On 19 April 1989, an explosion occurred within the Number Two 16-inch gun turret of the United States Navy battleship during a fleet exercise in the Caribbean Sea near Puerto Rico. The explosion in the center gunroom killed 47 of the turret's crewmen and severely damaged the gun turret itself. Two major investigations were undertaken into the cause of the explosion: one by the U.S. Navy and then one by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Sandia National Laboratories. The investigations produced conflicting conclusions.
The first investigation into the explosion, conducted by the U.S. Navy, concluded that one of the gun turret crew members, Clayton Hartwig, who died in the explosion, had deliberately caused it. During the investigation, numerous leaks to the media, later attributed to U.S. Navy officers and investigators, implied that Hartwig and another sailor, Kendall Truitt, had engaged in a romantic relationship and that Hartwig had caused the explosion after their relationship had soured. However, in its report, the U.S. Navy concluded that the evidence did not show that Hartwig was homosexual but that he was suicidal and had caused the explosion with either an electronic or chemical detonator.
The victims' families, media outlets, and members of Congress were sharply critical of the U.S. Navy's findings. The U.S. Senate and U.S. House Armed Services Committees both held hearings to inquire into the Navy's investigation and later released reports disputing the Navy's conclusions. The Senate committee asked the GAO to review the Navy's investigation. To assist the GAO, Sandia National Laboratories provided a team of scientists to review the Navy's technical investigation. During its review, Sandia determined that the powder bags used for the gun had likely been rammed farther into the gun breech and at a higher speed than designed (a so-called overram), resulting in the powder igniting while loading was still in progress. A subsequent test by the Navy confirmed that an overram could have caused an explosion. Sandia's technicians also found that the physical evidence did not support the Navy's theory that an electronic or chemical detonator had been used to initiate the explosion.
In response to the new findings, the U.S. Navy, with Sandia's assistance, reopened the investigation. In August 1991, Sandia and the GAO completed their reports, concluding that it was likely that the explosion was caused by an accidental overram of powder bags into the breech of the 16-inch gun. The U.S. Navy, however, disagreed with Sandia's opinion and concluded that the cause of the explosion could not be determined. The U.S. Navy expressed regret but did not apologize to Hartwig's family and closed its investigation.
Background
Recommissioning
Ordered in 1938 under the Second Vinson Act, Iowa was the lead ship of her class of battleship. She was launched on 27 August 1942 and commissioned on 22 February 1943. Iowas main battery consisted of nine 16-inch (406.4 mm)/50 caliber guns.Bonner, p. 56.
After serving in World War II and the Korean War, Iowa was decommissioned on 24 February 1958 and entered the Atlantic Reserve Fleet at Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. She remained in the Reserve Fleet until 1983. At this time, Iowa was moved to Avondale Shipyards near New Orleans, Louisiana, to undergo a modernization as part of President Ronald Reagan's "600-ship Navy" plan. Under the command of Captain Gerald E. Gneckow, she was recommissioned on 28 April 1984, one year ahead of schedule. In order to expedite the schedule, many necessary repairs to Iowas engines and guns were not completed, and the mandatory US Navy Board of Inspection and Survey (InSurv) inspection was not conducted at that time.Thompson, p. 26. – Although Iowa was refurbished within budget, the final price tag was $50 million above the originally projected cost, mainly because of overtime paid to the ship's contractors.
Almost two years later, beginning on 17 March 1986, Iowa underwent her overdue InSurv inspection under the supervision of Rear Admiral John D. Bulkeley; the ship failed the inspection. Among many other deficiencies, the ship was unable to achieve her top speed of during a full-power engine run. Other problems discovered included hydraulic fluid leaks in all three main gun turrets, totaling per turret per week; Cosmoline (anticorrosion lubricant), which had not been removed from all the guns; deteriorated bilge piping; frequent shorts in the electrical wiring; pump failures; unrepaired soft patches on high-pressure steam lines; and frozen valves in the ship's firefighting system. Bulkeley personally recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral James Watkins, and the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, that Iowa be taken out of service immediately. Lehman, who had advocated bringing the Iowa-class ships out of mothballs, did not take the ship out of service but instructed the leaders of the Atlantic Fleet to ensure that Iowas deficiencies were corrected.Thompson, pp. 26–27; Vistica, p. 111. – Main gun Turret Three leaked so much oil, hydraulic fluid, and water that the crew referred to it as the "rain forest." Gneckow was promoted to rear admiral some time later (Thompson, p. 175).
A month after the InSurv, Iowa failed an Operation Propulsion Program Evaluation. A short time later, the ship retook and passed the evaluation.Thompson, p. 27. In July 1987, Captain Larry Seaquist assumed command of the ship.Thompson, p. 28 gives 25 April as the date of the change of command.
