Clandestine human intelligence is intelligence collected from human sources (HUMINT) using clandestine espionage methods. These sources consist of people working in a variety of roles within the intelligence community. Examples include the quintessential spy (known by professionals as an asset or agent), who collects intelligence; couriers and related personnel, who handle an intelligence organization's (ideally) secure communications; and support personnel, such as access agents, who may arrange the contact between the potential spy and the case officer who recruits them. The recruiter and supervising agent may not necessarily be the same individual. Large espionage networks may be composed of multiple levels of spies, support personnel, and supervisors. Espionage networks are typically organized as a cell system, in which each clandestine operator knows only the people in his own cell, perhaps the external case officer, and an emergency method (which may not necessarily involve another person) to contact higher levels if the case officer or cell leader is captured, but has no knowledge of people in other cells. This cellular organization is a form of compartmentalisation, which is an important tactic for controlling access to information, used in order to diminish the risk of discovery of the network or the release of sensitive information.
Legal aspects Black's Law Dictionary (1990) defines espionage as: "gathering, transmitting, or losing ... information related to the national defense."
In the UK, "Under the 1911 Act, a person commits the offence of 'spying' if he, for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State;
(a) approaches, inspects, passes over or is in the neighbourhood of, or enters any prohibited place,
(b) makes any sketch, plan, model, or note which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy; or
(c) obtains, collects, records, or publishes, or communicates to any other person any secret official code word, or pass word, or any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy. [Note: "an enemy" apparently means a potential enemy, so could theoretically include all foreign governments]
"The offence of spying covers all such acts committed by any person within Her Majesty's dominions, and such acts committed elsewhere by British Officers or subjects. It is not necessary for the person concerned to have been warned beforehand that they were subject to the Official Secrets Act. The 1920 Act creates further offences of doing any "act preparatory" to spying, or of soliciting, inciting, seeking to persuade, or aiding and abetting any other person to commit spying.
The US defines espionage towards itself as "The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. Espionage is a violation of 18 United States Code 792–798 and Article 106, Uniform Code of Military Justice."
Major HUMINT organizations (a list of intelligence agencies) See List of intelligence agencies for a more complete list Country Espionage organization Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (ABIN) Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) or (French: Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité, SCRS) Ministry of State Security of the People's Republic of China or (Simplified Chinese: 国家安全部; Pinyin: Guojia Anquan Bu, or Guoanbu) Intelligence Directorate, formerly Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI) Cabinet General Intelligence Bureau Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE) or Directorate-General for External Security Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) Intelligence Bureau (IB) Mossad (HaMossad leModi'in uleTafkidim Meyuhadim (Hebrew: המוסד למודיעין ולתפקידים מיוחדים ) or Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations) Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) or Federal Intelligence Service Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Intelligence Bureau (IB) National Intelligence Service (South Korea) Foreign Intelligence Service (Romania) Foreign Intelligence Service (Russian: Служба Внешней Разведки or SVR); Main Intelligence Directorate (Russian: Главное Разведывательное Управление or GRU) South African Secret Service (SASS) National Intelligence Centre (México) (CNI), former CISEN Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), commonly known as MI6; Defence HUMINT Organisation (DHO), part of the Defence Intelligence, Joint Support Group; Special Reconnaissance Regiment Directorate of Operations (DO), Special Activities Center, Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Clandestine Service (DCS), part of the Defense Intelligence Agency; United States Army Intelligence Support Activity (USAISA), part of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC); Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Espionage is usually part of an institutional effort (i.e., governmental or corporate espionage), and the term is most readily associated with state spying on potential or actual enemies, primarily for military purposes, but this has been extended to spying involving corporations, known specifically as industrial espionage. Many nations routinely spy on both their enemies and allies, although they maintain a policy of not making comment on this. In addition to utilizing agencies within a government many also employ private companies to collect information on their behalf such as SCG International Risk and others.
Penetrations of foreign targets by people loyal to their own country Not all clandestine human sources change their loyalties to the country to which they were born, or owed their first allegiance. In this section we are talking of the classical and actually rare "spy", who really is a loyal citizen of country A but obtains information from country B, either through informal means (e.g., fake news reporting) or actually going to work for country B.
A special case is of the Country B loyalist who controls agents or provides other supporting or managerial functions against Country A.
