The Melbourne–Voyager collision, also known as the Melbourne–Voyager incident or simply the Voyager incident''', was a collision between two warships of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN): the aircraft carrier and the destroyer .
On the evening of 10 February 1964, the two ships were performing manoeuvres off Jervis Bay. Melbourne aircraft were performing flying exercises, and Voyager had been given the task of plane guard. After a series of turns, Voyager was ordered to resume its position behind Melbourne. Instead, Voyager turned to port across the carrier's path, and a collision became inevitable.Melbourne struck Voyager at 20:56, with the carrier's bow striking just behind the bridge and cutting the destroyer in two. Of the 314 aboard Voyager, 82 were killed. Melbourne, although damaged, suffered no fatalities.
The RAN proposed a board of inquiry to investigate the collision, but a full royal commission was established. The Royal Commission, headed by Sir John Spicer, concluded that Voyager was primarily at fault for failing to maintain effective situational awareness, but also criticised Melbourne captain, John Robertson, and his officers.
Increasing pressure over the results of the first Royal Commission, along with allegations that Captain Duncan Stevens was unfit for command, prompted a second Royal Commission in 1967. It was the only time in Australian history that two Royal Commissions had been held to investigate the same incident. The second Royal Commission found that Stevens was unfit to command for medical reasons.
Ships
HMAS Melbourne
HMAS Melbourne was the lead ship of the Majestic-class of light fleet aircraft carriers. She was laid down for the Royal Navy on 15 April 1943 at Vickers-Armstrongs' Naval Construction Yard in Barrow-in-Furness, England, and launched on 28 February 1945. Work was suspended at the end of World War II, and did not resume until the Australian government purchased her and sister ship in 1947. Melbourne was heavily upgraded to operate jet aircraft, and was only the third aircraft carrier in the world to be constructed with an angled flight deck. The carrier was commissioned into the RAN on 28 October 1955.
The carrier was long, had a displacement of 15,740 tons, and could reach a speed of . The carrier's air group consisted of de Havilland Sea Venom fighter-bombers, Fairey Gannet anti-submarine aircraft, and Westland Wessex helicopters. Melbourne underwent her annual refit from 16 September 1963 to 20 January 1964, with command handed over to Captain John Robertson in early January.
HMAS Voyager
HMAS Voyager was the first of three Australian-built destroyers. The first all-welded ship built in Australia, Voyager was laid down by Cockatoo Island Dockyard in Sydney on 10 October 1949, launched on 1 May 1952, and commissioned into the RAN on 12 February 1957.
At in length, Voyager displaced 2,800 tons (standard), and had a maximum speed of . After returning to Australia in August 1963, after a deployment to the Far East Strategic Reserve, Voyager was sent to Williamstown Naval Dockyard for refitting. Captain Duncan Stevens was appointed commanding officer at the end of that year. The refit was completed in late January 1964.
Collision On 9 February 1964, both ships arrived at Jervis Bay for post-refit trials. During the day of 10 February the ships operated independently, or exercised with the British submarine . That evening, while south-east of Jervis Bay, Melbourne was performing night flying exercises, while Voyager was acting as the carrier's plane guard escort; tasked with rescuing the crew from any aircraft that crashed or ditched. This required Voyager to maintain a position astern of and to port of Melbourne at a distance of . As aircraft carriers head into the wind to provide maximum assistance for takeoffs, their course can vary widely and on short notice; bridge teams aboard escorting destroyers must thus remain alert at all times.
During the early part of the evening, when both ships were manoeuvring together, Voyager had no difficulty maintaining her position. After the series of course changes which began at 20:40, intended to reverse the courses of both ships onto a northerly heading of 020° for flight operations, Voyager ended up ahead and to starboard of Melbourne.
At 20:52, Voyager was ordered to resume her plane guard station. According to Melbournes ship log the order to resume plane guard, sent as Foxtrot Corpen 020, was sent at 20.54.Voyager acknowledged the order and began turning a minute later. It was expected that Voyager would turn away from Melbourne, make a large circle, cross the carrier's stern, then advance towards Melbourne on her port side. Voyager did turn to starboard, away from Melbourne, but then unexpectedly turned to port. It was initially assumed by Melbourne bridge crew that Voyager was "fishtailing", conducting a series of zig-zag turns to slow the ship before swinging behind Melbourne, but Voyager did not alter course again. Recent investigations have demonstrated Melbournes bridge crew correctly interpreted Voyagers action as a fishtail manoeuvre.
