The Georgian affair of 1922 () was a political conflict within the Soviet leadership about the way in which social and political transformation was to be achieved in the Georgian SSR. The dispute over Georgia, which arose shortly after the forcible Sovietization of the country and peaked in the latter part of 1922, involved local Georgian Bolshevik leaders, led by Filipp Makharadze and Budu Mdivani, on one hand, and their de facto superiors from the Russian SFSR, particularly Joseph Stalin and Grigol Ordzhonikidze, on the other hand. The content of this dispute was complex, involving the Georgians' desire to preserve autonomy from Moscow and the differing interpretations of Bolshevik nationality policies, and especially those specific to Georgia. One of the main points at issue was Moscow's decision to amalgamate Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan into Transcaucasian SFSR, a move that was staunchly opposed by the Georgian leaders who urged for their republic a full-member status within the Soviet Union.
The affair was a critical episode in the power struggle surrounding the sick Vladimir Lenin, whose support Georgians sought to obtain. The dispute ended with the victory of the Stalin-Ordzhonikidze line and resulted in the fall of the Georgian moderate Communist government. According to historian Jeremy Smith, it also contributed to a final break between Lenin and Stalin, and inspired Lenin's last major writings.
Background
Marxism and the "National Question"
In 1848, Karl Marx wrote in The Communist Manifesto that "the working men have no country," and over the next several decades Marxist thinkers such as Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Kautsky, Otto Bauer, Vladimir Lenin, and Joseph Stalin would continue to engage with the question of how to relate a class-based worldview to the existence of nations and nationalism, reaching sometimes starkly different conclusions.
These questions began to take on an increasingly urgent political character in the aftermath of the overthrow of the government of Tsar Nicholas II and its replacement with the new Soviet government.
Stalin's views on the National Question
In his earliest school years in Georgia, Stalin (born Ioseb Jughashvili) had felt a connection to emerging Georgian nationalism, in part as a reaction against a policy of imperial Russification present in the seminary he attended while studying for the orthodox priesthood.Kotkin, Stephen: Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, Vol. 1, 1878–1928. New York: Penguin Books, 2014. Pgs. 32–35
By 1904, however, influenced by Marxist writings, Stalin had moved toward repudiation of independent Georgian nationalism, as he outlined in his essay The Social-Democratic View on the National Question.
Stalin developed his views further in his 1913 pamphlet Marxism and the National Question. The essay describes nationalism as an important force to be reckoned with that historically had arisen in tandem with the rise of capitalism and had gained a great deal of momentum in Russian border regions (including Georgia) following the fall of the tsarist autocracy, and attempted to strike a balance between a right of national self-determination as a legitimate response to oppressor chauvinism while also recognizing the potentially exploitative uses of nationalism as a means to divide the working class, to engage in actual oppression, or to cling to what Stalin viewed as outmoded cultural totems (derisively citing "such 'national peculiarities' of the Georgians as the vendetta!" as an example); similarly, it attempted to strike a balance between adherence to principles and the need to temporize according to particular circumstances.
In the same essay, Stalin specifically describes problems related to "cultural-national" autonomy in the Caucasus region, including Georgia, referring to the possible organization both within and beyond that territory of ethnically defined institutions, objecting in part that such a project would be bound to failure by the region's kaleidoscopic ethnic diversity and also that it might lead to power-grabs by what he viewed as "reactionary" religious leaders.
By 1917, partly as a result of these efforts, Stalin became the recognized expert within the Russia Bolshevik Party on the National Question, and had risen to position of Commissar of Nationalities in the new Soviet government.Kotkin, pg. 349
Diplomatic backdrop
The establishment of the new RSFSR in 1917 (and, especially, the conclusion of the Polish–Soviet War) touched off a flurry of diplomatic activity. Initially, relations between the Russian SFSR and other Soviet Socialist Republics were governed by a series of bilateral treaties, a state of affairs that the top Bolshevik leadership regarded as undesirable and unsustainable over a long period of time.
Shortly before the 10th Party Congress in March 1921, Stalin published theses emphasizing his view of the non-viability of bilateral treaties as a long-term solution, writing "Not one Soviet republic taken separately can consider itself safe from economic exhaustion and military defeat by world imperialism. Therefore, the isolated existence of separate Soviet republics has no firm basis in view of the threats to their existence from the capitalist states....The national Soviet republics that have freed themselves from their own and from the foreign bourgeoisie will be able to defend their existence and conquer the united forces of imperialism only by joining in a close political union."Kotkin, pg. 386
The terms under which different SSRs might be incorporated into some larger body with the RSFSR was, however, the subject of much debate.
