The Stairs expedition to Katanga (1891−1892), led by Captain William Stairs, was the winner in a race between two imperial powers, the British South Africa Company BSAC and the Congo Free State, to claim Katanga, a vast mineral-rich territory in Central Africa, for the latter. The mission became notable when a local chief, (Mwenda Msiri), was killed, and also for the fact that Stairs, the leader of one side, actually held a commission in the army of the other.
This "scramble for Katanga" was a prime example of the Scramble for Africa, and one of the most dramatic incidents of that period.
Historical background On one side of the race was the Congo Free State, Belgian King Leopold II's instrument for private colonisation in Central Africa. On the other was the company chartered by the British government to make treaties with African chiefs, the BSAC of Cecil Rhodes, who mixed a determined approach to gaining mineral concessionsNeil Parsons: "A New History of Southern Africa, Second Edition." Macmillan, London (1993), pp. 181−83 with a vision for British imperial development spanning the continent.
Caught between them, and attempting to play one off against the other, was Msiri, the big chief of Garanganze or Katanga, a tribal land not yet claimed by a European power, and larger than many European countries in acreage. Msiri, like many African chiefs, had started as a slave trader, and had used superior weapons obtained by trading ivory, copper and slaves, to conquer and subjugate neighbouring tribes, taking many of them as slaves for resale. By the time of the Stairs expedition, Msiri was the unchallenged despot of the area. Like the newcomers, he had plenty of cunning and strategic sense, but this time he was the one with the inferior military technology (as well as being totally opposed to the British concept of abolitionism).Joseph Moloney: With Captain Stairs to Katanga: Slavery and Subjugation in the Congo 1891-92. Sampson Low, Marston & Co, London (1893), Chapter X, pp. 170–81 (reprinted by Jeppestown Press, ).
The Berlin Conference At the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference and related bilateral negotiations between Britain and Belgium, the land west and north of the Luapula River−Lake Mweru system (Katanga) was allocated to the Congo Free State while the land to the east and south was allocated to Britain and the BSAC. However the agreements included a Principle of Effectivity under which each colonial power had to set up an effective presence in the territory—by obtaining treaties from local tribal chiefs, flying their flag, and setting up an administration and police force to keep order—to confirm the claim. If they did not, a rival could come in and do so, thereby 'legally' taking over the territory in the eyes of the civilized powers.Moloney (1893), pp. 6–12. Moloney agrees the specific point on p 11. In 1890 neither colonial power had treaties or an effective presence in Katanga, and as reports came of gold and copper being found in Katanga, the stage was set for a race between the BSAC and Free State.
Treaties obtained from local chiefs in Africa were not aimed at having them accept their subjugation − superior force did that (just as it had for the chiefs themselves, earlier) − but were solely to impress on rival colonial powers that they had the means to convince their own populations of the justice of any military action they might have to take to defend their claim to civilize the area, and that was all that mattered.René de Pont-Jest: L'Expédition du Katanga, d'après les notes de voyage du marquis Christian de Bonchamps published 1892 in: Edouard Charton (editor): Le Tour du Monde magazine, website accessed 5 May 2007. Section I: "D'ailleurs ces lettres de soumission de ces petits tyrans africains, auxquels on lit quatre longues pages, dont, le plus souvent, ils ne comprennent pas un mot, et qu'ils approuvent d'une croix, afin d'avoir la, paix et des présents, ne sont sérieuses que pour les puissances européennes, en cas de contestations de territoires. Quant au souverain noir qui les signe, il ne s'en inquiète pas un seul instant". The idea of democracy was spreading in Europe all throughout the nineteenth century, and, increasingly, governments were required to take account of public opinion. Public opinion in Europe could be a powerful motivator of colonial actions, as the Fashoda Incident a few years later demonstrated.
Previous expeditions First off the mark was Rhodes who sent Alfred Sharpe from Nyasaland in 1890, backed up by Joseph Thomson coming from the south, but Sharpe failed to persuade Msiri, and Thomson didn't make it to Msiri's capital at Bunkeya. Sharpe's reports were complacently dismissive about the likelihood of their rivals having any success, and he said that once the 60-year-old Msiri was gone, Katanga would be theirs.Alfred Sharpe's Travels in the Northern Province and Katanga. The Northern Rhodesia Journal, Vol III, No.3 (1957) pp. 210–19. In this case it would probably have become part of Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia, with which it shares strong cultural and ethnic links.
Leopold responded in 1891 by sending two expeditions, and Sharpe's view seemed to be borne out. The Paul Le Marinel expedition only managed to obtain a vaguely worded letter (the Le Marinel letter) from Msiri agreeing to Free State agents having a presence in Katanga, but nothing more. This expedition was hampered by an accident when the gunpowder it was bringing for Msiri blew up, killing several men and damaging some of the other gifts being brought to sweeten the deal. A Belgian officer from the expedition, Legat, stayed behind with a group of askaris at a boma on the Lufoi River about 40 km from Bunkeya to keep an eye on Msiri. (Msiri later accused Legat of actually having kept the supplies lost in the explosion for himself).
