Substantial debate exists over the ethical, legal, and military aspects of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 August and 9 August 1945 respectively at the close of the Pacific War theater of World War II (1939–45), as well as their lasting impact on both the United States and the international community. Topics include their military necessity toward ending the war in Asia, comparisons to the proposed Western Allied invasion of mainland Japan and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, comparison to other strategic bombing in the war, and characterization as state terrorism or a war crime.
On 26 July 1945 at the Potsdam Conference, United States president Harry S. Truman, British prime minister Winston Churchill and President of China Chiang Kai-shek issued the Potsdam Declaration, which outlined the terms of surrender for the Empire of Japan. This ultimatum stated if Japan did not surrender, it would face "prompt and utter destruction"."Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender issued at Potsdam Germany", 26 July 1945. Retrieved on 15 January 2012.
Some debaters focus on the presidential decision-making process, and others on whether or not the bombings were the proximate cause of Japanese surrender. Over the course of time, different arguments have gained and lost support as new evidence has become available and as studies have been completed. There is also the debate on the role of the bombings in Japan's surrender and the U.S.'s justification for them based upon the premise that the bombings precipitated the surrender. This remains the subject of both scholarly and popular debate, with revisionist historians advancing a variety of arguments. In 2005, in an overview of historiography about the matter, J. Samuel Walker wrote, "the controversy over the use of the bomb seems certain to continue". Walker stated, "The fundamental issue that has divided scholars over a period of nearly four decades is whether the use of the bomb was necessary to achieve victory in the war in the Pacific on terms satisfactory to the United States.".
Supporters of the bombings generally assert that they caused the Japanese surrender, preventing massive casualties on both sides in the planned invasion of Japan: Kyūshū was to be invaded in November 1945 and Honshū four months later. It was thought Japan would not surrender unless there was an overwhelming demonstration of destructive capability. Those who oppose the bombings argue it was militarily unnecessary,The Collins Encyclopedia of Military History, Dupuy & Dupuy, BCA 1994, p. 1308 inherently immoral, a war crime, or a form of state terrorism.. Critics believe a naval blockade and conventional bombings would have forced Japan to surrender unconditionally.Kramer, Ronald C; Kauzlarich, David (2011), Rothe, Dawn; Mullins, Christopher W, eds., "Nuclear weapons, international law, and the normalization of state crime", State crime: Current perspectives, pp. 94–121, . Some critics believe Japan was more motivated to surrender by the Soviet Union's invasion of Manchuria, Sakhalin and Kuril Islands, which could have led to Soviet occupation of Hokkaido.
From outside the United States, debates have focused on questions about America's national character and morality, as well as doubts concerning its ongoing diplomatic and military policies. There is also a school of thought which condemns the bombing as a war crime or crime against humanity.
Support Prevention of many U.S. and Japanese military casualties
Those who argue in favor of the decision to drop the atomic bombs on enemy targets believe massive casualties on both sides would have occurred in Operation Downfall, the planned Allied invasion of Japan.Ending the Pacific War: Harry Truman and the Decision To Drop the Bomb April 2034 20http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1404.200904.frank.trumanbomb.html The bulk of the force invading Japan would be American although the British Empire would contribute three divisions of troops (one each from the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia).Allan Brooke: War Diaries 1939–1945. June 28.
The U.S. anticipated losing many combatants in Downfall, although the number of expected fatalities and wounded is subject to some debate. U.S. President Harry S. Truman stated in 1953 he had been advised U.S. casualties could range from 250,000 to one million combatants.President Truman to James L. Cate, January 12, 1953. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/small/mb18g.htm Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard, a member of the Interim Committee on atomic matters, stated that while meeting with Truman in the summer of 1945 they discussed the bomb's use in the context of massive combatant and non-combatant casualties from invasion, with Bard raising the possibility of a million Allied combatants being killed. As Bard opposed using the bomb without warning Japan first, he cannot be accused of exaggerating casualty expectations to justify the bomb's use, and his account is evidence that Truman was aware of, and government officials discussed, the possibility of one million casualties.. However, other estimates were lower. For example, on June 18, 1945, General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the invasion force, predicted 95,000 casualties (a third of those deaths) in the first 90 days of the invasion.
