The Battle of Yeonpyeong, also known as the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong (South Korean: 제2연평해전; RR: Je I Yeonpyeong Haejeon), was a confrontation at sea between North Korean and South Korean patrol boats along a disputed maritime boundary near Yeonpyeong Island in the Yellow Sea in 2002. This followed a similar confrontation in 1999. Two North Korean patrol boats crossed the contested border and engaged two South Korean Chamsuri-class patrol boats. The North Koreans withdrew before South Korean reinforcements arrived.

This event sparked controversy in South Korea over the “blocking maneuver” in response to Northern Limit Line violations. Subsequently, the blocking maneuver was removed from the rules of engagement.서해상 교전수칙 / 시사상식사전

Background

The Northern Limit Line is considered by South Korea to be the maritime boundary between itself and North Korea, while North Korea disagrees and states that the boundary is farther south. North Korean fishing vessels often wander into the area and are frequently chased away by South Korean patrol vessels. Occasionally a North Korean patrol tries to enforce its southern claim by traversing the limit line. In 2002 one such incursion turned into a naval battle along the limit line.

Engagement

Comparison of Forces The specifications of the naval vessels of North and South Korea are as follows.서해교전/남북 경비정 비교/선제 공격 北경비정, 《서울신문》, 2002.6.30

South Korea

Chamsuri High-Speed Vessel 357

Specifications: Displacement 170 tons, Length 37m, Beam 6.7m, Draft 1.7m, Crew 32 (3 officers, 29 non-commissioned officers and crew), Maximum speed 37 knots, Cruising speed 7 knots, Range 600 nautical miles Armament: 1 × 40mm gun (bow), 2 × 20mm Vulcan guns (stern), 2 × M60 machine guns

North Korea

SO-1 class PCF(Dongsan Got Patrol Boat 684)

Specifications: Displacement 207 tons, Length 42m, Beam 6.1m, Draft 1.9m, Crew 30–40 (details unknown), Maximum speed 28 knots, Cruising speed 13 knots, Range 1,100 nautical miles Armament: 1 × 45mm SM-21-ZIF autocannon (North Korea replaced it with an 85mm ZiS-S-53 tank gun), 2 × 25mm 2M-3M twin autocannons (North Korea replaced them with 37mm M1939 (61-K) autocannons), RBU-1200 400mm torpedo launcher

Battle Situation The timeline of events on June 29, 2002, is as follows:퇴각 경고하자 北 함포사격, 《매일경제》, 2002.6.29시간대별 사태추이, 《MBC뉴스》, 2002.6.29NK조선, 2002년 서해교전 - 일지, 《NK조선》, 2013.10.30

06:30 Three squadrons of South Korean high-speed vessels (6 vessels) set sail to support fishing protection. 09:54 North Korean patrol boat Dongsan Got 388 (155 tons) begins crossing the NLL and heading south. South Korean Navy 253 high-speed vessel squadron conducts a response maneuver. 10:01 North Korean high-speed vessel Dongsan Got 684 (215 tons) additionally heads south. South Korean Navy 232 high-speed vessel squadron conducts a response maneuver. 10:25 North Korean Dongsan Got 684 opens fire with its 85mm naval gun at Chamsuri 357, which was conducting a blocking maneuver at a distance of 450m. South Korean 232 squadron returns fire. During this process, the bridge of Chamsuri 357 is destroyed, and Captain Yun Young-ha is killed. 10:26 Rear squadrons 253 and 256 high-speed vessels begin suppressive fire. 10:30 Squadron 256 begins its attack. 10:33 Squadron 253 begins its attack. 10:43 Jecheon (Pohang-class corvette) begins fire support. 10:47 Jinhae (Pohang-class corvette) begins fire support. 10:48 Jecheon detects North Korean Styx missile electronic signals and responds. 10:51 The North Korean patrol boat, now on fire, is towed by another patrol boat and retreats north of the NLL. 10:56 All forces cease fire. 11:25 Jecheon and Jinhae detect North Korean Silkworm missile electronic signals and respond. 11:45 Casualties on Chamsuri 357 are confirmed and rescued. Chamsuri 357 is abandoned for towing due to severe hull damage. 11:59 Chamsuri 357 sinks.

