The 1966 attack on Samu, codenamed by Israel as Operation Shredder, was a large cross-border assault on 13 November 1966 by the Israeli military on the Jordanian-controlled West Bank village of Samu. It was the largest Israeli military operation since the 1956 Suez Crisis and is considered to have been a contributing factor to the outbreak of the Six-Day War in 1967.Ben-Yehûdā, Ḥemdā and Sandler, Shmuel (2002). The Arab-Israeli Conflict Transformed: Fifty Years of Interstate and Ethnic Crises. SUNY Press. , p. 34.
Israel stated that the attack was in response to a Palestinian fedayeen guerrilla land mine attack two days earlier near the West Bank border, which killed three Israeli soldiers on a border patrol, purportedly from Jordanian territory. Prior to the cross-border attack, Jordan had been conducting an active campaign to curb insurgent activities from Palestinian fedayeen groups such as Fatah since 1965.Moshe Shemesh (2008) Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War. Sussex Academic Press. (h/c). pp 110–114
The handling of the incident was widely criticised in Israeli political and military circles, and the United Nations responded with United Nations Security Council Resolution 228, censuring Israel for "violating the United Nations Charter and the General Armistice Agreement."
Background Since 1963, King Hussein of Jordan had been meeting clandestinely with Israeli Foreign Minister, Golda Meir, and Prime Minister's deputy, Abba Eban, concerning peace and mutually secure borders. Hussein later stated that during one of his meetings with Israeli representatives: "I told them I could not absorb a serious retaliatory raid, and they accepted the logic of this and promised there would never be one."Bowen 2003, p. 26 (citing Amman Cables 1456, 1457, 11 December 1966, National Security Files (Country File: Middle East), LBJ Library (Austin, Texas), Box 146). On the night of 11 November, an Israeli border patrol vehicle carrying policemen drove over a mine near the Israeli-Jordanian border, killing three and wounding six;Israel, Army and defense – A dictionary, Zeev Schiff & Eitan Haber, editors, Zmora, Bitan, Modan, 1976, Tel-Aviv Hebrew the mine was reportedly planted by Palestinian guerrillas from Fatah. On 12 November, King Hussein sent a letter of condolence to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, via the U.S. embassy in Amman. From there it was sent to U.S. ambassador Walworth Barbour at the embassy in Tel Aviv; instead of forwarding it to the prime minister, he left the letter on his desk – assuming it was not important and there was no rush.Bowen, 2003, p. 26 (citing Amman Cables 1456, 1457, 11 December 1966, National According to another version of the story, the letter reached Barbour on the 11th (a Friday), but he delayed passing it on due to the coming Sabbath. Early on the morning of 13 November, King Hussein received an unsolicited message from his Israeli contacts stating that Israel had no intention of attacking Jordan. Early the same day also, the Israeli military mobilized 3,000–4,000 troops, and sent about 600 of these, with 60 half-tracks and 11 tanks, across the border into the Jordanian-controlled West Bank.
Prelude to the IDF cross-border attack Israel's rationale for the cross-border assault was to avenge three Israeli deaths in a land mine incident on 12 November 1966, based on the Israeli allegation that the attack had originated from Jordan. A further goal in the operation was to demolish houses in Palestinian villages located south of Hebron as a show of force to preempt future Palestinian violence.Tom Segev. 1967. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007. pp.150–152.
The Israeli rationale for the attack on Samu has often been questioned. For example, Colonel (ret.) Jan Mühren, a Dutch UN observer in the West Bank who patrolled Samu during this period, gave an interview to the Dutch current affairs program Nova on the 40th anniversary of the Six-Day War where he denied the Israeli charges regarding Samu. He said "Had the people from this village anything to do with the attack on Israel – Well no. Not just from this village but also not from the entire West Bank. ... only western officers operated here and we did patrols. The situation was completely calm." However, the attack against the Israeli patrol had occurred two days earlier, although the purported Jordanian origin of the perpetrators was never independently investigated.UN Security Council – Thirteen hundred and Twentieth Meeting. 16 November 1966. Document reference S/PV.1320 Jordan immediately lodged a formal complaint with the UN Security Council.Letter dated 14 November 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan. UN symbol reference S/7586
Although the Israeli goal was retribution for the Fatah land mine incident, purportedly having originated from Jordanian-controlled territory, Israel's first act was to cross the 1949 Armistice line and to destroy a Jordanian police post at Rujm El Madfa.https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/AF3BF4FC576922B60525672E0050BEA5 U.N. report by the Secretary General concerning incident of 13 November 1966 in Jordan. Retrieved 1 Oct 7. In addition to the large-scale destruction in Samu village, the Israeli forces also damaged other villages.
In a report by the Arab League, it was assumed that the main goal of this attack was to test the efficiency of what was called the United Arab Command, and see if any other Arab country such as Egypt or Syria would come to the aid of Jordan. The report also assumes that this battle was in preparation for the Six-Day War.
