The First Battle of al-Faw was a battle of the Iran–Iraq War, fought on the al-Faw peninsula between 10 February and 10 March 1986. The Iranian operation is considered to be one of Iran's greatest achievements in the Iran–Iraq War. The Iranians were able to capture the al-Faw peninsula, cutting off Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf in the process; this in turn hardened Iraqi attitudes to prosecute the war. The Faw peninsula was later recaptured by Iraqi forces near the end of the war.
On 9 February 1986, Iran launched Operation Dawn 8, a sophisticated and carefully planned amphibious assault across the Shatt al-Arab (Arvand Rud) river against the Iraqi troops defending the strategic al-Faw peninsula, which connects Iraq to the Persian Gulf.Stephen C. Pelletiere, The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum, ABC-CLIO, 1992, p.142 The Iranians defeated the Iraqi defenders, mostly Iraqi Popular Army, capturing the tip of the peninsula, including Iraq's main air control and warning center covering Persian Gulf, as well as limiting Iraq's access to the ocean. Iran managed to maintain their foothold in Al-Faw against several Iraqi counter-offensives, including Republican Guard assaults and chemical attacks, for another month despite heavy casualties until a stalemate was reached.
The First Battle of al-Faw was a major success for Iran who now held an important strategic position, but worried other states in the region, primarily in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, who increased their support for Iraq. The battle damaged the prestige of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi government, who began extensively improving defenses for the threatened major city of Basra. Although the battle officially ended in March 1986, intermittent clashes continued for two years until April 1988, when Iraq recaptured the al-Faw peninsula at the Second Battle of al-Faw.
Prelude The Iran–Iraq War had been fought for nearly 6 years. While the Iranians had driven the Iraqis off of their soil in 1982, Iranian efforts to invade Iraq and cause the downfall of the regime of Saddam Hussein had been fruitless. Iran had suffered due to a lack of spare parts and in its inability to replace lost equipment, and relied heavily on human wave attacks and light infantry warfare. Meanwhile, the Iraqis (especially after 1982) were heavily supported by foreign nations. The war bogged down into a stalemate.
In the face of increasing Iraqi armament and manpower, as well as increasing problems on their own side, Iran could no longer rely on outnumbering Iraqi troops. While the infantry and human wave assaults would remain key to their attacks throughout the war, Iran began to rely more heavily on infiltration and surprise attacks, as a part of limited light infantry warfare . In contrast to Iraq's static defences and heavy armour, Iran began training troops in infiltration, patrolling, night-fighting, marsh warfare, and mountain warfare. They also began training thousands of Revolutionary Guard commandos in amphibious warfare, as southern Iraq is marshy and filled with wetlands. Iran used speedboats to cross the marshes and rivers in southern Iraq and landed troops on the opposing banks, where they would dig and set up pontoon bridges across the rivers and wetlands to allow heavy troops and supplies to cross. Transport helicopters were used as well, ferrying troops to the battlefield. Iran largely focused on infiltrating through areas that were difficult for Iraqi armour, air power, and artillery to be used, such as valleys, the marshes of southern Iraq, and the mountains of northern Iraq.
Iran began to plan for a major offensive. While deceptively making it seem like the attack was to be against the southern Iraqi city of al-Basra (like most of Iran's attacks had been), the attack was really aimed at the southern al-Faw peninsula, touching the Persian Gulf, and the only area of Iraq that touched the open ocean.
Preparations The operation was planned by Iran's army chief of staff and the Iranian defense minister. It was planned entirely by professional military officers, but the battlefield commanders were a mix of regular army and Revolutionary Guards officers. The Iraqis were taken by surprise, as they had not expected the Iranians to be able to land troops on the peninsula. The Iranians hoped to cut off Iraq from the Persian Gulf, making the country landlocked, and threaten Basra from the south. More importantly, Iran hoped to deliver a series of blows against Iraq that would lead to its downfall via attrition warfare. The operation was to be called Operation Valfajr 8 (Dawn 8).
Iranian attack
On 9 February 1986, the Iranians launched Operation Dawn 8 (), in which 100,000 troops comprising five Army divisions and 50,000 men from the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij paramilitary advanced in a two-pronged offensive into southern Iraq.Karsh, Efraim The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988, London: Osprey, 2002 page 48 Unlike the earlier offensives, Dawn 8 was planned entirely by professional Army officers, all of whom were former officers of the Imperial Iranian Army during the rule of the Shah. The Iranians launched a feint attack against Basra (around al-Qurnah) from 9–14 February, attempting to split Iraq's 3rd and 7th Corps; this was stopped by the Iraqis. Meanwhile, the main Iranian blow fell on the strategically important Al-Faw peninsula, which fell after only 24 hours of fighting. Iran's northern forces launched human wave attacks, while the southern forces launched an armored attack against the enemy. Both attacks were stopped with heavy Iraqi firepower, and the Iranians suffered 4,000 casualties. However, the Iraqis became convinced that this was the main point of attack, and diverted their forces to that sector; this is now recognised as a deception.Karsh, Efraim The Iran-Iraq War, The Rosen Publishing Group, 2008, p. 46 Instead, Iran's primary objective was Iraq's al-Faw peninsula, the only area in Iraq that touched the Persian Gulf.
