The Melbourne–Evans collision was a collision between the light aircraft carrier of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the destroyer of the United States Navy (USN). On 3 June 1969, the two ships were participating in SEATO exercise Sea Spirit in the South China Sea. Around 3:00 am, when ordered to a new escort station, Evans sailed under Melbournes bow, where she was cut in two. Seventy-four of Evanss crew were killed.
A joint RAN–USN board of inquiry was held to establish the events of the collision and the responsibility of those involved. This inquiry, which was believed by the Australians to be biased against them, found that both ships were at fault for the collision. Four officers (the captains of Melbourne and Evans, and the two junior officers in control of Evans at the time of the collision) were court-martialled based on the results of the inquiry; while the three USN officers were found guilty, the RAN officer was cleared of wrongdoing.
Ships
HMAS Melbourne was the lead ship of the Majestic class of aircraft carriers. She was laid down for the Royal Navy on 15 April 1943, but construction was stopped at the end of the Second World War. She was sold to the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in 1948, along with sister ship , but was heavily upgraded while construction was completed and did not enter service until the end of 1955. In 1964, Melbourne was involved in a collision with the Australian destroyer , sinking the smaller ship and killing 81 of her crew and one civilian dockyard worker.
USS Frank E. Evans was an . She was laid down on 21 April 1944, and commissioned into the United States Navy (USN) on 3 February 1945.Naval History Department, History of USS Frank E. Evans (DD-754). She served in the Second World War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, and had earned eleven battle stars.
Lead up
Melbournes commanding officer during SEATO's Sea Spirit exercise was Captain John Phillip Stevenson.Frame, Pacific Partners, p. 126. Rear Admiral John Crabb, the Flag Officer Commanding Australian Fleet, was also embarked on the carrier. During Sea Spirit, Melbourne was assigned five escorts: the US destroyers Frank E. Evans, and , and the frigates HMNZS Blackpool and . Stevenson held a dinner for the five escort captains at the start of the exercise, during which he recounted the events of the Melbourne–Voyager collision, emphasised the need for caution when operating near the carrier, and provided written instructions on how to avoid such a situation developing again.Hall, HMAS Melbourne, p. 175. Additionally, during the lead-up to the exercise, Crabb had strongly warned that all repositioning manoeuvres performed by the escorts had to commence with a turn away from Melbourne.
Despite these warnings, a near-miss occurred in the early hours of 31 May when Larson turned towards the carrier after being ordered to the plane guard station.Hall, HMAS Melbourne, p. 176. Subsequent action narrowly prevented a collision. The escorts were again warned about the dangers of operating near the carrier and informed of Stevenson's expectations, while the minimum distance between carrier and escorts was increased from .
Collision On the night of 2–3 June 1969, Melbourne and her escorts were involved in antisubmarine training exercises.Hills, Muddied Waters In preparation for launching a Grumman S-2 Tracker aircraft, Stevenson ordered Evans to the plane guard station, reminded the destroyer of Melbournes course, and instructed the carrier's navigation lights to be brought to full brilliance.Smith & Lancaster, USS Frank E. Evans, p. 1. This was the fourth time that Evans had been asked to assume this station that night, and the previous three manoeuvres had been without incident.
Evans was positioned on Melbournes port bow, but began the manoeuvre by turning starboard, towards the carrier. A radio message was sent from Melbourne to Evanss bridge and combat information centre, warning the destroyer that she was on a collision course, which Evans acknowledged.Hall, HMAS Melbourne, p. 178. Seeing the destroyer take no action and on a course to place herself under Melbournes bow, Stevenson ordered the carrier hard to port, signalling the turn by both radio and siren blasts. At approximately the same time, Evans turned hard to starboard to avoid the approaching carrier.Sherbo, Death of a Destroyer. It is uncertain which ship began to manoeuvre first, but each ship's bridge crew claimed that they were informed of the other ship's turn after they commenced their own. After having narrowly passed in front of Melbourne, the turns quickly placed Evans back in the carrier's path. Melbourne hit Evans amidships at 3:15 am, cutting the destroyer in two.Frame, Pacific Partners, p. 127.
Melbourne stopped immediately after the collision and deployed her boats, liferafts and lifebuoys, before carefully maneuvering alongside the stern section of Evans.Hall, HMAS Melbourne, pp. 178, 184. Sailors from both ships used mooring lines to lash the stern to Melbourne, allowing the carrier to evacuate the survivors in that section.Hall, HMAS Melbourne, p. 184. Evanss severed bow section sank quickly; the majority of those killed were believed to have been trapped within. Members of Melbournes crew dived into the water to rescue overboard survivors close to the carrier, while the carrier's boats and helicopters collected those farther out.Hall, HMAS Melbourne, pp. 183–184. Clothing, blankets and beer were provided to survivors from the carrier's stores, some RAN sailors offered their own uniforms, and the ship's band was instructed to set up on the flight deck to entertain and distract the USN personnel.Smith & Lancaster, USS Frank E. Evans, p. 2. All of the survivors were located within twelve minutes of the collision and rescued before half an hour had passed, although the search continued for fifteen more hours.Hall, HMAS Melbourne, pp. 182, 184.
