During the Spanish Civil War, most European countries followed a policy of non-intervention to avoid potential escalation or expansion of the war to other states. This policy led to the signing of the Non-Intervention Agreement in August 1936 and the setting up of the Non-Intervention Committee, which first met in September. Primarily arranged by the French and British governments, the committee included the Soviet Union, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany. Ultimately, the committee had the support of 27 states.
A plan to control materials coming into Spain was put forward in early 1937, effectively subjecting the Spanish Republic to severe international isolation and a de facto economic embargo. The plan was mocked by German and Italian observers as amounting to immediate and decisive support for the Spanish Nationalist faction.Ángel Viñas, La Soledad de la República The subject of foreign volunteers in Spain was also much discussed by the European powers, but with little result; although agreements were signed late in the war, they were conducted outside the committee. Efforts to stem the flow of war materials to Spain were largely unsuccessful, with foreign involvement in the war proving instrumental to its outcome. Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union consistently broke the Non-Intervention Agreement, and France occasionally did so. Britain for the most part remained faithful to the agreement.
Non-Intervention Agreement Italy and Germany supported the Spanish Nationalists from the outset of the Spanish Civil War. The Soviet Union began supporting the Spanish Republicans four months later. Non-intervention and the Non-Intervention Agreement were proposed in a joint diplomatic initiative by the governments of France and the United Kingdom. It was part of the policy of appeasement of European fascism, and was aimed at preventing a proxy war in Spain from escalating into a European-wide conflict.
On 3 August 1936, Charles de Chambrun, the French ambassador to Italy, presented the French government's non-intervention plan, and the Italian foreign minister Galeazzo Ciano promised to study it. The British quickly accepted the plan in principle. The following day, the plan was presented to Konstantin von Neurath, the foreign minister of Germany, by André François-Poncet. The German position was that such a declaration was not needed, but discussions could be held on preventing the spread of the war to the rest of Europe if the Soviet Union participated. It was mentioned at the meeting of the French with Neurath that both countries were already supplying the parties in the war: France aiding the Republicans, and Germany the Nationalists. A similar non-intervention plan was proposed by the French to the Soviet Union. On 6 August, Ciano confirmed Italian support in principle. Despite a Pravda claim that 12,145,000 rubles had already been sent by Soviet workers to Spain, the Soviet government likewise agreed in principle if Portugal was included, and if Germany and Italy stopped aid immediately.
On 7 August 1936, France unilaterally declared non-intervention. Draft declarations had been put to the German and Italian governments. Such a declaration had already been accepted by the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, which renounced all traffic in war material, direct or indirect. The Portuguese foreign minister, Armindo Monteiro, was also asked to accept but held back. An ultimatum was put to Yvon Delbos by the British to halt French exports to Spain, or Britain would not be obliged to act under the Treaty of Locarno if Germany invaded. On 9 August, exports were duly suspended. However, collections for food, clothing and medical supplies to the Spanish Republicans continued. On 9 August, the Germans falsely informed the British that "no war materials had been sent from Germany and none will". During the blockade of the Strait of Gibraltar by the Spanish Republican Navy, one German Junkers was captured when it came down in Republican territory, which was explained as "merely a transport aircraft". Its release would be required before Germany signed the Non-Intervention Pact. Portugal accepted the pact on 13 August unless its border was threatened by the war.
There was popular support in the United Kingdom and France for the pact. In the UK, the socialist Labour Party was strongly for it, while the left in France wanted direct aid to the Republicans. By October 1937, the Labour Party would reject non-intervention. Initially, the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) was split. Its leaders Walter Citrine and Ernest Bevin used their block votes at the TUC Congress in September 1936 to pass motions supporting non-intervention. thus making it the official TUC policy. But they soon backtracked under pressure from the LSI and the International Federation of Trade Unions, and by June 1937, Citrine, Bevin and the TUC repudiated non-intervention.
The "Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Breaches of the Non-Intervention Agreement in Spain", composed of a panel of distinguished personalities, met in London and issued a report secretly sponsored by the Comintern. Both the British and French governments were aware that events in Spain could spiral into a Second World War. France was reliant on British support for non-intervention. Léon Blum, the socialist prime minister of France, feared that openly backing the Republic would lead to civil war and a fascist takeover in his country, and would not in the end bring the outcome he hoped for in Spain.