Clandestine reporting Richard Sorge was a Soviet citizen (i.e., country A), who posed as a German (country C) journalist in Tokyo, to report on Japan (country B) back to the Soviet Union. Sorge was eventually caught and executed by the Japanese, who generally honored his bravery. Especially in wartime, while a country may need to execute an agent, they sometimes respect them.
It is a truism that a live captured spy has more potential value than a dead one, since a live one can still be interrogated, or perhaps turned into a double agent. There have been cases where countries have announced the execution of people who are actually alive.
Dangled mole Dangled moles start out being loyal to one country B, but go to work for another service A, reporting back to their original service. Such operations can become "infinities of mirrors" as the mole may be detected and the service by which they are employed tries to double them, which may or may not work.
One of the best-known, and apparently most successful, was the early Soviet recruitment of Kim Philby (i.e., service B), who was then dangled to the British Secret Intelligence Service (i.e., service A), for whom Philby went to work and rose to high rank. Philby is discussed further below.
As far as is known from public sources, the only mole, already loyal to a foreign service, who went to work for the CIA (i.e., in the service A role) was Karl Koecher, who actually was loyal to the Czechoslovak intelligence service (service B1), while Czechoslovakia was a Soviet (i.e., service B) satellite state. Koecher became a CIA translator and a good source of information to the Czechs and Soviets. While, as far as is known in public sources, still loyal to his original agency, Koecher was ordered to report to Moscow by Oleg Kalugin, longtime legal resident of the USSR in the US. Kalugin accused Koecher of being a US double agent. Koecher retired from the CIA and went to work in academia, but was subsequently reactivated by the KGB and went to work, part-time, for the CIA. During this period, he was discovered by the FBI, who attempted to double him against the KGB, but the FBI considered him unreliable and eventually arrested him. The arrest was legally tainted, and Koecher was eventually exchanged for Soviet prisoners, both sides apparently not wanting the affair to be in a public court.
The US used Katrina Leung as a dangled mole to the PRC, although the true loyalty of Leung, who came to the US on a Taiwanese passport, is not known with certainty. She may have had a long-term allegiance to the PRC, been loyal to the US and then been turned by the PRC, or primarily been loyal to herself.
Human sources who changed allegiance With the exception of penetration moles, other human sources start out as highly trusted by their services. What causes an individual to betray service A, typically his country of birth? The most common shorthand for changing allegiance is MICE, an acronym for:
Money: Low salary? Greedy? Needs money for family crisis? In debt? Ideology: Hates his system, admires ours? Compromise (or coercion): Vulnerable to blackmail? Emotional relationship with an access agent? Ego (or excitement): Lonely? Looking for a friend? Passed over for a promotion? Not appreciated by peers and superiors? Seeking praise and recognition? Adventurous? Looking for personal challenge? Wants to be James Bond? Egomaniac? Wants to prove he can get away with it?
Sometimes more than one factor applies, as with Robert Hanssen, an FBI counterintelligence agent who was a "write-in" to the KGB. While he received large amounts of money, he apparently felt unappreciated in his own service and spying on it satisfied his ego.
Psychological factors can apply to people changing allegiance for reasons other than coercion or ideology. To go beyond slogans, Project Slammer was an effort of the Intelligence Community Staff, under the Director of Central Intelligence, to come up with characteristics of Project Slammer, an Intelligence Community sponsored study of espionage.
It "examines espionage by interviewing and psychologically assessing actual espionage subjects. Additionally, persons knowledgeable of subjects are contacted to better understand the subjects' private lives and how they are perceived by others while conducting espionage.
How an espionage subject sees himself (at the time of espionage) Attitude Manifestations His basic belief structureSpecial, even unique. Deserving. His situation is not satisfactory. No other (easier) option (than to engage in espionage). Only doing what others frequently do. Not a bad person. His performance in his government job (if presently employed) is separate from espionage; espionage does not (really) discount his contribution in the workplace. Security procedures do not (really) apply to him. Security programs (e.g., briefings) have no meaning for him, unless they connect with something with which he can personally identify. He feels isolated from the consequences of his actions:He sees his situation in a context in which he faces continually narrowing options, until espionage seems reasonable. The process that evolves into espionage reduces barriers, making it essentially "Okay" to initiate the crime. He sees espionage as a victimless crime. Once he considers espionage, he figures out how he might do it. These are mutually reinforcing, often simultaneous events.