The Battle of Kadesh was a major military conflict in the early 13th century BC, between the attacking Ramesses II of the Egyptian Empire and defending Muwatalli II of the Hittite Empire. In the previous year, Ramesses II had invaded the neighboring province of Amurru. At the Orontes River, the armies engaged each other just upstream of Lake Homs and near the stronghold of Kadesh, along what is today the Lebanon–Syria border.Near the modern village of Al-Houz in Syria's Al-Qusayr District. see Kitchen, K. A., "Ramesside Inscriptions", volume 2, Blackwell Publishing Limited, 1996, pp. 16–17.

The battle occurred on Year 5 III Shemu day 9 of Ramesses II, generally dated to May 1274 BCE based on the standard Egyptian chronology (low chronology; the high chronology has the date about 20 years earlier).Around "Year 5 III Shemu day 9" of Ramesses II's reign (James Henry Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, vol. III, p. 317) or more precisely: May 12, 1274 BC based on Ramesses' commonly accepted accession date in 1279 BC. It is the earliest pitched battle in recorded history for which details of tactics and formations are known, and believed to be the largest battle ever fought involving chariots, numbering at a total of 5,000 to 6,000. After being outmaneuvered, ambushed, and surrounded, Ramesses II personally led a charge through the Hittite ranks with his bodyguard. He broke through and, with the arrival of a rearguard Egyptian force, managed to reverse the disaster and drive off the Hittites. The outcome is considered a stalemate.

Background After expelling the Hyksos' 15th Dynasty around 1550 BC, the rulers of the New Kingdom of Egypt became more aggressive in reclaiming control of their state's borders. Thutmose I, Thutmose III, and his son and coregent Amenhotep II fought battles from Megiddo north to the Orontes, including conflict with Kadesh.

Many Egyptian accounts between c. 1400 and 1300 BC reflect the general destabilization of Djahy, a region in southern Canaan. During the reigns of Thutmose IV and Amenhotep III, Egypt continued to lose territory to the Mitanni in northern Syria.

During the late Eighteenth Dynasty, the Amarna letters tell the story of the decline of Egyptian influence in the region. The Egyptians showed little interest in this region until almost the end of the dynasty.Moran, William L., "The Amarna Letters", Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992 Horemheb (d. 1292 BC), the last ruler of this dynasty, campaigned in this region, finally beginning to turn Egyptian interest back to the area.

This process continued in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Like his father Ramesses I, Seti I was a military commander who set out to restore Egypt's empire to the days of the Eighteenth Dynasty pharaohs almost a century before. Inscriptions on the Karnak walls record the details of his campaigns into Canaan and ancient Syria. W. J. Murnane, The Road to Kadesh: A Historical Interpretation of the Battle Reliefs of King Sety I at Karnak. (Second Edition Revised), Chicago: The Oriental Institute, 1990, He took 20,000 men and reoccupied abandoned Egyptian posts and garrisoned cities. He made an informal peace with the Hittites, took control of coastal areas along the Mediterranean Sea, and continued campaigning in Canaan. A second campaign led to his capture of Kadesh and the Amurru kingdom. His son and heir, Ramesses II, campaigned with him. Historical records show a large weapons order by Ramesses II in the year before the expedition he led to Kadesh in his fifth regnal year.

At some point, both regions may have lapsed back under Hittite control. What exactly happened to Amurru is disputed. Hittitologist Trevor R. Bryce suggests, that although it may have fallen once again under Hittite control, it is more likely Amurru remained a Hittite vassal state.Bryce, Trevor, The Kingdom of the Hittites, Oxford University Press, new edition 2005, , p. 233.

The immediate antecedents to the Battle of Kadesh were the early campaigns of Ramesses II into Canaan. In the fourth year of his reign, he marched north into Syria to recapture AmurruGrimal, Nicolas, A History of Ancient Egypt (1994) pp. 253ff. or as a probing effort to confirm his vassals' loyalty and explore the terrain for possible battlegrounds. In the spring of the fifth year of his reign, in May 1274 BC, Ramesses II launched a campaign from his capital Pi-Ramesses (modern Qantir). The army moved beyond the fortress of Tjaru on the Horus Military Route and along the coast leading to Gaza.

The recovery of Amurru was Muwatalli II's stated motivation for marching south to confront the Egyptians.

Contending forces

Ramesses led an army of four divisions: Amun, Re, Set, and the apparently newly-formed Ptah division.

There was also a poorly documented troop called the nrrn (Ne'arin or Nearin), who were possibly Canaanite military mercenaries or Egyptians, that Ramesses II had left in Amurru in order to secure the port of Sumur. This division would come to play a critical role in the battle. Also significant was the presence of Sherden troops fighting for the Egyptian army. This is the first record of them as Egyptian mercenaries. They would play an increasingly significant role in Late Bronze Age history, ultimately appearing among the Sea Peoples that ravaged the east Mediterranean at the end of the Bronze Age. Healy in Armies of the Pharaohs observes:

On the Hittite side, King Muwatalli II had mustered several of his allies, among them Rimisharrinaa, the king of Aleppo. Ramesses II recorded a long list of 19 Hittite allies brought to Kadesh by Muwatalli. This list is of considerable interest to Hittitologists, as it reflects the extent of Hittite influence at the time.