Bolshevik takeover of Georgia
Soviet rule in Georgia was established by the Soviet Red Army during the February–March 1921 military campaign that was largely engineered by the two influential Georgian-born Soviet officials, Joseph Stalin, then People's Commissar for Nationalities for the RSFSR, and Grigol Ordzhonikidze, head of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee (Zaikkraikom) of the Russian Communist Party. Disagreements among the Bolsheviks about the fate of Georgia preceded the Red Army invasion. While Stalin and Ordzhonikidze urged the immediate Sovietization of independent Georgia led by the Menshevik-dominated government, Trotsky favored "a certain preparatory period of work inside Georgia, in order to develop the uprising and later come to its aid". Lenin was unsure about the outcome of the Georgian campaign, fearful of the international consequences and the possible crisis with Kemalist Turkey. Lenin finally gave his consent, on February 14, 1921, to the intervention in Georgia, but later repeatedly complained about the lack of precise and consistent information from the Caucasus.Suny, Ronald Grigor (1994), The Making of the Georgian Nation: 2nd edition, pp. 210–212. Indiana University Press, Well aware of widespread opposition to the newly established Soviet rule, Lenin favored a reconciliatory policy with Georgian intelligentsia and peasants who remained hostile to the militarily imposed regime. However, many Communists found it difficult to abandon the methods used against their opposition during the Russian Civil War and make adjustment to the more flexible policy. For moderates like Filipp Makharadze, Lenin's approach was a reasonable way to secure for Soviet power a broad base of support. They advocated tolerance toward the Menshevik opposition, greater democracy within the party, gradual land reform and, above all, respect for national sensitivities and Georgia's sovereignty from Moscow. Communists like Ordzhonikidze and Stalin pursued a more hard-line policy: they sought to eliminate political opposition and centralize party control over the newly Sovietized republics.Knight, Ami W. (1993), Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, p . 26–27. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey,
Conflict soon broke out between the moderate and hard-line Georgian Bolshevik leaders. The dispute was preceded by Stalin's ban on formation of the national Red Army of Georgia, and subordination of all local workers' organizations and trade unions to the Bolshevik party committees. Dissatisfied by the Soviet Georgian government's moderate treatment of the political opposition and its desire to retain sovereignty from Moscow, Stalin arrived in Tbilisi, capital of Georgia, in early July 1921. After summoning a workers' assembly, Stalin delivered a speech outlining a program aimed at elimination of local nationalism, but was booed by the crowd and received hostile silence from his colleagues.Lang, David Marshall (1962). A Modern History of Georgia, p. 238. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Within the days that followed, Stalin removed the Georgian Revolutionary committee chief Makharadze for inadequate firmness and replaced him with Polikarp Mdivani, ordering local leaders to "crush the hydra of nationalism". Makharadze's supporters, including the Georgian Cheka chief Kote Tsintsadze and his lieutenants, were also sacked and replaced with more ruthless officers Kvantaliani, Atarbekov, and Lavrentiy Beria.
Conflict over confederation
Within less than a year, however, Stalin was in open conflict with Mdivani and his associates. One of the most important points at issue was the question of Georgia's status in the projected union of Soviet republics. Over the objections of other Georgian Bolsheviks, Grigol Ordzhonikidze in late 1921 had set in motion the formation of a union of all three Transcaucasian republics—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—as a means of resolving simmering territorial and ethnic disputes, and with Stalin's strong backing insisted that this federation join the Soviet Union together as one federative republic. The Georgian Central Executive Committee, particularly Mdivani, vehemently disagreed with this proposal, desiring their country to retain a stronger individual identity and enter the union as a full member rather than as part of a single Transcaucasian SFSR. (Ordzhonikidze's proposal, however, was passed at a Georgian Party Congress with support of rank-and-file delegates.)Kotkin, pg. 479 Stalin and his aides accused the Georgian Central Executive Committee of selfish nationalism and labeled them as "national deviationists". On their part, the Georgian Central Executive Committee responded with charges of "Great Russian chauvinism". On October 21, 1922, Mdivani contacted Moscow to berate Ordzhonikidze in harsh terms. The same day, Lenin sent a telegram rebuking Mdivani, upholding Stalin's position, and expressing his strong support for the political and economic integration of the Transcaucasian republics, informing the Georgian leaders that he rejected their criticism of Moscow's bullying tactics.
The conflict peaked in November 1922, when Ordzhonikidze resorted to physical violence with a member of the Mdivani group and struck him during a verbal confrontation.Kort, M (2001), The Soviet Colossus, p.154. M.E. Sharpe, The Georgian leaders complained to Lenin and presented a long list of abuses, including the notorious incident involving Ordzhonikidze.
Lenin's involvement In late November 1922, Lenin dispatched the VeCheka chief Dzerzhinsky to Tiflis to investigate the matter. Dzerzhinsky sympathized with Stalin and Ordzhonikidze and, hence, tried to give Lenin a significantly smoothened picture of their activities in his report. However, Lenin's doubts about the conduct of Stalin and his allies around the Georgian question mounted. He was also afraid of negative outcry that might ensue abroad and in other Soviet republics. In late December 1922, Lenin accepted that both Ordzhonikidze and Stalin were guilty of the imposition of Great Russian nationalism upon non-Russian nationalities.Thatcher, Ian D. (2003), Trotsky, p. 122. Routledge,