On 29 June 2002, a North Korean patrol boat crossed the northern limit line and was warned to turn back. Shortly afterward, a second North Korean patrol craft crossed the line and it was also warned to retreat across the line. The North Korean boats began threatening and harassing the South Korean vessels following them.

After traveling south past the limit line, the North Korean vessels attacked the two South Korean patrol killer medium (PKM) boats that had been monitoring them. At 10:25, the vessel that first crossed the line opened fire with its 85 mm gun and scored a direct hit on the wheelhouse of PKM-357 causing several casualties.

The two squadrons then began a general engagement. The South Koreans using their 40 and 20 mm guns against the North Korean RPGs, 85 mm, and 37 mm guns. About ten minutes later, two more PKMs and two corvettes reinforced the South Korean vessels and severely damaged one of the North Korean craft. Now heavily outnumbered and taking casualties, the North Korean vessels retreated back across the Limit Line at 10:59.

Aftermath

Both the North Korean and South Korean flotillas took casualties from the action. Thirteen North Koreans were killed and twenty five wounded according to South Korea. The South Koreans suffered six fatalities, four during the battle, one 83 days later from wounds suffered during the battle, and one found dead at sea after the battle. The dead were Lt. Cmdr. Yoon Yeong-ha, Jo Cheon-hyung, Seo Hu-won, and Hwang Do-hyeon (during the battle), Park Dong-hyeok (days later), and Han Sang-guk (found at sea); Eighteen others were injured.

The damaged PKM-357 later sank while under tow, while the damaged North Korean vessel was able to limp its way back to port. Both sides laid blame on each other and South Korea demanded an apology from North Korea.

According to a North Korean defector's statement in 2012, the North Korean patrol boat crewmembers involved in the battle suffered extensive splinter injuries from the South Korean "Devastator" shells. The injured North Koreans were reportedly quarantined in a hospital in Pyongyang to hide the extent of the casualties suffered in the battle.

PKM 357 was later raised and towed to Pyeongtaek Naval Base, where she is now a museum ship. For display at the War Memorial of Korea, another Chamsuri-class patrol boat, PKM 301, was repainted and given faux battle damage to simulate PKM 357.

Search and salvage Search and salvage operations, delayed by a typhoon, were postponed again and began on August 5, but bad weather delayed the main operation. On August 9, the remains of missing Chief Petty Officer Han Sang-guk were recovered from the bridge.'서해 실종'韓중사 유해 수습,침몰 고속정서 인양…수도통합병원 안치, 《경향신문》, 2002.8.10 Due to bad weather and operational difficulties, the high-speed vessel was salvaged only on August 21, 53 days after sinking.‘고속정’17일만에 인양, 《문화일보》, 2002.8.21 The vessel had sunk to a depth of 28m, 25.2 km west of Yeonpyeong Island. The salvaged hull had four large holes, including two in the front of the bridge, and hundreds of marks from shells and shrapnel. The national flag was still hanging on the mast behind the bridge, drawing media attention.수백군데에 포탄흔적 긴박했던 상황 생생히…인양 서해교전 고속정, 《서울신문》, 2002.8.22

List of South Korean Casualties Chief Petty Officer Han Sang-guk was found dead during the search of the hull after being missing; Corporal Park Dong-hyuk died while being treated after being evacuated. The other four were killed during the battle.

Yoon Young-ha, Lieutenant Commander (Captain, posthumously awarded the Order of Military Merit, Chungmu) Han Sang-guk, Chief Petty Officer (Helmsman, posthumously awarded the Order of Military Merit, Hwarang)7월 1일 중사 진급이 예정되어 있었으나 실종으로 진급이 일단 취소되었다가 유족들의 건의와 인양 날짜를 고려하여 2015년 7월 10일 상사 진급하였다. Cho Cheon-hyung, Petty Officer (Weapons Officer, posthumously awarded the Order of Military Merit, Hwarang) Hwang Do-hyun, Petty Officer (Weapons Officer, posthumously awarded the Order of Military Merit, Hwarang) Seo Hu-won, Petty Officer (Engineer, posthumously awarded the Order of Military Merit, Hwarang) Park Dong-hyuk, Corporal (Medical Officer, posthumously awarded the Order of Military Merit, Chungmu)

