The Río Negro massacres (Spanish: Masacres de Río Negro) were a series of killings of villagers by the government of Guatemala between 1980 and 1982.

The Río Negro massacres took place during the midst of the Guatemalan Civil War, a period of time when Guatemala was experiencing intense political violence amid the Cold War. After the civil war began in 1960, Indigenous communities were continuously accused by the Guatemalan military of being supporters of guerrilla movements, and were thus seen as enemies of the state.

In 1978, in the face of the civil war, the Guatemalan government proceeded with its economic development program, including the construction of the Chixoy hydroelectric dam. Financed in large part by the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, the Chixoy dam was built in Rabinal, a region of the department of Baja Verapaz historically populated by the Maya Achi. To complete construction, the government undertook voluntary and forcible relocations of dam-affected communities from the fertile agricultural valleys to the much harsher surrounding highlands. Government officials initially promised that communities displaced by the reservoir created by the Chixoy dam would receive land of equal or better quality than the fertile valley that would ultimately be flooded. However, many residents reported that the resettlement areas lacked sufficient farmland and water access for agriculture, one of the primary ways these communities made an income. When hundreds of residents refused to relocate, or returned after finding the conditions of resettlement villages were not what the government had promised, these men, women, and children were kidnapped, raped, and massacred by paramilitary and military officials. The massacre, along with the many others that occurred during the 'Silent Holocaust' period of the Guatemalan Civil War, was a part of the "scorched-earth" policies meant to target Mayan communities.

More than 440 Maya Achi were killed in the village of Río Negro alone. The string of extrajudicial killings that claimed up to 5,000 lives between 1980 and 1982 became known as the Río Negro massacres. The government officially declared the acts to be counterinsurgency activities, even though local church workers, journalists and the survivors of Río Negro deny that the town ever saw any organized guerrilla activity.Environment News Service via NISGUAInternational Rivers Network/Witness for Peace, press release, Thursday 9 May 1996

Political and legal implications

In 2005, a petition was filed to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the Rio Negro massacre, and it is in the admissibility stage. Meanwhile, the government has sought to deal with the petitioners and victims of over 100 complaints filed against Guatemala in the IACHR, in some cases negotiating resettlement and compensation agreements. These, however, have often been conducted under the threat of violence or massacre and have largely been aborted, halted, or reneged after agreement had been reached. Even when "paid" on paper, remediation has often failed to reach the intended recipients. Entitlements such as the provision of free electricity have vanished, and since they were usually made by verbal promise alone, no documentation exists by which to defend the rights. Inadequate farm and household land provided through resettlement has contributed significantly to the severe poverty and malnutrition of the region (Center for Political Ecology, Chixoy Dam Legacy Issues Study, 2005). Some of the cases, though, have been resolved, and financial compensation has been paid to the families of a number of individuals who disappeared or suffered summary execution. In a comparable case in 2000, families who survived the 1982 Dos Erres massacre were awarded a total of 1.82 million US$ in compensation (Summary record of the 1940th meeting: Guatemala. 10/08/2001. CCPR/C/SR.1940.) along with a formal excuse from President Alfonso Portillo on behalf of the state.Guatemala in brief. Barrientos resigns, replaced by a general

In 1998, sixteen years after the Río Negro massacres, three former civil patrollers were convicted of three of the murders. At a second trial in 1999, the three were sentenced to 50 years imprisonment. Cases against 45 other civil patrollers are still open, but no charges have been brought. Nor have any military officials who planned, ordered, or participated in the massacres had to face the courts (Amnesty International, "Worldwide Appeal: Guatemala: Rio Negro massacre – Update"). Also in 1999, the Guatemalan Truth Commission (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico – CEH) issued a finding that the Río Negro massacres constituted state-sponsored genocide under Article II of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CEH 1999: Conclusions, Chapter II: ¶¶ 108–123).

Confronted with government and financier intransigence and deleterious living conditions, 23 Maya Achi communities banded together in 1993 to create the Coordinating Committee of Communities Affected by the Construction of the Chixoy Dam (COCAHICH). Since its creation, COCAHICH has been quite effective at spreading its story and commissioning investigations, and somewhat less effective at bringing about legal action and just compensation. By organizing a peaceful mass demonstration outside Chixoy Dam in 2004, the communities were finally able to pressure the Guatemalan government into forming a Damages Verification Commission. The World Bank accepted an invitation to join the Commission shortly thereafter, and the Inter-American Development Bank has considered doing the same. In addition, the Guatemalan press in 2004 issued a public apology for its false and prejudicial coverage against the COCAHICH, a first step toward a broader apology by the Guatemalan government.