Le Marinel was followed by the Delcommune Expedition, which tried to persuade Msiri on the basis of the Le Marinel letter to accept the Free State flag and Leopold's sovereignty. It also failed, and moved off to the south to explore Katanga's mineral resources.Moloney (1893), pp. 6–9.
Preparations and outward journey
Personnel
Belgium was short of people with tropical experience but Leopold was adept at recruiting other European nationalities for his schemes. Central Africa was a wild frontier attracting mercenaries for hire. At the recommendation of British-American explorer Henry Morton Stanley, who had already acted for Leopold in the Congo, the 27 year old Swahili speakingRené de Pont‐Jest (1892): Section I. Captain William Stairs was appointed to lead the expedition, on the basis of his experience on the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition on which he had become Stanley's second in command. He had a reputation of someone who would obey orders and get the job done.Moloney (1893), p. 13. That previous expedition had been marked by violence and brutality against any Africans who stood in its way as well as against its own African members.Daniel Liebowitz and Charles Pearson: The Last Expedition — Stanley's Mad Journey Through the Congo. W.W. Norton & Co.; New York (2005) pp. 109−48, 313−22. Canadian born at a time when it was part of the British Empire, Stairs had been educated partly in Britain and had joined a British regiment. He was considered to be and considered himself English or British.Moloney (1893), pp. 199, 205.
Stairs' second-in-command was the only Belgian on the expedition, Captain Omer Bodson, who had already served the Free State in the Congo, and had had some contact with the Emin Pasha Relief expedition's controversial 'rear column'.Moloney (1893), p. 14. Third in command was the Marquis Christian de Bonchamps, a French adventurer and hunter. There were two other whites: Joseph Moloney, the expedition doctor and also something of an adventurer, had previous African experience as a medical officer in the Boer War, and on an expedition in Morocco; and Robinson, the carpenter and fixer.Moloney (1893), p. 15.
Unlike Sharpe, Stairs was not at all complacent about being in a race, and thought it likely that Joseph Thomson would be sent to negotiate with Msiri for the BSAC before they could get there.Moloney (1893), p. 10.
The expedition hired 400 Africans, consisting of four or five Zanzibari 'chiefs' or supervisors including Hamadi bin Malum and Massoudi, about 100 askaris or African soldiers, a number of cooks and personal servants for the whites, and the rest, the majority, were porters or 'pagazis'. Most were from Zanzibar, some were from Mombasa, 40 were hired later in Tabora, Msiri's birthplace.Moloney (1893), pp. 23−24. At Bunkeya the expedition also had use of eight tough Dahomeyan askari stationed at Legat's boma on the Lufoi who knew Bunkeya well.Moloney (1893), p. 167.
The expedition's askaris were armed with 200 'Fusil Gras' rifles (a standard French army weapon of the time) while the officers each had several weapons including Winchester repeating rifles. Msiri's army had muskets, and needed gunpowder.Moloney (1893), p. 191.
Orders and objectives Stairs' orders were to take Katanga with or without Msiri's agreement. If they found a BSAC expedition had beaten them and had a treaty with Msiri they should await further orders. If they obtained a treaty and a BSAC expedition arrived, they should ask it to withdraw and use force to make them comply if necessary.Moloney (1893), p. 9. Moloney and Stairs were quite prepared for this eventuality. They were aware that in 1890, Cecil Rhodes had seized Manicaland in the face of Portuguese claims by sending an armed unit under Frederick Selous to occupy the territory and force the Portuguese to withdraw.Moloney (1893), pp. 131, 208.
Having taken Katanga they should then await the arrival of a second Free State column, the Bia Expedition led by two Belgian officers, which was coming down from the Congo River in the north to meet them.Moloney (1893), pp. 11−12.
Route and journey
The island of Zanzibar was the expedition's base, as it was for most ventures into Central Africa. They left Zanzibar on June 27, 1891. The preferred route was via the Zambezi and Lake Nyasa (Lake Malawi) but Harry Johnston, British Commissioner in Nyasaland who had acted for Rhodes by sending Sharpe on his failed mission to Msiri, advised that military action he was taking against slave traders made that route unsafe. Instead they crossed German East Africa from Zanzibar, marching 1,050 km during the dry season to Lake Tanganyika through country with potentially hostile tribes and slave traders. They crossed the lake by boat, then marched 550 km to Bunkeya as extreme heat and humidity indicated the build-up to the rainy season which then brought chilling rain, mosquitoes and unsanitary conditions.Moloney (1893), p. 12.
Averaging 13.3 km per day, it took them 120 days' marching spread over five months (with rest days and delays).Moloney (1893), p. 15. Moloney thought this was probably a record for expeditions of the type. The journey included extremes of thick forest, swamps and desolate stony plains. It also included beautiful landscapes, fertile woodland and game-rich grasslands. In one afternoon, Bodson shot a dozen antelope;Moloney (1893), p. 157. on another occasion, the men feasted on hippopotamus until they could not move.Moloney (1893), p. 97.
The officers had donkeys to ride on, but these died after crossing Lake Tanganyika.René de Pont-Jest (1892): Section II. The expedition was not attacked by hostile tribes or raiders as were weaker caravans going to Lake Tanganyika that year.Moloney (1893), pp. 63–5.