installed to police the armistice lines and act as negotiators, aid-workers, and combat soldiers.
Despite this, sporadic sniping and shelling continued to take place between the two sides. Gospić, which was close to the front lines, was repeatedly subjected to shellfire from the Serbian Army of Krajina (SVK). The town was of great importance in securing lines of communication between Zagreb, Dalmatia and Rijeka. Much of the shelling took place from the Serb-controlled Medak Pocket, an area of high ground near Medak, Croatia approximately four to five kilometres wide and five to six kilometres long which consisted of the localities of Divoselo, Čitluk and part of Počitelj plus numerous small hamlets. The pocket was primarily a rural area with a combination of forest and open fields. It was fairly lightly inhabited before the attack, with about 400 Serb civilians residing in the area and was held by units of the SVK's 15th Lika Corps.
The pocket adjoined Sector South, one of the four United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia. It was not actually in the UNPA but lay just outside in a so-called "pink zone"—RSK held territory outside the UNPAs, patrolled by UNPROFOR peacekeepers. Prior to the Medak Pocket offensive, Croatian government forces had launched several relatively small-scale attacks to retake rebel Serb-held territory in "pink zones" in the Miljevci plateau in June 1992 and the area of the Maslenica bridge in northern Dalmatia in January 1993—the Operation Maslenica. It has been alleged that the timing of the Maslenica and Medak offensives was owed to the political imperatives of Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, who was facing political difficulties following Croatia's intervention in the war in Bosnia.Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, p. 291. Yale University Press, 1997
During Croatian chief of staff Janko Bobetko's visit to Gospić area, he and his team concluded that the situation on that area of the front was unsatisfactory. It was especially critical on the Velebit mountain range, which was held by the members of the special police of the Croatian Ministry of the Interior. If these positions were overrun, the city of Gospić would become semi-surrounded. Croatian lines were also harassed by constant intrusions of smaller recon-sabotage groups that operated behind enemy lines. On 4 September one such group attacked Croatian positions on Velebit, which resulted in two Croatian policemen being killed.
Upon the Velebit attack, General Mladen Markač ordered the creation of a plan that would prevent further intrusions on territory held by the special police. When Bobetko learnt of that plan, he suggested fitting it into the plan of activities of the Croatian Army. From the beginning of September, the intensity of artillery attacks on wider area of Gospić also intensified. Bobetko therefore decided to run a small-scale tactical operation with the goals of partially neutralizing Serb artillery positions around city of Gospić, destroying enemy recon-sabotage group base in Divoselo, and shortening the length of Croatian frontline.
The offensive
9–14 September
The Croatian offensive involved around 2,500 troops drawn from the Croatian Army's Gospić Operational Zone. It began by preparatory fire of 9th Guards Brigade artillery batteries approximately at 06:10 on 9 September 1993. The attack was designed as the double envelopment maneuver in which tanks and infantry of the 9th Guards Brigade, starting from the Gospić suburb of Bilaj, provided one thrust of the attack, while commandos of Special Police of the Croatian Ministry of the Interior (MUP) starting from the Velebit mountain range provided a second thrust. The MUP units previously held vital Croatian positions on Velebit. These forces were also supported by the 111th Brigade of Croatian Army, Gospić Home Guard Regiment, and Lovinac Home Guard Regiment.. These two reinforced battlegroups successfully linked up same day at 14:00 in the village of Rajičevci, surrounding one battalion of the Serb militia and a number of Serb civilians in the Medak pocket. This was followed by mopping up operations. After two days of fighting, the Croatian forces had taken control of Divoselo, Čitluk and part of Počitelj. The salient was pinched out with the new front line running just in front of the village of Medak.
