Strategic reset was a policy framework designed to stop counterproductive U.S. engagement in a fragmenting Iraq and to strengthen the United States' stance throughout the Middle East. In military terms, "reset" refers to "a series of actions to restore units to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with future mission requirements.""Readiness Committee Written Statement." Brigadier General Charles A. Anderson
The proposal advocates harnessing U.S. military, economic, and diplomatic power to protect critical national security interests rather than expending this power in efforts to accommodate political progress amid multiple internal and external conflicts in Iraq. The plan for strategic reset entails four key measures: acknowledging Iraq's political and demographic fragmentation implementing prompt phased military redeployment establishing local and regional methods for improving security and diplomacy in the Middle East developing a functional strategy to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict. The framework was set forth in a 2007 report by the Center for American Progress, a progressive think tank based in Washington, D.C.Center for American Progress: "Strategic Reset" retrieved 27 June 2007
Background The Center for American Progress developed the framework for strategic reset on the premise that "with the Iraq War well into its fifth year, the Bush administration still lacks a realistic plan for the Middle East and Iraq." www.americanprogress.org retrieved 27 June 2007 Senior Fellows Brian Katulis and Lawrence J. Korb, together with Peter Juul, laid out the plan in the form of a 64-page report released June 25, 2007.
In 2007, when retired U.S. Marine Corps Gen. John J. Sheehan published a newspaper editorial explaining his decision not to accept the position of "War Czar" or White House implementation manager for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, he wrote: "What I found in discussions with current and former members of this administration is that there is no agreed-upon strategic view of the Iraq problem or the region. ... [A]fter thoughtful discussions with people both in and outside of this administration, I concluded that the current Washington decision-making process lacks a linkage to a broader view of the region and how the parts fit together strategically.""Why I Declined to Serve.” Washington Post, 16 Apr 2007 qtd. in CAP
Citing Gen. Sheehan, the report gives examples from what are described as seven years of relative progress in the Middle East (1994–2000) followed by seven years of setbacks (2001–2007), such as:CAP Report
decline and stall of the Arab–Israeli peace process followed by irruption of war between Israel and Hezbollah Late 1990s containment and sanction of Iraq replaced by refugee crises and war Iran's new global influence and increased progress on its nuclear program Hamas' movement from margin to center of its political stage and victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative election. Direct relation of oil prices to rising levels of violence in the Middle East
U.S. strategy in Iraq in 2007 relied on Iraqi political progress, increased numbers of U.S. troops in the country, and diversification of tactics for political and economic support.Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq While proponents of strategic reset supported diversification, particularly as it regards "situat[ing] the strategy in a regional approach," they strongly oppose sending more U.S. troops to Iraq, and they maintain that the "fundamental premise of Bush's surge strategy—that Iraq's leaders will make key decisions to advance their country's political transition and national reconciliation—is at best misguided and clearly unworkable."Center for American Progress
In 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group released a report stressing the need for troop withdrawal and for redoubled diplomatic efforts, including efforts to address the Arab–Israeli conflict.Iraq Study Group Report pp 6–7, retrieved 28 June 2007 The report also said that the Iraqi government "should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security," and that the "primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations."Iraq Study Group Report p 7, retrieved 28 June 2007 Supporters of the strategic reset framework disagree with the latter terms, claiming that "the ISG was examining an Iraq that simply does not exist anymore," and that embedding U.S. forces to support Iraqi ones "would create unmanageable force protection problems for U.S. troops."CAP "Strategic Reset" p 6 retrieved 28 June 2007 Strategic reset emphasizes making counterterrorism the primary role of U.S. troops, rather than engaging them in sectarian conflict.CAP "Strategic Reset" p 30 retrieved 28 June 2007 It also emphasizes the necessity of recognizing Iraq's failed national reconciliation and adapting U.S. policy to the inevitable decentralization of Iraqi politics.CAP "Strategic Reset" p 10 retrieved 28 June 2007
In 2007, The Washington Post described as "strategic reset" a proposal by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that took the form of "an unusually detailed public explanation of the new American effort to create a de facto alliance between Israel and moderate Arab states against Iranian extremism.""Rice's Strategic Reset." Washington Post 26 Jan 2007