Seventy-four of the 273 crew on Evans were killed. It was later learned that Evanss commanding officer, Commander Albert S. McLemore, was asleep in his quarters at the time of the incident, and charge of the vessel was held by lieutenants Ronald Ramsey and James Hopson; the former had failed the qualification exam to stand watch, while the latter was at sea for the first time.Hall, HMAS Melbourne, p. 200.
Post-collision events
Following the evacuation of Evanss stern, the section was cast off while the carrier moved away to avoid damage, but against expectations it failed to sink.Hall, HMAS Melbourne, p. 185. The stern was recovered and towed by fleet tug to Subic Bay, Philippines, arriving there on 9 June. After being stripped for parts, the hulk was decommissioned on 1 July, and was later sunk when used for target practice.
Melbourne travelled to Singapore, arriving on 6 June, where she received temporary repairs to her bow.Bastock, Australia's Ships of War, p. 312. The carrier departed on 27 June and arrived in Sydney on 9 July, where she remained until November docked at Cockatoo Island Dockyard for repairs and installation of the new bow.
817 Squadron RAN, which was responsible for the Westland Wessex helicopters embarked on Melbourne at the time of the collision, later received a USN Meritorious Unit Commendation for its rescue efforts. Five other decorations were presented to Australian personnel in relation to the rescue of Evanss crew: one George Medal, one Member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE), one Air Force Cross, and two British Empire Medals.Hall, HMAS Melbourne, pp. 191–192. Fifteen additional commendations for gallantry were awarded by the Australian Naval Board.
Joint board of inquiry A joint RAN–USN board of inquiry was established to investigate the incident, following the passing of special regulations allowing the presence of Australian personnel at a US inquiry. The board was in session for over 100 hours between 9 June and 14 July, with 79 witnesses interviewed: 48 USN, 28 RAN, and three from other navies.Stevenson, In The Wake, pp. 68, 167–168.
The board was made up of six officers. The RAN representatives were Rear Admiral David Stevenson (no relation to Melbournes Captain Stevenson), Captain Ken Shards, and Captain John Davidson.Jo Stevenson, In The Wake, p. 56. The USN officers were captains S. L. Rusk and C. B. Anderson. Presiding over the board was USN Rear Admiral Jerome King, a posting that was controversial as he was the commanding officer of both the forces involved in Sea Spirit and the fleet unit to which Evans normally belonged, and was seen during the inquiry to be biased against Captain Stevenson and other RAN personnel.Cooper, in Stevens, The Royal Australian Navy, p. 203. King's attitude, performance, and conflict of interest were criticised by the Australians present at the inquiry and the press, and his handling of the inquiry was seen as detrimental to Australia–United States relations.Frame, Pacific Partners, pp. 127–128.
Despite admissions by members of the USN, given privately to personnel in other navies, that the incident was entirely the fault of Evans, significant attempts were made to reduce the US destroyer's culpability and place at least partial blame for the incident on Melbourne.Frame, Pacific Partners, p. 128. At the beginning of the inquiry, King banned one of the RAN legal advisers from attending, even as an observer.Stevenson, In The Wake, p. 71. He regularly intervened for American witnesses but failed to do so on similar matters for the Australians.Stevenson, In The Wake, p. 85. Testimony on the collision and the subsequent rescue operation was to be given separately, and although requests by American personnel to give both sets of testimony at the same time in order to return to their duties were regularly granted, the same request made by Stevenson was denied by King.Stevenson, In The Wake, p. 95. Testimony of members of the RAN had to be given under oath, and witnesses faced intense questioning from King, despite the same conditions not applying to USN personnel.Stevenson, In The Wake, p. 163. There was also a heavy focus on the adequacy of Melbournes navigational lighting.Stevenson, In The Wake, p. 136. Mentions of the near miss with Larson were interrupted with the instruction that those details could be recounted at a later time, but the matter was never raised by the board.
The unanimous decision of the board was that although Evans was partially at fault for the collision, Melbourne had contributed by not taking evasive action sooner, even though doing this would have been a direct contravention of international sea regulations, which stated that in the lead-up to a collision the larger ship was required to maintain course and speed.Hall, HMAS Melbourne, p. 204. The report was inconsistent in several areas with the evidence given at the inquiry, including the falsity that Melbournes navigational lights took significant time to come to full brilliance.Stevenson, In The Wake, pp. 196–197. Several facts were also edited out of the transcripts of the inquiry.Stevenson, In The Wake, pp. 200–201.
Courts-martial Stevenson