The Battle of Vargas Swamp () fought on July 25, 1819, was an engagement of Bolívar's campaign to liberate New Granada. The battle involved a joint Venezuelan and Neogranadine army commanded by General Simón Bolívar against the III Division of the Spanish Royalist Army commanded by Colonel José María Barreiro. The Battle of Vargas Swamp is considered one of the most important battles of the Colombian War of Independence, as it cleared the path for the Patriot army to advance towards Santafé de Bogotá, while also demoralizing the Royalist troops. Vargas Swamp was also the bloodiest battle of the 1819 New Granadan liberation campaign.
The battle came as a result of Bolívar trying to outflank Spanish forces by capturing the provincial capital of Tunja through the Toca road, doing this would enable the Patriots to cut off the Spanish army's supply and communication lines to Santafe de Bogotá, while also allowing the Patriots to gain the lead in the race to capture the lightly defended viceregal capital. The Royalists however caught wind of this plan and placed their forces on favorable ground in order to block them near a chokepoint between the towns of Tibasosa and Paipa. The battle lasted 6 hours, with the Royalist army having the advantage of being on higher ground as well as better equipment and better training.
This battle was difficult for Bolívar's forces who by 5pm looked like they would lose, with the Royalists almost encircling and destroying the Patriots. However a cavalry attack by a force of Llanero Lancers under the command of Lt. Colonel Juan José Rondón coupled with an infantry attack by the British Legion under Colonel James Rooke were able to break the Spanish lines and force them to withdraw. These actions turned defeat into victory for the Patriots.
Bolívar's army narrowly bested the royalist army in spite of the exhaustion of the troops after climbing the Páramo de Pisba, and crossing the swamp. This battle and the next victory over the Spanish by the Boyacá Bridge secured the independence of New Granada.
The battle was fought in an area between the towns of Paipa and Tibasosa known as Vargas swamp, which now no longer exits.
Prelude After Bolívar's army had crossed the Andes Mountain Range at the Paramo de Pisba in early July 1819 he arrived to the town of Socha, his army of Venezuelan and New Granadan troops as well as a British Legion were in a sorry state, his troops lacked uniforms and had lost all their horses as well as cattle along with some 100 dead, 500 sick, and a loss of a large amount of munitions. Over the next few days his army rested with the help of the local people of the Tunja Province (now Boyacá Department). Their assistance would be vital as they would provide food, horses, as well as tend to the sick troops, the women of these villages reportedly tore up their dresses and any clothes they could find in an effort to sew new uniforms for the naked army. Bolívar would also be able to recoup some of his forces as a large amount of locals joined his army or were conscripted.
Colonel José María Barreiro commander of the 4,000 strong III Division of Expeditionary Army of Costa Firme, the main Spanish Royalist force in the kingdom, had been garrisoned in the capital of the province, Tunja at the time of the Patriot invasion. Barreiro was surprised that Bolívar had crossed through the Paramo de Pisba especially during the winter rain season. Having heard rumours of potential invasion by the rebels in late June of 1819 he had dispersed his troops to guard the various mountain passes (except Pisba) that he thought Bolívar would take, thus at the time he had found out of the presence of Patriot forces at Socha he only had 1,000 troops with him at Tunja with some 400 guarding Santa Fe and another amount of troops scattered throughout the Altiplano Cundiboyacense. Over the next few days Barreiro began receiving intelligence reports concerning the composition of Bolívar's army revealing that he was at a numerical disadvantage, however in his letters to the viceroy he expressed confidence in his forces as they were better equipped, better armed, and had formal military training compared to mixed group of soldiers and peasants that made up Bolívar's forces.
During the following days leading up to the battle small detachments of the Patriot Vanguard clashed with patrolling Royalist troops at the town of Corrales. On July 10, Barreiro now forced to respond, sent a detachment to the town of Topaga and Corrales to block them where his troops would inflict a loss on the Patriots, however this was counteracted when Patriot cavalry forced them back to Corrales. The two armies would clash again at the Battle of Gámeza on July 11, which was indecisive for both sides. As a result of this, Bolívar realized that he was still not strong enough to face Barreiro in an open battle and discarded his initial strategy of a frontal assault on the town of Sogamoso, instead opting for a flanking maneuver through the Cerinza Valley with Barreiro falling back towards the town of Paipa to block him.
Battle
Preparations
From their camp in Bonza, on July 20, after a brief rest, the Patriot army resumed their campaign with Bolívar's main goal being the capture of the provincial capital of Tunja through the Toca road which would enable the Patriots to cut off the royalists' line of communication with Santa Fe, while also allowing them to gain the lead in the race to capture the viceregal capital. For this reason, Bolívar decided to march on the Tibasosa-Paipa road, in order to surprise the Royalists at Paipa. To do this, the Patriot army would have to cross the Chicamocha River, which was swollen as a result of the winter rain season. On the 22nd, the British Legion (which had crossed the Andes between July 14 and 15) finally rejoined his army.