Principles of the strategic reset framework Advocates of strategic reset maintain that the current administration's misjudgments regarding Iraq policy have jeopardized the United States' national security interests and that it must act now in order to prevent further attrition of its military and to effectively confront a growing global terrorist threat. The strategy requires that U.S. troops rapidly be withdrawn from Iraq and enlisted in efforts to counter this threat, while available political resources are deployed throughout the Middle East in order to minimize conflict in Iraq and to ensure stability in the region at large. It also requires the U.S. to take action on several fronts, especially the Arab–Israeli conflict, in order to build international support and promote regional commitment to this stability. A further requirement is that the international community cooperate to promote rule of law and to encourage legitimate, non-aggressive governments in the Middle East, preventing the formation of "security vacuums" exploited by Al Qaeda.CAP retrieved 28 June 2006
Adapting to Iraq's fragmentation Since 2005, Iraq's major sectarian conflicts have continued to generate violence at high levels, and Iraq has failed to engineer a political solution to the problems that fuel them.Brookings Institution retrieved 28 June 2007 In northern Iraq, Turkmen, Kurds, and Arabs are fighting over the jurisdiction of the Kurdistan Regional Government, and Turkey is conducting raids on the Kurdistan Workers Party.Today's Zaman retrieved 28 June 2007 In the south and west, respectively, there is intra-Shi'a violence and violence between Iraqi Sunnis and Sunnis linked to Al-Qaeda; Baghdad and surrounding areas host the deadliest violence in the form of civil war between Sunni and Shi'a. CAP report p 5 retrieved 28 June 2007 Proponents of strategic reset point out that no significant progress has been made on "benchmarks" established by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice such as constitutional reform or laws regulating provincial elections, distribution of oil revenue, or treatment of citizens subject to de-Baathification; they argue that no realistic policy can predicate the resolution of Iraq's sectarian conflicts on the rule of a unified Iraqi governing authority. On June 26, 2007, for example, Iraqi commandos raided the house of Culture Minister Asad Kamal al-Hashimi, who is believed to have ordered an assassination attempt fatal to both sons of Mithal al-Alusi, a member of Iraq's parliament."Sunni Leaders Angry Over Arrest Warrant." Houston Chronicle 26 June 2007 According to the CAP, "Iraq's leaders fundamentally disagree on what kind of country Iraq is and should be, and Iraq's political transition has not succeeded in bridging these divides. This lack of political consensus among Iraq's leaders has resulted in a violent struggle for power."
Stopping unconditional arming of security forces
Under the strategic reset framework, one immediate response to the political stalemate is cessation of the ongoing provision of weapons to Iraqi security forces, whose number now exceeds 500,000. According to the CAP, these security forces—who continue to receive considerable U.S. support—exhibit divided loyalties that stem directly from divisions in the political structure; they have been implicated in corruption, militia membership, death squads, and killing American troops sent to train them. "The fundamental problem with Iraq's security forces is that they lack the allegiance and in many cases the motivation to defend their country. The United States has poured more than $20 billion into building a national army and police force that does not have the unity and support of its own leaders." CAP report pp 16–18 retrieved 28 June 2007 Supporters of the strategic reset see two dangers in allowing the current policy of arming and training these security forces to continue: the first danger is that the U.S. is providing weaponry to opposing sides of a civil war. For example, Matthew Yglesias, writing for The Atlantic, has said, "[T]his business of arming and training Iraqi security forces in the absence of a political solution is not just a waste of time and money, but directly counterproductive. Our weapons and funding are fueling civil conflict in the face of deep political fragmentation and there are absolutely no guarantees as to who these arms will be turned against next year or the year after that.""Strategic Reset," The Atlantic Online, 25 Jun 2007 retrieved 29 June 2007
The second danger arises from the fact that the majority of Iraq's security forces are Shi'a who constitute "some of the closest allies of America's greatest rival in the Middle East—Iran." CAP report pp 13–14 retrieved 28 June 2007
Decentralization A second response to fragmentation in Iraqi politics is decentralization of U.S. policy and power structure in Iraq. The strategic reset framework calls for reassignment of personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad into "provincial outposts" established throughout Iraq. It also calls for the U.S. to forgo building a new Baghdad embassy, one projected to be the world's largest. According to the report, the adoption of this pragmatic, localized approach to placing diplomats and intelligence employees would represent progress on three fronts: It would provide bases for intelligence operations to counter terrorism, allow U.S. officials to give consular support to Iraq's estimated 2 million internally displaced persons, and bring U.S. personnel into closer working relationships with local Iraqi institutions.CAP report p 22 retrieved 28 June 2007
Phased military redeployment