Operation Shredder Israel mobilised a force of around 3,000–4,000 soldiers, backed by tanks and aircraft, in the attack code-named Operation Shredder. The force was divided into a large reserve force, which remained on the Israeli side of the border, and two attack forces, which crossed into the Jordanian-controlled West Bank. In what was justified as a retaliatory attack against Fatah, ground troops moved into the village of Rujm al-Madfa located just southwest of Hebron, and destroyed its police station. From there, the larger force of eight Centurion tanks followed by 400 paratroopers mounted in 40 open-topped half-tracks and 60 engineers in 10 more half-tracks headed for Samu. Meanwhile, the smaller force of three tanks and 100 paratroopers and engineers in 10 half-tracks headed toward two smaller villages, Khirbet el-Markas and Khirbet Jimba. When the larger force entered Samu, most of the town's residents responded to orders by the IDF to gather in the town square. Sappers from the 35th paratrooper brigades then dynamited numerous buildings within and near the village; reports of the total number of houses destroyed range from 40 to 125 (IDF and United Nations estimates, respectively). In addition the UN reported the destruction of the village medical clinic, a 6-classroom school and a workshop, plus damage to one mosque and 28 houses.
The 48th Infantry Battalion of the Jordanian Army, commanded by Major Asad Ghanma, encountered the Israeli forces north-west of Samu. Two companies of the Hitteen Infantry Brigade (لواء المشاة حطين) also approached from the north-east; these were composed of roughly 100 men and 20 convoy vehicles, and commanded by Col. Bahjat al-Muhaisen (العميد الركن بهجت المحيسن). Believing that Israel was attacking Yattah, another village south of Hebron, rather than Samu, al-Muhaisen ordered his forces to advance towards Yattah. However, the road to Yattah passed directly through Samu, and as the Jordanian column entered the village, Israeli forces opened fire on it, destroying 15 of its 20 vehicles and forcing the Jordanians to retreat and regroup.Martin, Gilbert: Israel: A History
Eight Jordanian Hawker Hunter jets were scrambled at Mafraq Airbase and attacked Israeli forces to relieve pressure on their own troops, but were met by a force of four Israeli Mirage 3 jets. In the air battle that followed, a Jordanian plane was shot down and the pilot was killed, and an Israeli plane was damaged and forced to land. Its pilot was severely injured. Col. Muheisen's column and a platoon of Jordanian soldiers armed with two 106 mm recoilless rifles launched a counterattack, and a three-hour battle ensued, after which the Israelis withdrew across the border.
During the battle, sixteen Jordanian military personnel (15 soldiers and one pilot) were killed, and fifty-four other soldiers were wounded, including Colonel al-Muhaisen. One Israeli soldier was killed; Col. Yoav Shaham, the commander of the Israeli paratrooper battalion. Ten other Israeli soldiers were wounded. Three local civilians were also killed.Bowen, 2003, pp. 23–30.Oren, 2002, pp. 33–36.
Aftermath Some authors consider the Battle of Samu to have been a contributing factor to the outbreak of the Six-Day War in 1967. Norman Finkelstein believed that it marked the onset of the crisis which culminated in the June 1967 war. Clea Bunch wrote that "the attack on Samu was the first link in a lengthy chain of miscalculations, false perceptions and high stakes gambles that steadily led to war".
In Jordan, following the battle, King Hussein was faced with a storm of criticism for failing to protect Samu, emanating from Jordanians, as well as from Palestinians and neighboring Arab countries. Riots spread throughout the West Bank demanding the king be overthrown. Four Palestinians were killed by Jordanian police as a result of the riots. On 20 November, Hussein ordered nationwide military service.'King Husain orders nationwide military service', The Times, Monday, 21 November 1966; pg. 8; Issue 56794; col D.
Egyptian and Syrian radio also verbally attacked Jordan accusing King Hussein of collaborating with the CIA to plot an overthrow of the Ba'ath Party in Syria. Following the Palestinian demonstrations against him, King Hussein accused Nasser of using the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force on Egypt's border with Israel, as an excuse for failing to take action against Israel.Brenchley, 1989, p. 147. As Palestinians rioted in Hebron, Nablus, Jerusalem on the West Bank and Irbid in Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organization warned all Jordanian ministers to resign by noon on 26 November.'Unified Arab command criticizes Jordan's actions', The Times, 26 November 1966; pg. 6; Issue 56799; col D.
In Israel, angered opposition parties demanded to know why Israel attacked Jordan rather than Syria, which was the guerrilla home base. In a special parliamentary debate, Prime Minister Eshkol listed 14 major acts of sabotage carried out from Jordan in the past year, climaxed by the land-mine explosion that killed three Israeli troops on 12 November. Eshkol said: "It is regrettable that this particular act of aggression came from Jordan." But since it did, he had picked Jordan as his target. "No country where the saboteurs find shelter and through whose territory they pass on their way to Israel can be exempt from responsibility." What Eshkol left unsaid was his certainty that, with the so-called Arab unity being what it was, Jordan would find itself with far less Arab support than Syria, which was much closer to Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser. Jordan's Arab partners did wait until the Israelis had withdrawn before making indignant vows of support.