The days of July 23 and 24 were dedicated to the construction of rafts to ford the river with this being completed by end of the 24th. With these completed on July 25, at five in the morning, the army began their crossing of the Chicamocha and decided to ford the river at a site known as Puente de Balsa.
However during the crossing many of the rafts collapsed, and the Patriot army struggled to get across the swollen river and would not do so until 10 am, a delay of 5 hours, which Bolívar worried would allow the Royalists to know their movements. During the delay, Bolívar dispatched a group of 40 infantrymen of the Cazadores battalion with the mission of conducting reconnaissance as well as stalking royalist troops. These infantrymen would position themselves on a hill near Vargas Swamp called Cruz de Murcia. Prior to this, from his camp near Paipa, Barreiro had been suspecting a Patriot move but could not confirm where it would take place he expressed these feelings in a letter he wrote to Viceroy Juan de Sámano in Santa Fe informing him of that a battle was imminent stating in an excerpt from the letter.
.....After dawn or before If the enemy moves, we will undertake the clash that must decide our luck. - God keep Your Excellency many years. Boncita Field, one and a half hours away from Paipa. July 20, 1819 at eight at night. Your Excellency Colonel. — José Maria Barreyro.
When the patriots became delayed because of the collapse of their rafts, spies informed Barreiro of this around 7 to 8am. Upon hearing this information he ordered that the King's 1st infantry battalion as well as other squadrons march at once towards the area of Vargas Swamp. This Royalist Vanguard marched down the road that crossed the Salitre bridge and continued their march towards the swamp, at 10 am they encountered the 40 Patriot infantry that had taken up positions at the Cruz Murcia, and thanks to their superior numbers annihilated the Patriot infantry and continued their march.Lozano Cleves, Alberto (1980) Asi se hizo la independencia. Bogotá: 2da Edicion. Biblioteca Banco Popular. p. 121. The Royalist vanguard arrived at Vargas Swamp and took up positions on Picacho and Cangrejo hills, in order to block the Patriots' passage through the chokepoint at the Varguitas ravine and the path that bordered the swamp. Barreiro arrived at 11 am with the rest of the army and placed more forces on the hill while keeping his cavalry in the reserve near his headquarters at the Casa de la Seis Ventanas and awaited the arrival of the Patriot army.
Battle Bolívar and the Patriot army were finally able to ford the river around 10 am and reached the area of Vargas swamp around noon, where he was informed of the defeat of the advance force, at the same time his troops spotted the presence of Royalist troops on top of Picacho hill. Having nowhere to retreat, with the Royalist Army blocking his way forward and the swollen Chicamocha River to his back, the Patriot army were forced to do battle.
Bolívar's strategy was aimed at taking over Picacho hill through an advance of the vanguard commanded by Brigadier General Francisco de Paula Santander who deployed the Cazadores battalion under the command of Colonel Joaquín París, this effort would be the left flank of his army. Meanwhile Brigadier General José Antonio Anzoátegui, in command of the rearguard, would attack Cangrejo hill; Colonel Arthur Sandes, commander of the Rifles Battalion, would advance on the right wing; the Barcelona Battalion, led by Colonel Ambrosio Plaza, would be located in the center; and in the reserve would be the 1st of the Line, Bravos of Páez, the British Legion as well as the cavalry would be kept in the reserve under Bolívar's direct command.
The Rifles, Barcelona, and Cazadores battalion began their assault marching past the Varguitas ravine and ascending the steep slope that faced the ravine. Barreiro observing this movement ordered Colonel Nicolás López to conduct a flanking manevour with the King's 1st battalion on the Patriot left wing where the Cazadores battalion was located; and that the Tambo Battalion, commanded by his second in command Colonel Francisco Jiménez, conduct a frontal charge simultaneously in the center and the left wing.Lozano Cleves, Alberto (1980) Asi se hizo la independencia. Bogotá: 2da Edicion. Biblioteca Banco Popular. p. 124
The Royalist charge managed to fend off the Patriots and pushed them back towards the Varguitas ravine. Bolívar seeing his troops being pushed back then ordered the 1st of the Line infantry battalion under Colonel Antonio Obando to support the Patriot line. With these reinforcements the Patriots assaulted the hills once again and were able to retake their lost positions while also forcing the Royalists to fall back to their initial positions.
Barreiro counteracted and ordered Colonel Juan Tolrá to take part of the Numancia Battalion, and support López and Jiménez. This action stopped the Patriot advance as both sides fought centimeter by centimeter to maintain their position on the hills, the fighting on Picacho hill was especially brutal, with Santander's troops fighting an uphill battle where they suffered tremendously as the Royalists were able to display their superior firepower against them, the clash was so violent that wounded men began rolling down the northern slope, as well as hand-to-hand combat occurring in some occasions. Despite the stubborn Patriot resistance, the Royalists were once again able to push them back down the hills.Lozano Cleves, Alberto (1980) Asi se hizo la independencia. Bogotá: 2da Edicion. Biblioteca Banco Popular. p. 127.