The 14th Armored Division was an armored division of the United States Army assigned to the Seventh Army of the Sixth Army Group during World War II. It remains on the permanent roll of the Regular Army as an inactive division, and is eligible for reactivation. The division is officially nicknamed the "Liberators".
History The 14th Armored Division was constituted and added to the roll of the US Army on 28 August 1942; it was activated on 15 November in a ceremony at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas. It was organized initially as a heavy division with two armored regiments (the 47th and 48th) and one armored infantry regiment, the 62nd Infantry Regiment. It was reorganized from a heavy division to a light division on 20 September 1943. The reorganization saw the loss of two tank battalions from the Armored regiments, one battalion each. The 1st Battalion of the 47th Armor was redesignated as the 786th Tank Battalion and the 3rd Battalion of the 48th Armor was redesignated as the 716th Tank Battalion.
The division departed Camp Chaffee in November to participate in the 2nd Army maneuvers in Tennessee from 17 November 1943 until 10 January 1944. At the conclusion of the exercise, the division was assigned to Camp Campbell, Kentucky. The division remained at Camp Campbell until late September when it was alerted for movement to the ETO (European Theater of Operations) via Camp Shanks, New York where it went for final processing. Units departed Camp Campbell on 1 October and completed their arrival at Camp Shanks on the 6th of that month. After completing their processing, the division boarded four transport ships for deployment on 13 October 1944.
France and the Alsatian Plain The 14th Armored Division landed at Marseille in southern France, on 29 October 1944. Within two weeks some of its elements were in combat, maintaining defensive positions along the Franco-Italian frontier. The division was assigned to US 6th Army Group on 1 November. On 10 November, the division was assigned to US Seventh Army. On 12 November the Combat Command Reserve (CCR) was detached, and ordered to the Maritime Alps by 6th Army Group to relieve units in defensive positions there. On 15 November, Combat Command A moved north from the area of Marseille to Épinal to take part in the VI Corps drive through the Vosges Mountains, and was followed by Combat Command B five days later. Hard fighting at Gertwiller, Benfeld, and Barr helped VI Corps to crack the German defenses, the division was on the Alsatian Plain in early December. On 17 December the division attacked across the Lauter River into Germany itself, along with the other units of VI Corps, it fought its way into a heavily defended portion of the German Westwall. Due to the growing crisis in the Ardennes, General Eisenhower, the supreme commander, ordered the Seventh Army to stop its attack and withdraw from the Westwall, where its units assumed positions south of the Lauter River. The order was poorly timed as elements of the 14th Armored Division had penetrated deep into the German defenses, and were poised to break out into the enemy's rear.
Operation Nordwind Task Force Hudelson On 25 December 1944 VI Corps ordered the division's Combat Command R, commanded by Colonel Daniel Hudelson, to assemble a regimental-sized task force (TF Hudelson), to establish defensive positions along a 10-mile section of the Seventh Army line linking XV and VI Corps. It was located in the rugged Vosges Mountains in the area of Bannstein in France, southeast of Saarbrücken. The balance of the division was placed in Corps Reserve to protect against a Saar Valley penetration by the Germans. Additionally, it was ordered to be prepared to move to the vicinity of Phalsbourg as a counter-attacking force to stop and prevent a break-through in the XV Corps area.
TF Hudelson consisted of the division's 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion, the 94th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and Company A of the 125th Armored Engineer Battalion. TF Hudelson was further reinforced by two VI Corps units, the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and the 1st Battalion, 540th Combat Engineers. Just before midnight on New Year's Eve 1944, the German Army Group G launched Operation Nordwind, the last major German counter-offensive of the war. The advancing German units were from the XC and LXXXIX Corps, attacking through the Low Vosges. TF Hudleson held only a thin line of strong points and screens. During the night and day of 1 January 1945, TF Hudelson found itself engaged by elements of five enemy divisions, the 256th, 257th, 361st and 559th Volksgrenadier. Just after midnight on the 1st, the 62nd Armored Infantry reported "enemy attack across the entire front of our battalion zone. The main effort by enemy being made on battalion left flank in the sector of C Co, by estimated 2000 Infantry supported by five (5) Mark IV tanks". After Action Report, 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion, 14th Armored Division, Jan thru Apr 1945, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS pg 15 The troops of TF Hudelson took the brunt of the German advance which had penetrated to Bannstein by day-break. The Task Force was soon overrun or bypassed by the German divisions but it managed to delay and slow the German advance until substantial reinforcements could arrive and stem the German advance. By the fourth day of the German counter-offensive it had advanced 10 miles. With pressure building during the first day of the attack, aerial observation reported a strong regimental size element moving towards Bannstein. Reinforcements were sent to Baerenthal to reinforce the VI Corps left flank and the 14th Armored Division was ordered to establish blocking positions. On 2 January, the 45th Division along with the attached Task Force, occupied positions to block any further penetration by the Germans. This allowed for the relief of Task Force Hudelson and its return to division control.