Battle

Muwatalli had positioned his troops behind "Old Kadesh". Ramesses II was misled by two captured nomads who said the Hittite army was still far off at Aleppo. The nomads were Hittite spies sent to mislead the pharaoh.

Ramesses ordered his forces to set up camp. He marched hastily towards Kadesh, completely unaware of the large enemy force waiting for him.

Ramesses II describes his arrival on the battlefield in the two principal inscriptions concerning the battle, the so-called "Poem" and the "Bulletin":

As Ramesses II and the Egyptian advance guard were about 11 kilometers from Kadesh, south of Shabtuna, he met two Shasu nomads who told him that the Hittite king was "in the land of Aleppo, on the north of Tunip" 200 kilometers away, where, the Shasu said, he was "(too much) afraid of Pharaoh, L.P.H., to come south".<ref name="Wilson">Wilson, John A, "The Texts of the Battle of Kadesh", The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures, Vol. 34, no. 4, July 1927, p. 278.</ref> This was, according to Egyptian texts, a false report ordered by the Hittites "with the aim of preventing the army of His Majesty from drawing up to combat with the foe of Hatti". An Egyptian scout then arrived at the camp bringing two Hittite prisoners. The prisoners revealed that the entire Hittite army and the Hittite king were actually close at hand:

After this, Ramesses II called his princes to meet with him and discuss the fault of his governors and officials in not informing the position of Muwatalli II and the Hittite army.

Ramesses was alone with his bodyguard and the Amun division. The vizier was ordered to hasten the arrival of the Ptah and Seth divisions. The Ra division had almost arrived at the camp. While Ramesses II was talking with the princes and ordering the Amun division to prepare for battle, the Hittite chariots crossed the river and charged the middle of the Ra division as they were making their way toward Ramesses II's position. The Ra division was caught in the open and scattered in all directions. Some fled northward to the Amun camp, all the while being pursued by Hittite chariots.

The Hittite chariotry rounded north and attacked the Egyptian camp through the Amun shield wall, creating panic among the Amun division.

The momentum of the Hittite attack began to wane as chariots were impeded by and in some cases crashing into obstacles in the large Egyptian camp.Mark Healy, op. cit., p. 61. In the Egyptian account, Ramesses describes himself as being deserted and surrounded by enemies: "No officer was with me, no charioteer, no soldier of the army, no shield-bearer[.]"

Ramesses II was able to defeat the initial attackers and return to the Egyptian lines: "I was before them like Set in his moment. I found the mass of chariots in whose midst I was, scattering them before my horses[.]" The pharaoh, forced into a desperate fight for his life, called upon his god Amun and faced the enemy. Ramesses II personally led several charges into the Hittite ranks along with his personal guard, some chariots from his Amun division, and survivors from the routed Ra division.

The Hittites, believing their enemies to be routed, stopped to plunder the Egyptian camp. They were subsequently driven back towards the Orontes River and away from the camp by an Egyptian counterattack.Mark Healy, p. 62. In the ensuing pursuit, Hittite chariots were overtaken and dispatched by lighter Egyptian chariots.

Having suffered this significant reversal in the battle, Muwatalli II still commanded a large force of reserve chariotry and infantry, as well as the walls of the town. As the retreat reached the river, he ordered another thousand chariots to counter-attack, led by high nobles close to the king. As the Hittite forces approached the same Egyptian camp again, the Ne'arin troop contingent from Amurru suddenly arrived, surprising the Hittites. Finally, the Ptah division arrived from the south, threatening the Hittite rear.

After six unsuccessful Hittite charges, their forces were almost surrounded and the survivors were pinned against the Orontes.The Battle of Kadesh in the context of Hittite history The remaining Hittite elements were forced to abandon their chariots and attempt to swim the river "as fast as crocodiles" (according to Egyptian accounts). Many drowned.

Following the battle, the Hittites were routed, but they held on to Kadesh.

Aftermath

Unable to support a long siege of the walled city of Kadesh, Ramesses gathered his troops and headed south towards Damascus and ultimately back to Egypt. Ramesses proclaimed he had routed his enemies and that he had not attempted to capture Kadesh.Nicolas Grimal, A History of Ancient Egypt, Blackwell Books, 1992, p. 256. The battle was a personal triumph for Ramesses. After moving into the ambush, facing defeat and death, the king had managed to rally his scattered troops and save the day. The following day, the Egyptians and Hittites faced off directly, in a battle that resulted in stalemate.Brand, Ramesses II: Egypt's Ultimate Pharaoh (2023), p. 156. Note: In 1985, Dr. Hans Goedicke proposed that Ramesses' description of the slaughter was actually a decimation of his own troops. See Goedicke, H. (1985). The “Battle of Kadesh:” A Reassessment. In H. Goedicke (Ed.), Perspectives on the Battle of Kadesh, pp. 100-101). Although followed by Mark Healy Qadesh 1300 BC: Clash of the Warrior Kings, pp. 83-84 and Wilkinson, Ramesses the Great: Egypt's King of Kings p. 52 the argument has not found wide acceptance among academic scholars. See Kitchen, Ramesside Inscriptions: Notes and Comments, Vol. II p.29

Hittite records from Hattusa tell a different conclusion to the conflict, in which Ramesses was forced to depart from Kadesh in defeat. Modern historians conclude that the battle ended in a draw from a practical point of view. It is held as a turning point for the Egyptians, who had developed new technologies and rearmed against years of territorial incursions by the Hittites.