On 5 August 1936, the United States made it known that it would follow a policy of non-intervention but did not announce it officially. Its isolationism on the Spanish war would later be identified by Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles as a disastrous decision.Preston (2004) p. 145. Five days later, the Glenn L. Martin Company enquired whether the U.S. government would allow the sale of eight bombers to the Spanish Republican Air Force; the response was negative. The U.S. also confirmed it would not take part in mediation attempts, including one by the Organization of American States. Despite the neutrality of the U.S. and British governments, oil companies from both countries such as Texaco and Shell sold oil to the Nationalist side throughout the war; this included 3,500,000 tons of oil provided on credit, which was more than double the amount of oil imported by the Republic.
Mexico soon became the first state to support the Republicans openly. On 15 August, the United Kingdom banned exports of war material to Spain. Neurath agreed to the pact but also suggested that volunteers—many of whom would eventually form the International Brigades—should be included. Italy similarly agreed and signed on 21 August after a determined diplomatic offensive by Britain and France. The surprising reversal of views has been put down to the growing belief that countries could not abide by the agreement anyway. German Admiral Erich Raeder urged his government to either back the Nationalists completely and bring Europe to the brink of war, or abandon the Nationalists and sign the agreement which the Germans did on 24 August.
The Soviet Union was keen not to be left out. On 23 August, it acceded to the Non-Intervention Agreement, which was followed by a decree from Stalin banning exports of war material to Spain, thereby bringing the Soviets into line with the Western powers. Soviet foreign policy considered Collective security against German fascism a priority, and the Comintern had expressed a similar position in 1934. The Soviets walked a fine line between (a) cooperating with France and Great Britain, and (b) not being seen as hindering the world revolution and communist ideals. This mid-1930s period was also the time of the first significant trials of the Old Bolsheviks during the Great Purge. Soviet press and opposition groups were firmly against non-intervention in Spain, and non-intervention could hardly have been further from the Soviet goal of spreading the revolution.
Shortly after the agreement was signed, the Non-Intervention Committee was created to uphold the agreement's principles. However, the double-dealing of the Germans and Soviets soon became apparent. The agreement removed the need for a declaration of neutrality, which would have granted the Nationalists and Republicans control over neutrals in the areas they controlled, and had little legal standing. In the United Kingdom, the rationale for non-intervention was partly based on an exaggerated assessment of German and Italian preparedness for war.
Many historians argue that the British policy of non-intervention was a product of the Establishment's anticommunism. Scott Ramsay instead argues that Britain demonstrated a "benevolent neutrality" and was simply hedging its bets, avoiding favouring one side or the other. Its goal was that in a future European war, Britain would enjoy the 'benevolent neutrality' of whichever side won in Spain.Scott Ramsay. "Ensuring Benevolent Neutrality: The British Government's Appeasement of General Franco during the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939". International History Review 41:3 (2019): 604–623. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2018.1428211. The British government was also concerned about the far right and ultimately concluded that no desirable basis of government was possible in Spain because of the present polarisation.Scott Ramsay. "Ideological Foundations of British Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War: Foreign Office Perceptions of Political Polarisation in Spain, 1931-1936." Diplomacy & Statecraft 31, no. 1 (2020): 44–64.
Non-Intervention Committee
The ostensible purpose of the Non-Intervention Committee (1936–1939) was to prevent personnel and matériel reaching the warring parties of the Spanish Civil War, as was articulated in the Non-Intervention Agreement.
The committee first met in London on 9 September 1936 and was attended by all European countries with the exception of Switzerland, whose policy of neutrality prohibited even intergovernmental action. It was chaired by William Morrison, Britain's Financial Secretary to the Treasury. The meeting was concerned mostly with procedure. Charles Corbin represented the French, Dino Grandi represented the Italians and Ivan Maisky represented the Soviets. Germany was represented by Ribbentrop (with Otto Christian Archibald von Bismarck as deputy) but left the running to Grandi although they found working with him difficult. Portugal, whose presence had been a Soviet requirement, was not represented. There was little faith in the committee's effectiveness since the British and French were no doubt aware of the continued shipment of arms to the Nationalists from Italy and Germany. Britain protested twice to the Italians, once in response to Italian aircraft landing in Mallorca, the other pre-emptively over any significant change in the Mediterranean. Stanley Baldwin, the British prime minister, and Blum both attempted to halt global exports to Spain and believed it in Europe's best interests. Soviet aid to the Republic was threatened in the committee. The Soviet aid began to flow once it was clear that the Non-Intervention Agreement was not preventing Italian and German aid to the Nationalists.