Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme (; ; February 1, 1910 – December 23, 2009) was a Tibetan senior official who assumed various military and political responsibilities both before and after 1951 in Tibet. He is often known simply as Ngapoi in English sources.
Early life Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme was born in Karma Gorge of Lhasa as the son of a leading Tibetan aristocratic family descended from former kings of Tibet, the Horkhang. His father was governor of Chamdo in Eastern Tibet and commander of the Tibetan armed forces.Jacques de Goldfiem, Personnalités chinoises d'aujourd'hui, Éditions L'Harmattan, 1989, pp. 189–190. After studying traditional Tibetan literature, he went to Britain for further education.Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme 1910–2009 , Tibet Sun, 23 December 2009. He was married to Ngapoi Cedain Zhoigar, Vice President of the Tibetan Women's Federation,Mackerras, Colin. Yorke, Amanda. The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China. (1991). Cambridge University Press. . p. 100. hence his name Ngapoi.
Career Upon returning in 1932 from his studies in Britain, he served in the Tibetan army. Ngapoi began his career as a local official in Chamdo in 1936. As a cabinet member of the former government of Tibet under the Dalai Lama, he advocated reform. In April 1950 he was appointed governor-general (commissioner) of Chamdo, but took office only in September, after the previous governor, Lhalu, had left for Lhasa.Bhuchung D. Sonam, Ngabo — Yes Tibetan, No Patriot , Phayul.com, December 26, 2009.
Commander-in-chief of the Tibetan Army at Chamdo
While serving as governor-general of Chamdo, he also became commander-in-chief of the Tibetan Army.
While his predecessor, Lhalu, had made elaborate military plans and fortifications and asked the Kashag for more soldiers and weapons to stop the People's Liberation Army from entering Tibet, Ngapoi had the fortifications removed, refused to hire Khampa warriors and to install two portable wireless sets as he thought it was better to negotiate.
In October 1950, his forces confronted the People's Liberation Army. The battle was quickly over. As he had warned before his departure for Chamdo, "the Tibetan forces were no match for the PLA who [...] had liberated the whole of China by defeating several million Kuomintang soldiers".Puncog Zhaxi, La libération pacifique du Tibet comme je l'ai vécue, in Jianguo Li (ed.), Cent ans de témoignages sur le Tibet: reportages de témoins de l'histoire du Tibet, 2005, 196 p., pp. 72–82, esp. p. 72: "[...] il a conclu que les troupes tibétaines étaient incapables de faire front à l'APL (l'Armée populaire de libération) qui [...] avait libéré l'ensemble du pays en triomphant de millions de militaires du Kuomintang." Ngapoi surrendered Chamdo to the Chinese. The PLA surprised him by treating him well and giving him long lectures on the New China's policies toward minor nationalities. Within a year, he was the deputy commander-in-chief for the PLA forces in Tibet. He became a leader not only of Tibet but also the Chinese Communist Party in Tibet.Gary Wilson, It was no Shangri-La: Hollywood Hides Tibet's True History , in Workers World Newspaper, December 4, 1997.
Head of the Tibetan Delegation to the Beijing Peace Negotiations
As a delegate of the government of Tibet sent to negotiate with the Chinese Government,Ngapoi recalls the founding of the TAR www.chinaview.cn, 2005-08-30. he headed the Tibetan delegation to the Beijing peace negotiations in 1951, where he signed the Seventeen Point Agreement with the Chinese Communist government in 1951, accepting Chinese sovereigntyGoldstein, Melvyn C., A History of Modern Tibet – The Demise of the Lamaist State: 1912–1951, 1989, p. 813. in exchange for guarantees of autonomy and religious freedom.
The validity of his acceptance on behalf of the Tibetan government has been questioned. The Tibetan exiled community claims that his signature of the Agreement was obtained under duress, and that, as only the governor of Chamdo, signature of the agreement exceeded his powers of representation and is therefore invalid.Tsering, Shakya (1999). The Dragon in the Land of Snows. A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947. Columbia University Press. , pp. 70–71.
In his biography My Land and My People, the Dalai Lama claims that in 1952, the acting Tibetan Prime Minister Lukhangwa told Chinese representative Zhang Jingwu that the Tibetan "people did not accept the agreement".According to Dalai Lama's My Land and My People, (New York: 1992), p. 95, acting Tibetan Prime Minister Lukhangwa said: "It was absurd to refer to the terms of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. Our people did not accept the agreement and the Chinese themselves had repeatedly broken the terms of it. Their army was still in occupation of eastern Tibet; the area had not been returned to the government of Tibet, as it should have been."