Peninsula landings Taking place between 9 and 25 February, the assault across the Shatt al-Arab achieved significant tactical and operational surprise, allowing the Iranian forces to initially gain a quick victory over forces of the Iraqi Popular Army in the area. Considered a turning point in the war, unlike the tactics of human wave assaults used elsewhere at the front, the operation was a sophisticated and carefully planned amphibious operation.
The Iranians launched their assault on the peninsula at night, their men arriving on rubber boats.Bulloch, John & Morris, Harvey The Gulf War, Methuen: London, 1989 Iranian Navy SEALs spearheaded the offensive despite a shortage of gear. Prior to this action Iranian Naval Commandos performed reconnaissance of the Faw peninsula. The Iranian SEALs penetrated an obstacle belt and isolated Iraqi bunkers whose troops had taken cover from the heavy rains inside or were sleeping. Iranian demolition teams detonated charges on the obstacles to create a path for the Iranian infantry waiting to begin their assault.
The Iranian command was fortunate in taking advantage of torrential rain during the initial 24 hours that made it impossible for Iraq to bring to bear its superior air and artillery firepower. Not only did the amphibious landings provide a significant lodgement behind Iraq's tactical front, but they also created a psychological shock wave throughout the Persian Gulf region.Mohiaddin Mesbahi, The USSR and the Iran-Iraq War: From Brezhnev to Gorbachev, in Farhang Rajaee, ed., The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression, University Press of Florida, 1993, p.83 Soon after the initial landings, Iranian combat engineers were able to construct bridges to improve the flow of ground troops into the lodgement area.
The first Iranian attack used frogmen against Umm al-Rasas island in the Shatt Al-Arab across from Khorramshahr as a stepping stone to reach the Al-Faw peninsula. They captured the island, but an Iraqi counterattack recaptured it three days later.
Iran's second simultaneous attack was aimed at the foot of the peninsula. Using a division size strike force of the Revolutionary Guard's amphibious forces on small boats and large LST boats, they landed at six points on the peninsula, after an intense artillery and air bombardment. The Iranians were well supported by artillery and air power during this attack. Iranian forces drove north along the peninsula almost unopposed, capturing it after only 24 hours of fighting. :240The resistance, consisting of several thousand poorly trained soldiers of the Iraqi Popular Army, fled or were defeated, taking 4,000 casualties and 1,500 becoming prisoners of war. The Iranian strike force overran the tip of the peninsula, in 24 hours, and while most of the frontline Iraqis fled, the town of Al-Faw held out until 14 February. The Iraqis had not expected an Iranian attack at this area, assuming that the Iranians were incapable of launching a major amphibious operation.
Due to being taken by surprise, and poor weather, the Iraqis were unable to launch a major counterattack, but began to fight back as early as 12 February. Iran quickly in the meantime set up pontoon bridges across the Shatt al-Arab, and rapidly moved 20,000 troops from the Basij, Revolutionary Guards, and Regular Army onto the peninsula. To avoid detection by American satellites and Iraqi warplanes, the components of the bridges were welded together underwater during the night. Oxygen tanks were then strapped to the sides of the bridge, causing it to rise to the surface. Afterwards, they dug in and set up defenses.
After taking the Faw, the Iranians built a pontoon bridge and began to dig in.
Iraqi counteroffensive Initial attempts by Iraq to dislodge the Iranian troops made little impression due to lack of coordination, but cost Iraq 20-25 aircraft lost.Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991, University of Nebraska Press, 2004, p.217 Iran's successive operations toward Umm-al-Qasr, which had been undertaken with the intention to cut off Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf, were contained only with considerable losses to Iraq's Republican Guard despite a three-pronged counterattack on 12 February led by General Maher Abd al-Rashid, supported by some of Iraq's best commanders Hisham Sabah al-Fakhri, and Sa'adi Tuma 'Abbas al-Jabburi. However, lack of effective combined arms tactics by the Iraqi troops, and soft ground limiting tank mobility eventually halted the counterattack despite intensive close air support.
On 12 February 1986, the Iraqis began a counter-offensive to re-take the Faw, which failed after a week of intense fighting. Saddam sent one of his best commanders, General Maher Abd al-Rashid and the Republican Guard to begin a new offensive to re-capture the Faw on 24 February 1986. A new round of intensive fighting took place, centered on a three-pronged counterattack. The Iraqi offensives were supported by helicopter gunships, hundreds of tanks and a huge bombing offensive by the Iraqi Air Force. Despite having an advantage in firepower and the extensive use of chemical warfare, the Iraqi attempt to re-take the Faw again ended in failure.