Cause analysis Reasons for South Korea's Heavy Losses

Firepower Chamsuri high-speed vessels were equipped with 20mm Vulcan guns, 30mm autocannons, 40mm autocannons, and M60 7.62mm machine guns. However, North Korean vessels were equipped with 85mm tank guns and 14.5mm machine guns, giving them superior firepower. Although the 85mm tank gun had limited range and accuracy, a single hit could be fatal, while the weapons on Chamsuri vessels were insufficient to sink enemy ships. Despite concentrated fire from six Chamsuri vessels, Dongsan Got 684 was not sunk.

Defense Chamsuri 357 was directly hit by an 85mm shell in the bridge, destroying the command center. Although the deputy captain took command, the weak defense exposed critical facilities such as the bridge to danger.

Response Maneuvers When enemy vessels violated the NLL, the procedure was warning broadcast → demonstration maneuver → blocking maneuver → warning shots → suppressive fire. The blocking maneuver, especially, was vulnerable to surprise attacks, and Chamsuri 357 was attacked during this maneuver.

Frigate Response It took a full 18 minutes after the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong began for frigates to join the battle with their 76mm rapid-fire guns. During this time, Chamsuri 357 suffered heavy damage. Initially, the frigates failed to properly assess the situation, and the Chamsuri vessels were not within their firing range. As a result, fire support was inadequate, and the North Korean high-speed vessel was not sunk.

Controversy

Criticism of Government Response

After the First Battle of Yeonpyeong, President Kim Dae-jung instructed the Navy to defend the Northern Limit Line, not to make preemptive attacks, to respond according to the rules of engagement if the enemy fired first, and not to escalate the conflict into war, forming the “four major rules of engagement.”［해군］ 교전규칙 어떻게 변해왔나, 《한국일보》, 2002.7.1〔사설］안보구멍 왜 뚫렸나, 《동아일보》, 2002.7.2［한석동 칼럼］ 서해교전 영웅들은 어디 있는가 , 《쿠키뉴스》, 2010.4.27 The Navy introduced the blocking maneuver, known as the “pushing operation.” Some argue that the heavy South Korean casualties in the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong were due to President Kim's rules of engagement and the introduction of the blocking maneuver. However, even before this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff's maritime operational guidelines included five steps: warning broadcast → blocking maneuver → warning shots → threatening fire → suppressive fire, and the same engagement rules and blocking maneuver were used in the First Battle of Yeonpyeong, resulting in a major victory.교전규칙 변경 전·후 , 《중앙일보》, 2009.11.11 At the time, Defense Minister Lee Jun stated, “President Kim issued the four guidelines during the 1999 Battle of Yeonpyeong, but these were already included in the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s operational regulations drafted in 1997 and were written according to the basic principles of the rules of engagement, not added or modified due to the Sunshine Policy.”정치.통일분야 정부측 답변, 《연합뉴스》, 2002.7.22 There is criticism that President Kim Dae-jung convened the National Security Council (NSC) only 4 hours and 35 minutes after the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong, a slow response despite the deaths of six South Korean soldiers."침몰원인, 어떤 경우든 단호히 대응" , 《조선일보》, 2010.4.8 The NSC, chaired by the president as commander-in-chief, concluded that the clash was accidental and accepted North Korea’s notification to the same effect. President Kim is also criticized for allowing the scheduled departure of the Kumgangsan tourist ship the day after the battle.제2연평해전 10년… 貶毁(폄훼)의 역사 바로잡아야, 《문화일보》, 2012.6.28 Lee Hoi-chang, then opposition presidential candidate, said at a general meeting, “The government calls the West Sea provocation accidental and has asked the United States and Japan for a calm response. What kind of government is this?”“정부, 北 우발적 도발로 몰고 있다” 한나라 축소의혹 제기