However, according to Sambo Rimshi, one of the Tibetan negotiators,Goldstein, Melvyn C., A History of Modern Tibet – The Calm before the Storm: 1951–1959, 2007, p. 87, p. 96 n 32. the Tibetan delegation, including Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, went to Beijing with the Dalai Lama's authorization and instructions.Goldstein, Melvyn C., A History of Modern Tibet – The Demise of the Lamaist State: 1912–1951, 1989, pp. 758–759.Goldstein, Melvyn C., A History of Modern Tibet – The Calm before the Storm: 1951–1959, 2007, pp. 87, 95–98. As Sambo Rimchi recalled, Dalai Lama's instruction to the negotiators clearly states:
According to Sambo, the young Dalai Lama also told the negotiators to use their best judgment according to the situation and circumstances and report back to the Kashag in Yadong. Sambo recalled that the negotiators brought a secret codebook so that they could establish a wireless link with Yadong and discuss issues as they arose.Goldstein, Melvyn C., A History of Modern Tibet – The Calm before the Storm: 1951–1959, 2007, pp96–97. According to historians Tom A. Grunfeld, Melvyn C. Goldstein and Tsering Shakya, the young Dalai Lama did ratify the Seventeen Point agreement with Tsongdu Assembly's recommendation few months after the signing.Gyatso, Tenzin, Dalai Lama XIV, interview with Grunfeld, A. Tom, 25 July 1981. see Grunfeld's The Making of Modern Tibet, chapter 6, note 22.Goldstein, Melvyn C., A History of Modern Tibet – The Demise of the Lamaist State: 1912–1951, 1989, pp 812–813.The History of Tibet: Volume III The Modern Period: 1895-1959, edited by Alex McKay, London and New York: Routledge Curzon (2003), p. 603.
In 1959, the Dalai Lama on his arrival in India after he fled Tibet repudiated the "17-point Agreement" as having been "thrust upon Tibetan Government and people by the threat of arms"."The 17-Point Agreement" The full story as revealed by the Tibetans and Chinese who were involved .
An advocate of reform Ngapoi Ngawang Jigmé was one of a small number of progressive elite Tibetans that were eager to modernize Tibet and saw in the return of the Chinese an opportunity to do so. They were in a sense a continuation of the movement for reform that emerged in the 1920s with Tsarong Dzasa as its main proponent but was stopped short by the 13th Dalai Lama under the pressure of conservative clerics and aristocrats.Melvyn C. Goldstein,, A History of Modern Tibet – The Calm before the Storm: 1951–1959, University of California Press, 2007, p. 87, p. 191: "(...) there were a few others who had very modern and progressive ideas. In particular, a small number of elite Tibetans genuinely favored working closely with the Chinese to implement the agreement and modernize Tibet. (...) They were, in a sense, a continuation of a movement for reform and change that began after (...) 1914, when a group of young aristocratic officers led by Tsarong (...) sought to create a modern and effective army. They had been thwarted by clerics and conservative aristocrats who (in the middle 1920s) persuaded the 13th Dalai Lama that they were a threat to his rule and to religion."
Implementing the Seventeen Point Agreement (1951–1952)
Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme was instrumental in solving the food problems of the People's Liberation Army in 1951–1952 by creating a Kashag subcommittee tasked with inventorying grain stores with a view to selling some to the PLA in accordance with point 16 of the Seventeen Point Agreement ("The local government of Tibet will assist the People's Liberation Army in the purchase of food, fodder, and other daily necessities").Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon, online version: "The dire food problems of the Chinese led Ngabö to push successfully for one interesting innovation in Lhasa – the creation of a subcommittee of the Kashag whose mission was to deal effectively with matters concerning the arrangements and accommodations of the Chinese, including food for the PLA."Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, vol. 2: The Calm Before the Storm: 1951–1955, Asian Studies Series, University of California Press, 2007, p. 639: "Point 16 (...) stated, 'The local government of Tibet will assist the People's Liberation Army in the purchase and transport of food, fodder, and other daily necessities'."
A Kashag minister trusted by both the Chinese and the Dalai Lama (1953–1954) Ngapoi was appointed by the Tibetan government to head the newly formed Reform Assembly. He was the Kashag minister (Kalön) most trusted not only by the Chinese but also by the Dalai Lama. The latter, who was in favour of reforms and modernization, frequently discussed political issues with Ngapoi in private. As a result, in 1953–1954, the Reform Assembly crafted new laws reforming interest rates, old loans, and the administration of counties.Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, vol. 2, The Calm before the Storm: 1951-1955, op. cit., chap. 22, p. 547: "On the Tibetan government's side, a reform organization headed by Ngabo was begun. He was not only the Kashag minister most trusted by the Chinese but also the one most trusted by the Dalai Lama, who frequently discussed political issues with him privately and who himself was in favour of reforms and modernization for Tibet. In 1953-1954, therefore, the Tibetan government's Reform Assembly crafted new laws reforming interest rates, old loans, and the administration of counties."
Administrative, military, and legislative responsibilities
After 1951, Ngapoi's career continued within the ranks of Chinese Communist administration of Tibet. He served as the leader of the Liberation Committee of Chamdo Prefecture until 1959.. He was also a member of the Central People's Government's State Ethnic Affairs Commission and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference National Committee between 1951 and 1954.
He was Deputy Commander of the Tibet Military District between 1952 and 1977, and a member of the National Defence Council from 1954 through the Cultural Revolution. He was appointed as lieutenant general and awarded the "Order of Liberation" first class in 1955.Lieutenant General - Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, www.mod.gov.cn, August 1, 2009.
Secretary General of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region When in April 1956 a Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Autonomous Region of Tibet was set up in accordance with the central government's decision, Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme was appointed its secretary general.White Paper 1998: New Progress in Human Rights in the Tibet Autonomous Region , February 1998, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN. He was appointed vice-president of the Committee in 1959, the 10th Panchen Lama being its president.Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme passes away at 100 , www.chinaview.cn, 23 December 2009 : "1959-1964: Vice-chairman of CPPCC National Committee, vice-chairman of Preparatory Committee of Tibet Autonomous Region, and member of National Defense Council."
Chairman of the People's Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region