The defense industry of Russia is a strategically important sector and a large employer in the Russian Federation. As of April 2025, it employs approximately 4.5 million people nationwide. It also accounts for 20% of all manufacturing jobs in Russia. Total defense spending in Russia reached 7.5% of GDP in 2023.

President Vladimir Putin considered the Syrian civil war to be a good platform for advertisement of the capabilities of Russian weapons capable of boosting Russia's military sales. Russia accounted for 21% of global arms sales in 2014–18, that figure dropped to 11% in 2019–23 (SIPRI's statistics). In 2023, Russia was for the first time the third largest arms exporter, falling just behind France. Russian arms exports fell by 53% between 2014–18 and 2019–23. The number of countries purchasing major Russian arms dropped from 31 in 2019 to 12 in 2023. States in Asia and Oceania received 68% of total Russian arms exports in 2019–23, with India accounting for 34% and China for 21%. The Russian Industry and Trade Minister Anton Alikhanov claimed on 12 August 2024 that the Russian defense industry now employs about 3.8 million people.

International sanctions after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have been ineffective in countering Russian arms manufacturing. Russian military production has steadily grown, with missile production now exceeded pre-war levels. Russia currently manufactures more ammunition than all NATO nations combined, estimated at seven times the amount of the West. It has doubled its annual tank production and tripled its artillery and rocket production from pre-invasion numbers. Russia's production costs are drastically lower than those of competing nations, costing about 10 times less to create an artillery shell than comparable NATO ammunition. As of 2024, Russia produces about 3 million artillery shells a year, nearly three times the quantity from the US and Europe. The Russian defense industry has also heavily increased its production of armored vehicles and UAVs since 2023. Russia's expanding arms production has been linked to its managed economy, with heavy state subsidization of unprofitable arms manufacturers prior to the 2022 invasion, in comparison with capitalist western nations with arms manufacturers geared towards maximizing shareholder profit. On 23 November 2024, the German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated that Russia has now fully switched to a "war economy" and produces in three months the weapons and ammunition that the European Union produces in a year. NATOs Secretary General Mark Rutte made the same assessment in January 2025. On 3 April 2025, General Christopher Cavoli said before the US Senate Armed Services Committee that Russia is replacing its extensive battlefield losses of equipment and munitions at an "unprecedented rate" due to the expansion of industrial capabilities and the transition to a war economy. The New York Times wrote in April 2026 that Russia was ahead of the United States in building plants for the manufacturing of advanced drones.

History 1990s Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Arms industry entered a period of prolonged crisis. In the 1990s, the Government of Russia sharply reduced state defense procurement, many defense enterprises went bankrupt, and others reoriented themselves toward civilian production. At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, according to former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the government was spending over $100 billion to support the country's military-industrial complex. With the advent of "market relations," newly elected Russian President Boris Yeltsin launched privatization and the creation of joint-stock companies, in which most enterprises associated with the military-industrial complex were sold-off and later liquidated due to unprofitability.

2000s In April 2000, by decree of Russian President, Vladimir Putin, the state-owned military-technical cooperation intermediary, Russian Technologies, was merged with another intermediary, Promexport. This was the first step toward unifying state-owned military-technical cooperation intermediaries. On October 23, 2000, Putin signed a decree lifting restrictions prohibiting the transfer of more than 10% of shares in state-owned defense industry enterprises to the control of holding companies. The lifting of these restrictions allowed the government to begin establishing concerns in the arms industry.Военно-промышленный комплекс // Коммерсантъ, 24 мая 2004

On November 4, 2000, Putin signed a decree merging two intermediaries in the military-technical cooperation (Promeksport and Rosvooruzheniye) into a single intermediary, Rosoboronexport. Rosvooruzheniye's head, A. Ogarev, was dismissed. Former Promexport deputy director Andrey Belyaninov was appointed head of Rosoboronexport, and former Promexport head Sergey Chemezov was appointed deputy general director of Rosoboronexport. Chemezov and Belyaninov were former colleagues of Putin's in the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. On December 1, 2000, Putin signed a decree establishing the Committee of the Russian Federation for Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States (CMTC)—a federal executive body for the regulation and control of arms exports. was appointed head of CMTC. State oversight of military-technical cooperation was transferred from the Ministry of Industry and Science of Russia, subordinate to Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, to the Ministry of Defense, which reports directly to the President of Russia.

On October 17, 2001, Putin dismissed the head of the Ministry of Industry and Science of Russia, . Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov was appointed minister.