A quarter of a million casualties is roughly the level the Joint War Plans Committee estimated, in its paper (JWPC 369/1) prepared for Truman's 18 June meeting. A review of documents from the Truman Library shows Truman's initial draft response to the query describes General Marshall only as saying "one quarter of a million would be the minimum". The "as much as a million" phrase was added to the final draft by Truman's staff, so as not to appear to contradict an earlier statement given in a published article by Stimson (former Secretary of War).The Final Months of the War With Japan. Part V: Did the SIGINT Picture Affect the Discussions at Potsdam? In a study done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1945, the figures of 7.45 casualties per 1,000 man-days and 1.78 fatalities per 1,000 man-days were developed. This implied the two planned campaigns to conquer Japan would cost 1.6 million U.S. casualties, including 380,000 dead.. JWPC 369/1 (prepared June 15, 1945)The Final Months of the War With Japan. Part III, note 24 which provided planning information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, estimated an invasion of Japan would result in 40,000 U.S. dead and 150,000 wounded. Delivered on June 15, 1945, after insight gained from the Battle of Okinawa, the study noted Japan's inadequate defenses resulting from a very effective sea blockade and the Allied firebombing campaign. Generals George C. Marshall and Douglas MacArthur signed documents agreeing with the Joint War Plans Committee estimate..
In addition, a large number of Japanese combatant and non-combatant casualties were expected as a result of such actions. Contemporary estimates of Japanese deaths from an invasion of the Home Islands range from several hundreds of thousands to as high as ten million. General MacArthur's staff provided an estimated range of American deaths depending on the duration of the invasion, and also estimated a 22:1 ratio of Japanese to American deaths. From this, a low figure of somewhat more than 200,000 Japanese deaths can be calculated for a short invasion of two weeks, and almost three million Japanese deaths if the fighting lasted four months. A widely cited estimate of five to ten million Japanese deaths came from a study by William Shockley and Quincy Wright; the upper figure was used by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, who characterized it as conservative.. Some 400,000 additional Japanese deaths might have occurred in the expected Soviet invasion of Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan's main islands,. An Air Force Association webpage states that "Millions of women, old men, and boys and girls had been trained to resist by such means as attacking with bamboo spears and strapping explosives to their bodies and throwing themselves under advancing tanks." The AFA noted that "[t]he Japanese cabinet had approved a measure extending the draft to include men from ages fifteen to sixty and women from seventeen to forty-five (an additional 28 million people)".
The great loss of life during the Battle of Iwo Jima and other Pacific islands gave U.S. leaders an idea of the casualties that would happen with a mainland invasion. Of the 22,060 Japanese combatants entrenched on Iwo Jima, 21,844 died either from fighting or by ritual suicide. Only 216 Japanese POWs were held at the hand of the Americans during the battle. According to the official Navy Department Library website, "The 36-day (Iwo Jima) assault resulted in more than 26,000 American casualties, including 6,800 dead" with 19,217 wounded., talks about how many historians have overestimated the number Japanese defenders, with 20,000 and even 25,000 listed. Burrell puts the range between 18,061 and 18,591, with exactly 216 of these taken prisoner. The rest were KIA or MIA. To put this into context, the 82-day Battle of Okinawa lasted from early April until mid-June 1945 and U.S. casualties (out of five Army and two Marine divisions) were above 62,000, of which more than 12,000 were killed or missing..
The U.S. military had nearly 500,000 Purple Heart medals manufactured in anticipation of potential casualties from the planned invasion of Japan. To date, all American military casualties of the 60 years following the end of World War II, including the Korean and Vietnam Wars, have not exceeded that number. In 2003, there were still 120,000 of these Purple Heart medals in stock.Giangreco, Dennis M. & Moore, Kathryn, "Are New Purple Hearts Being Manufactured to Meet the Demand?"; History News Network (December 1, 2003), Retrieved December 4, 2006 Because of the number available, combat units in Iraq and Afghanistan were able to keep Purple Hearts on hand for immediate award to wounded soldiers on the field.
Expedited end of war saved lives
Supporters of the bombings argue waiting for the Japanese to surrender would also have cost lives. "For China alone, depending upon what number one chooses for overall Chinese casualties, in each of the ninety-seven months between July 1937 and August 1945, somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 persons perished, the vast majority of them noncombatants. For the other Asian states alone, the average probably ranged in the tens of thousands per month, but the actual numbers were almost certainly greater in 1945, notably due to the mass death in a famine in Vietnam.".This justification of "saving lives" was never used by Truman in the weeks following the strikes, and there was no need to: the American public viewed the nuclear attacks positively. It did surface years afterwards in his memoirs: during the interim, of course, questions had been raised about the necessity and morality of his decision to drop atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. See : "Even when secret wartime documents were declassified, historians did not focus on the striking inconsistencies between these documents and those parts of the principal decision-makers' memoirs that dealt with estimates of lives saved." Miles, a veteran government official and former senior fellow of the Wilson Center, described the notion that Hiroshima saved 500,000 American military and numerous other deaths simply as a "myth".