In accordance with their defense strategy called "Strategy of Real Threat", which envisioned deterring any Croatian attack of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina by bombarding Croatian cities in retribution, Serbian forces began to use long-range artillery (including FROG-7 ballistic missiles and M-87 Orkan) to bombard Karlovac, the Zagreb suburb of Lučko, Samobor and Jastrebarsko on 10 September. These indiscriminate attacks left dozens of civilians killed and wounded with extensive damage to homes and property. Seven civilians were killed and 23 wounded during an artillery attack on downtown Karlovac alone. On 9 September, Serb forces shelled and damaged an oil refinery in Sisak. On 13 and 14 September, MiGs-21 of the Croatian Air Force successfully destroyed some of the SVK artillery and rocket batteries on Banovina and Kordun, but one of the Croatian aircraft was downed by SA-6 near Gvozd, and its pilot, Miroslav Peris, was killed.
The SVK launched ground counter-attacks which retook some of the captured territory. It also threatened to attack 20 or 30 more targets throughout Croatia unless the captured territory was handed back. The two sides exchanged heavy artillery fire during 12–13 September, with the UN recording over 6,000 detonations in the Gospić-Medak area.
According to former SVK colonel Milislav Sekulić, one of the reasons for success of Croatian offensive on Medak Pocket was the poor combat readiness of SVK forces in that area. Notably, a month before, "[c]itizens and fighters of Divoselo" complained to their commanding officer that village defence consisted of only 30 people, out of which the youngest was aged 15 and oldest 72. At the same time, some of their men deserted from the frontline, only to engage in smuggling and other criminal activities around Knin.
15–17 September
Ceasefire The offensive attracted strong international criticism; facing political and military pressure at home and from abroad, the Croatian government agreed to a ceasefire.David C. Isby, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995, p. 269 Major-General Petar Stipetić recalled that he was summoned in Zagreb by chief of staff Janko Bobetko on 15 September, where he met with him and four other UN officers. Bobetko handed him the ceasefire agreement; however, after Stipetić signed the document, Bobetko said that he would never sign that agreement, which angered Stipetić. Stipetić also said that order of withdrawal caused a lot of anger among Croatian soldiers, although he expected nothing less. According to him, certain commanders warned him not to go to their sector because their men want to kill him for signing the ceasefire. When he came in Gospić, he met with General Rahim Ademi, who asked him to try to get some time from UNPROFOR because battlefield sanitation was not completed at that point, therefore UNPROFOR gave him three days to fix the battlefield. On 15 September a ceasefire agreement was signed by General Mile Novaković on behalf of the Serbian side and Major-General Petar Stipetić on behalf of the Croatian side. The agreement required the Croatian forces to withdraw to their starting lines of 9 September and for Serb forces to withdraw from the pocket and remain withdrawn thereafter. The Croatian withdrawal was scheduled for 12:00 on 15 September.
In order to oversee the withdrawal and protect local civilians, UNPROFOR sent 875 troops of the 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group (2PPCLI BG), its rifle companies consisting of 50% to 80% augmentees from the army reserve,Tested Mettle: Canada's Peacekeepers at War, Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan (Esprit de Corps Books, 1998), p. 124 to move into the pocket, accompanied by two French Army mechanized units. The UN forces, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel James Calvin, were instructed to interpose themselves between the Serb and Croatian forces.
Canadian buffer
"Operation Harmony" was the name given to the Canadian participation in UNPROFOR. The initial Canadian contingent, which deployed in March and April 1992, was drawn primarily from the 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group based in Lahr, Germany. It was based on troops of the Royal 22e Régiment, along with detachments from the Royal Canadian Regiment and 4 Combat Engineer Regiment. The Canadians were among the best trained troops at UNPROFOR's disposal, making them a natural choice for this dangerous task. They were equipped with M-113 armoured personnel carriers and carried a mix of M2 .50 caliber machine guns, C6 medium machine guns, C7 assault rifles, C9 light machine guns, and 84 mm Carl Gustav RCLs. The attached Heavy Weapons Support Company brought 81 mm mortars and a specially fitted APC armed with anti-tank guided missiles.