On October 29, 2001, by decree of Putin, the Sukhoi Aviation Holding Company was established, which is wholly state-owned. Later, large stakes in the Sukhoi Design Bureau, Irkut Scientific Production Corporation, and Beriev Aircraft Company were transferred to Sukhoi Holding Company. The decree also transformed the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant and the Novosibirsk Aircraft Production Association Plant into joint-stock companies, with the majority of their shares transferred to Sukhoi Holding Company.

In November 2001, during a meeting of the commission on military-technical cooperation, Putin demanded that the after-sales service for Russian military equipment and spare parts supplies be streamlined.

On April 23, 2002, Putin signed a decree establishing a holding company based on the Antey concern and NPO Almaz. The holding company included several dozen Russian enterprises developing and producing air defense and missile defense systems. The holding company also received the main enterprises, previously part of the Defense Systems group. In April 2003, Putin appointed Alexander Burutin as his advisor on military-technical policy. Burutin was responsible for state defense procurement, military-technical cooperation, and military-industrial complex reform.

In 2004, the KVTS was reorganized into the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation under the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, and the Goskomoboronzakaz was reorganized into the Federal Service for Defense Procurement under the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

In 2006, the Russian state arms development program for 2007-2015 was approved. This program provides for the procurement and development of military equipment (military transport aircraft, spacecraft, motor vehicles, armored vehicles, missile defense and air defense systems, ships, and submarines) for the Russian Armed Forces. A total of 4.9 trillion rubles will be allocated to finance this program over its lifetime. In 2006, the Military-Industrial Commission under the Government of Russia was established, similar to the Military-Industrial Commission of the Soviet Union. It was tasked with implementing state military-industrial policy and military-technical support for national defense, law enforcement, and state security.

On March 1, 2007, in accordance with a decree of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Rosoboronexport became the sole state intermediary in military-technical cooperation, and arms manufacturers were deprived of the right to export finished products.Торговый залп // Коммерсантъ, 10 ноя 2008-- accessdate=2020-05-25>

On September 11, 2007, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov announced that the Russian defense industry would transition to long-term contracts (more than three years). Previously, contracts were signed for one year. This change was related to Russia's transition to a three-year state budget.

Since January 1, 2008, by decision of the Military-Industrial Commission, all procurement for the armed forces has been conducted through the .

In 2009, the state allocated approximately 6 billion rubles in subsidies for ongoing lending to defense industry enterprises, and 60 billion rubles in contributions to the authorized capital of these enterprises. During the same year, 76 billion rubles in state guarantees were issued for these enterprises.Председатель Правительства В. В. Путин провел рабочую встречу с Министром промышленности и торговли России В. Б. Христенко и руководителем ФСВТС России М. А. Дмитриевым // Сайт председателя правительства России, 15 февраля 2010 The total amount of state support for defense industry enterprises in 2009–2010 amounted to approximately 220 billion rubles.

Economic significance Russia's arms industry employs approximately 3.5 million people as of 2024, and accounts for 20% of all manufacturing jobs in Russia. The combined revenue of the industry's 20 largest companies in 2009 was $12.25 billion. The Russian military-industrial complex consists of nearly 6,000 companies, many of which have been unprofitable and required government subsidization. Persistent government sustenance of these companies has been linked to Russia's demonstrated capability to substantially ramp up arms production after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Production of arms grew considerably after 2022, resulting in new production lines, 24 hour operations for factories, and the reopening of mothballed industrial sites.

Visiting Severodvinsk, then-deputy premier of the Russian Government in charge of defense industry, Dmitry Rogozin said the local shipbuilders are contracted to build eight fourth-generation nuclear submarines by 2020, and that more orders are coming. He further said the earlier program for scrapping third-generation submarines is being revised so that "these vessels will get newer missiles and be subjected to a series of repair efforts enabling them to serve for another seven years".

Russian shipbuilders and naval missile manufacturers, such as Sevmash, survived the difficult period of transition from a command to a market-driven economy, and kept skills needed for the development of advanced combat systems. In November 2011, the Russian defense ministry awarded Sevmash contracts for construction of four Project 955A Borey-A strategic underwater cruisers armed with the Bulava intercontinental ballistic missiles. This order comes after construction of three Project 955 Boreys (Yuri Dolgorukiy, Aleksander Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh). The Russian Navy also ordered five Project 885M Yasen-M fast attack submarines, in addition to the head vessel, the K-329 Severodvinsk. The exact sum of these contracts has not been made public. It is only known that the Alexander Nevsky was built under contract worth 23 billion Rubles.

In March 2020, the Deputy Prime Minister, Yuri Borisov, said that the Russian government intended to restructure the debts of the Russian military–industrial complex in the amount of 750 billion rubles, half of which will be written off. Borisov said this while speaking at a forum of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Tatarstan.