The major fighting between 1 and 8 January occurred in the Vosges Mountains and two combat commands of the division were in almost continuous action against the German thrusts. With the failure of his attack in the Vosges, the enemy attempted to break through to Hagenau and threaten Strasbourg and the Saverne Gap by attacks at Hatten and Rittershoffen, two small villages located side by side on the Alsatian Plain. However, this, the strongest attack of Operation Nordwind, was halted by the 14th Armored in the fierce defensive Battle of Hatten-Rittershoffen which ranged from 9 to 21 January 1945.
Hatten and Rittershoffen As the fighting in the VI Corps sector intensified, the Germans committed the 21st Panzer and the 25th Panzer Grenadier Divisions to the attack with a breakthrough to Hagenau. On 9 January, German armor was able to penetrate the center of the VI Corps sector. This caused Brooks, the Corps commander, to commit his final reserve force, the 14th Armored, in an effort to stop the German XXXIX Panzer Corps advance. Ordered to take up positions in the vicinity of Hatten and Rittershoffen, the 14th assumed command and control of units from the 242nd Infantry Regiment and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 315th Infantry Regiment, 79th Infantry Division . With heavy fighting in and around the towns, success was measured in how many buildings were controlled by each side as the Americans controlled the western half of the villages and the Germans the eastern half. On 15 January, the Germans strengthened the forces in both villages with elements of the 20th Parachute Regiment from the 7th Parachute Division, and the 104th Infantry Regiment from the 47th Volksgrenadier Division. As the fighting raged, the 14th Armored found itself increasingly on the defensive with Combat Command A holding Rittershoffen and Combat Command Reserve defending positions in and around Hatten. Combat Command B took up defensive positions behind the Rittershoffen to Leiterswiller road.
The resupply of the division was becoming very difficult due to the constant reorganizing of forces, the evacuation of the wounded and the shrinking perimeter. Gasoline, of which almost was consumed in seven days, had to come from near Saverne away along icy roads in blackout conditions. Mortar ammunition had run out by 15 January and the Division's G-4 notified the advanced command post that no more might be available for two weeks. Instructions were given for all abandoned German 8 cm mortar ammunition to be picked up and a method was devised by the Division ammunition officer to use this in American 81 mm mortars. Artillery ammunition was strictly rationed after 15 January when 6,247 rounds of ammunition were expended out of a total of nearly 40,000 rounds for the entire seven days. In order to alleviate the shortage a convoy of twenty trucks were sent to Marseilles and returned loaded with ammunition dug out of the surf and the landing sites for the invasion of Southern France. Artillery was further handicapped by the shortage of telephone wire. Poor visibility hampered air operations on both sides for most days. On 15 January the first German jet propelled aircraft was seen in the area bombing a battery of the 499th Armored Field Artillery Battalion.
Approximately 39 American and 51 German tanks were destroyed, damaged or abandoned. Recovery of disabled vehicles was very difficult due to the complete lack of cover. Following the battle, the division's G-4 (staff officer) reported to the commanding officer that the division was still short of 62 medium tanks despite having received over 60 replacements during the month of January. The 136th Ordnance Maintenance Battalion's report for the month listed approximately 150 tanks that had been knocked out in combat, repaired and returned to the division's tank battalions. An example of this is seen in the operational reports of the 47th and 48th Tank Battalions. At the height of the fighting the 47th reported that it had a total of 17 operational tanks out of an authorized strength of 50, all were committed to holding its portion of the line. The 48th Tank Battalion report for the same period included the comment that its tank companies were now of approximately squad strength.
The Division sustained battle casualties amounting to 104 killed, 899 wounded and 112 missing. German losses were estimated at in excess of 3,100 in total. The problem of obtaining infantry and armored replacement personnel, especially combat junior officers, was critical.
The Division's 11-day stand at Hatten and Rittershoffen allowed the VI Corps and Seventh Army to withdraw to prepared defensive positions. On 21 January, after the rest of Seventh Army had withdrawn to the south bank of the Moder River, the 14th and its supporting units withdrew from Hatten and Rittershoffen and moved south to join the rest of the army.
Lieutenant-General Jacob L. Devers, commanding general, 6th Army Group later commented that the Battle of Hatten-Rittershoffen "was one of the greatest defensive battles of the war." Units of the 14th Armored Division were nominated for four Presidential Unit Citations for its actions at Hatten-Rittershofen. Of these, two were awarded. Col. Hans von Luck, who commanded the 21st Panzer Division at Hatten-Rittershoffen wrote in his memoirs "Panzer Commander" that the battle ".... was one of the hardest and most costly battles that had ever raged on the western front." These are strong, telling words from a professional German panzer officer who had fought with Rommel's famed Afrika Korps in North Africa, served two tours of duty on the Eastern Front, and led the only armored counter-attack to be attempted against the Allied beachhead in Normandy. A veteran officer who served on the staff of Army Group G during the battle wrote after the war that the American defense of the town against overwhelming odds was "heroic."