Also in 2004, the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights against both Guatemala and the states composing the directorial boards of the banks involved in the Chixoy dam project. One argument presented in the petition suggests these states cannot ignore or violate their human rights obligations simply by using banks as agents. A second argument posited by the petition asserts that the World Bank, as a specialized agency, may be legally bound to uphold the principles of the UN Charter, including respect and preservation of human rights. However, the Bank's charter claims legal immunity for itself and its employees. COHRE argues that such immunity is only for acts within the scope of the World Banks' operations, and human rights violations clearly lie outside of that scope. It is still unclear whether the Bank can be held liable.

As COHRE cites, the accountability of the States making up the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank is supported by the International Law Commission (ILC) of the UN General Assembly, which has indicated in Article 1 of the provisionally adopted Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations that States may be responsible for internationally wrongful acts of international organizations. Article 3 adds, inter alia, that an internationally wrongful act has occurred "when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the international organizations under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation."

Despite Guatemala's human rights advances, in 2005 the UN Committee on Human Rights continued to be concerned about the persisting discrimination against indigenous peoples such as the Maya Achi, with regard to access to, inter alia, land ownership, work, education, health services and adequate nutrition and housing.

Historical Clarification Commission report

The Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) promoted by the United Nations released its report in 1999. In its Annex 1 ((Illustrative cases), chapter Number 10 is called "Massacre and Elimination of the Community of Río Negro, Guatemala". This part is only available in Spanish, so here is an unofficial translation from that part of the report. Full report in Spanish

I. Background: The Pueblo Viejo-Quixal hydroelectric project and resistance from members of the community of Río Negro to be evicted from their land

The community of Río Negro, settled on the banks of the river Chixoy, in the town of Rabinal, Baja Verapaz department, lived on agriculture, fishing and the exchange of goods with the neighboring community of Xococ. In the 1970s, Río Negro had a population of about 800 people, all indigenous Achís.

The lives of the people of Río Negro, and the people living on the riverbanks Chixoy, changed radically with the construction of the hydro-Quixal Pueblo Viejo. An inhabitant of the region recognized: "In the community before we were safe and in peace; but after the construction of the dam many problems emerged”.

In 1975 the National Electrification Institute (INDE) presented the project for the construction of a hydropower dam in the river basin Chixoy to solve the problem of electricity in the country, under the auspices of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the World Bank. "The plan envisaged the flooding of more than 50 miles along the river and some tributaries, which affect nearly 3445 people from communities living on the margins". Affected communities had to be moved and resettled elsewhere. In June 1978 the Government declared the area in national emergency due to the flood caused by the building of the dam. The INDE pledged to find and deliver to the displaced equal or better lands than those that would be flooded. The community of Río Negro did not accept the proposals of the State.

The authorities tried to settle residents of Río Negro in Pacux, an arid place, and houses that broke its scheme cultural life. The peasants resisted leaving their lands. A person who gave testimony said that Río Negro "was the model community of the area, with the best organization, was the most prosperous in the region, and that was one of the reasons why this community was not as easy to fool as all others." In 1978 many people in the community moved their homes to bring them high land that would not be inundated by flood waters.

Faced with this situation, the INDE acknowledged that "the problems that occurred in the resettlement were: a) misunderstanding of the affected population on the need for the construction of the project, b) attachment to their region and the land that had affected villagers c) the difficulty in obtaining land in the region necessary for relocations that took place ".

The attachment to their region "referred to the INDE, is because the area of the river Chixoy was inhabited from the Maya Classic period (330 BC to 900 years AD) by indigenous people, and there were several religious ceremony places. The INDE noted the existence of 50 religious ceremony ancestral sites distributed throughout the valley, on the terraces bordering the river, that would be flooded.

The construction of the dam was imminent. A survivor said that INDE explained the situation to the representatives of the village in the following terms: "Even if you do not want to leave, since the President signed the contract already, you can not stop the project because it has already been approved. So it will continue, and some day you will have to leave." A legal adviser to the INDE said, referring to communities: "some left willingly and others had to be forced out. Those who wanted to negotiate, fine, and for those who did not, we used force".