Due to Justice Spicers report in 1964 it has been written that on Voyagers bridge, the officer of the watch and the navigator had become distracted, and Stevens was reading navigational charts, impairing his night vision. Recent investigations challenge this opinion by providing direct testimony of the three survivors from Voyager bridge who gave evidence at the first royal commission. There was no such distraction; the officer of the watch and navigator on Voyager were manoeuvring Voyager into position. The officer of the watch remained at the pelorus from the first to the last four signals and was watching Melbourne through the entire exercise with his binoculars. Captain Stevens was also seen by one witness to come out from the chart area at 20.54, several minutes before the collision, and was seen to return to his chair or near his chair before suddenly moving and giving the order "full ahead, hard astarboard" 20 seconds before the collision.
The port bridge lookout had come on duty while Voyager was turning to starboard, and raised the alarm when the swing back to port brought Melbourne back into view around 20:55. Melbourne navigation officer ordered the carrier's engines to half speed astern around the same time, which Captain Robertson increased to full astern a few seconds later. At the same time, Stevens gave the order "Full ahead both engines. Hard a-starboard," before instructing the destroyer's quartermaster to announce that a collision was imminent. Both ships' measures were too late; at 54 seconds from impact, the ships were less than apart and in extremis –physically unable to alter their speed or course enough to avoid a collision. Recent investigations have asserted the time of alert for both ships was 40 seconds. Captain Robertson himself was adamant that Voyager appeared to be doing a legitimate manoeuvre by fishtailing to get into station, that the arrival of danger was sudden and irreversible, and that Melbournes bridge crew did not see Voyagers port light till 20 seconds before the collision.Melbourne struck Voyager at 20:56, with the carrier's bow cutting into the forward superstructure of the destroyer just aft of the bridge and operations room. The senior officers on the bridge were killed on impact. The mass of the oncoming carrier rolled Voyager to starboard before cutting the ship in two, with the bow passing down Melbourne port side, and the stern down the starboard. Voyager forward boiler exploded, briefly starting a fire in the open wreckage of the carrier's bow before it was extinguished by seawater. The destroyer's forward section sank in 10 minutes, due to the weight of the two gun turrets. The aft section did not begin sinking until half an hour after the collision, and did not completely submerge until 00:18. In the messages that were sent immediately to the Fleet Headquarters in Sydney, Robertson underestimated the extent of the damage to Voyager and as a result the Captain Cook Graving Dock at Garden Island was ordered to clear the troopship from the dock to make room for Voyager, and the salvage ship, , began sailing south to tow the destroyer to Sydney.Melbourne launched her boats almost immediately after the collision to recover survivors, and the carrier's wardroom and C Hangar were prepared for casualties. One cutter was able to rescue 40 people before beginning to take on water. The cutter was commanded by Leading Seaman M. A. W. Riseley, who rescued as many survivors as he could despite the weight limit of the rescue boat. The admiral's barge was damaged by debris. Eight helicopters were also launched, but it was then deemed too dangerous to have so many active in such a small area, and they were limited to two at a time. Most of the sailors in the water were unable or unwilling to be rescued with the helicopters' winches, so the helicopters were reassigned to provide illumination of the site with their landing lights. At 21:58, Melbourne was informed that five minesweepers (HMA Ships , , , , and ), two search-and-rescue (SAR) boats from ( and ), and helicopters from Naval Air Station Nowra, had been dispatched. The destroyer escort was also being prepared to sail. Arriving just before 22:00, Air Nymph collected 34 survivors and attempted to transfer them to Melbourne, but swells pushed the boat up under the carrier's flight deck and damaged two communications aerials, and the SAR boat was sent back to Creswell to offload the survivors. Another 36 were recovered by Air Sprite and transported ashore. Sea searches continued until 12 February, and aircraft made occasional passes over the area until 14 February, looking for bodies.
From the 314 personnel aboard Voyager at the time of the collision, 14 officers, 67 sailors, and one civilian dockyard worker were killed, including Stevens and all but two sailors of the bridge crew. The majority of those killed had been in the forward section of Voyager when the collision occurred, off duty and relaxing or sleeping. Only three bodies were recovered, one of them being that of Stevens. They were buried on 14 February, and the missing were declared dead on 17 February. Memorial services were held around Australia on 21 February. There were no casualties aboard Melbourne.
Repairs and replacement At 03:00, after the Voyager survivors were bedded down and the forward collision bulkheads had been inspected and shored up, Robertson handed command of the search operation to Stuart and began to make for Sydney. Melbourne was docked at Cockatoo Island Dockyard for repairs to her bow, which were completed by May 1964. She remained in service with the RAN until 1982, and was sold for scrap to China in 1985.
Following the collision, both the United Kingdom and the United States of America offered to lend ships to the RAN as a replacement; the Royal Navy offered Daring class destroyer , while the United States Navy offered two destroyers: and . Duchess was accepted and modernised, and as she was only intended to be in RAN service for four years (although she was later sold to the RAN and served until 1977), the RAN ordered the construction of two improved s (British Type 12 frigates), based on the design. and entered service in 1970 and 1971 respectively.
Investigations
First Royal Commission