After a deployment to the Persian Gulf, Iowa returned to Norfolk, Virginia, for maintenance on 10 March 1988. On 23 May, Captain Seaquist was replaced by Captain Fred Moosally as Iowas commanding officer.Thompson, pp. 33–35.
Gunnery training and experiments A week after taking command, Moosally and his executive officer, Mike Fahey, canceled a planned $1 million repair package for Iowas main gun batteries, including repairs to the main gun turrets' lighting, electrical, powder hoist, and hydraulic systems—75 detailed deficiencies in all; instead, the funds were spent on overhauling the ship's powerplant.Thompson, pp. 46–47. In August 1988, Iowa set sail on sea trials around the Chesapeake Bay area and then began refresher training in the waters around Florida and Puerto Rico in October.Thompson, pp. 51–57. – According to Thompson, a grounding incident occurred on 25 August when, apparently encountering difficulty in conning the ship through shallow water, Iowa, with Moosally at the helm, narrowly missed colliding with the frigates and and the cruiser before running aground in soft mud outside the bay's main ship channel near the Thimble Shoals. After one hour, Iowa was able to extricate herself without damage and return to port (Thompson, pp. 58–60).
Between September 1988 and January 1989, sailors aboard Iowa reportedly conducted little training with her main guns, in part because of ongoing, serious maintenance issues with the main gun turrets. According to Ensign Dan Meyer, the officer in charge of the ship's Turret One, morale and operational readiness among the gun-turret crews suffered greatly.Garzke, Diehl, p. 171; Thompson, pp. 68–69; Vistica, p. 289
In January 1989 Iowas master chief fire controlman, Stephen Skelley, and gunnery officer, Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Michael Costigan, persuaded Moosally to allow them to experiment with increasing the range of the main guns using "supercharged" powder bags and specially designed shells. Moosally was led to believe, falsely, that top officials from Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) had authorized the experiments. In fact, John McEachren, a civilian employee in the Safety Office at the Naval Sea Systems Command, had given the go-ahead to conduct the experiments even though he had no authority to do so. McEachren concealed his approval of the gunnery experiments from his superiors.Engelberg, "Navy Finding on Iowa Blast Is Drawing Criticism", Thompson, pp. 69–71, 346–47. Skelley, 40, from Decatur, Illinois, had devoted his life to studying battleships and battleship gunnery. After completing an initial active-duty tour with the U.S. Navy, Skelley returned to civilian life. For the next 15 years his only steady job was selling kitchenware door-to-door. At the same time, Skelley served in the Navy Reserve, eventually rising to the rank of master chief petty officer, and returned to active duty at that rank. Said Seaquist of Skelley, "I decided that Skelley was brilliant, but was also a weird little fellow who required a very tight leash...He could be dangerous if left to his own devices, because he was totally fixated with getting more accuracy and range out of the guns, even if that entailed cutting corners and compromising safety." (Thompson, p. 30) Costigan was a 1972 Naval Academy graduate who had been twice passed over for promotion to commander. He had previously served on the and, like Skelley, was a battleship devotee. (Thompson, pp. 61–62.)
Several of the officers and petty officers in charge of the main gun turret crews believed that Skelley's and Costigan's proposed experiments were dangerous, especially because of the age of the guns and the turrets, in addition to their numerous maintenance problems. Meyer complained to Commander Robert John Kissinger, Iowas chief weapons officer, about the proposed experiments, but Kissinger refused to convey the concerns to Captain Moosally or halt the experiments.Engelberg, "Navy Finding on Iowa Blast Is Drawing Criticism", Schwoebel, p. 44; Thompson, p. 73.
On 20 January 1989, off Vieques Island, Iowas Turret One fired six of the experimental shells using the supercharged powder bags. Skelley claimed that one of the 16-inch shells traveled , setting a record for the longest conventional 16-inch shell ever fired. Although the shells had been fired without serious incident, Meyer and Petty Officer First Class Dale Eugene Mortensen, gun chief for Turret One, told Skelley that they would no longer participate in his experiments. Skelley asked Turret Two's gun chief, Senior Chief Reggie Ziegler, if he could use Turret Two for his experiments; Ziegler refused. Skelley then asked Lieutenant Phil Buch, Turret Two's officer in charge, and Buch acquiesced.Thompson, pp. 70–81. In the 1950s, the US Navy had fired a nuclear-equipped 16-inch shell further than Skelley's shell. Ziegler, 39, was a 19-year Navy veteran and was scheduled to retire in January 1990. He had volunteered for the assignment to Iowa.