The United States Air Force became a separate military service on 18 September 1947 with the implementation of the National Security Act of 1947.The primary source used for the history of the USAF prior to 1946 is Bernard C. Nalty. Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force (Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), onlineU.S. Intelligence Community (October 2004). National Security Act of 1947 . Retrieved April 14, 2006. The Act created the National Military Establishment, later renamed the United States Department of Defense, which was composed of four of the five branches, the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and a newly created Air Force.U.S. Department of State(2006). National Security Act of 1947. Retrieved April 14, 2006. Prior to 1947, the responsibility for military aviation was divided between the Army for land-based operations and the Navy and Marine Corps for sea-based operations from aircraft carrier and amphibious aircraft. The Army created the first antecedent of the Air Force on 1 August 1907, which through a succession of changes of organization, titles, and missions advanced toward eventual separation 40 years later. The predecessor organizations leading up to today's U.S. Air Force are:
Aeronautical Division, Signal Corps (1 August 1907 – 18 July 1914) Aviation Section, Signal Corps (18 July 1914 – 20 May 1918) Division of Military Aeronautics (20 May 1918 – 24 May 1918) Air Service, U.S. Army (24 May 1918 – 2 July 1926) U.S. Army Air Corps (2 July 1926 – 20 June 1941) U.S. Army Air Forces (20 June 1941 – 17 September 1947)
World War I and between wars
World War I In 1917, upon the American entry into World War I, the first major U.S. aviation combat force was created when an Air Service was formed as part of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). Major General Mason Patrick commanded the Air Service of the AEF; his deputy was Brigadier General Billy Mitchell. These aviation units, some of which were trained in France, provided tactical support for the U.S. Army, especially during the Battle of Saint-Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne offensives. Among the aces of the AEF Air Service were Captain Eddie Rickenbacker and 2nd Lieutenant Frank Luke. Concurrent with the creation of this combat force, the U.S. Army's aviation establishment in the United States was removed from control of the Signal Corps and placed directly under the United States Secretary of War. An assistant secretary was created to direct the Army Air Service, which had dual responsibilities for development and procurement of aircraft, and raising and training of air units. With the end of the First World War, the AEF's Air Service was dissolved and the Army Air Service in the United States largely demobilized.
In 1920, the Air Service became a branch of the Army and in 1926 was renamed the Army Air Corps. During this period, the Air Corps began experimenting with new techniques, including air-to-air refueling and the development of the B-9 and the Martin B-10, the first all-metal monoplane bombers, and new fighters.
Billy Mitchell: Air power court martialed Americans were fascinated with aviation in the 1920s and 1930s and refused to allow War Department conservatism to block innovation. General Billy Mitchell, the deputy director of the Air Service sought to wrest control of coastal defense away from the Navy. He went public insisting that his planes could sink battleships any day, a claim proven with a series of tests that culminated in the sinking of the SMS Ostfriesland. Mitchell lost his self-control in 1925 when he accused the Navy in a press release of "incompetency, criminal negligence and almost treasonable administration of the national defense." He received the highly publicized court martial he wanted, and was allowed to expound his theory that air power alone would suffice to win the next big war. He was convicted, and resigned. He became a popular hero and public opinion forced the War Department to strengthen the Air Corps. Mitchell's main argument was air power had to be autonomous—had to be controlled by fliers who understood the new technology, new tactics, new strategies, and who would not waste precious air assets in trying to assist old-fashioned armies and navies. Until his death in 1936 Mitchell, as a civilian, was a tireless prophet of airpower before numerous civilian audiences, but he lost touch with aviation developments and ceased to be influential inside the services. Indeed, his almost hysterical attacks made many generals hostile. The Air Corps managed a few publicity stunts, but always seemed to be overshadowed by glamorous civilians like Charles Lindbergh, Howard Hughes, or Amelia Earhart. In 1934 President Franklin Roosevelt, feuding with the airline industry, suddenly turned the delivery of air mail over to the Air Corps. Multiple crashes by inexperienced Air Corps pilots in mediocre planes with poor navigation gear emphasized the fragility of the new service, and undercut its claims that in wartime it could perform miracles. Roosevelt, however, had become a firm believer in air power and had behind him both public opinion and Congress. When mobilization began in spring 1940 Roosevelt was as energetic as anyone in expanding the Air Corps role, calling for 50,000 planes a year, and sending the best new models to Britain for its war against the Luftwaffe.
Command structure In 1935, as a result of recommendations from two civilian review boards, the next advancement toward independence for the Air Force occurred when all flying units, which heretofore had been distributed to various ground commands, were grouped together as an aerial task force under one air commander as the General Headquarters Air Force. The Air Corps, headed by the Chief of the Air Corps, continued as before but now held responsibility only for supply, airfields, and training, in effect splitting the Air Force into two parts. Both were commanded by major generals (Frank Andrews and Oscar Westover, followed by Henry H. ("Hap") Arnold).
Technology In 1937, the B-17 Flying Fortress made its first appearance. In a feat of navigation impressive for the time, three B-17s intercepted the Italian passenger liner Rex at sea. Though intended to demonstrate the ability of the Air Corps to defend the nation's coasts, the mission also indicated the emerging doctrine within the Air Corps of the supremacy of strategic bombing.
During World War I, aviation technology developed rapidly; however, the Army's reluctance to use the new technology began to make airmen think that as long as the Army controlled aviation, development would be stunted and a potentially valuable force neglected. Air Service senior officer Billy Mitchell began to campaign for an independent Air Force, co-equal to the Army and Navy. But his campaign offended many and resulted in a court martial in 1925 that effectively ended his career. His followers, including future aviation leaders "Hap" Arnold and Carl Spaatz, saw the lack of public, congressional, and military support that Mitchell received and decided that America was not ready for an independent air force. Under the leadership of its chief of staff Mason Patrick and, later, Arnold, the Air Corps waited until the time to fight for independence arose again.
World War II
The Air Force came of age in World War II. President Franklin D. Roosevelt took the lead after the Munich Agreement, calling for a vastly enlarged air force based on long-range strategic bombing. President Roosevelt instituted a plan to construct 15,000 military aircraft per year, which grew to 50,000 per year after the Axis victory in the Battle of France. Organizationally it became largely independent from the Army in 1941, when the Army Air Corps became a part of the new U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF), and the GHQ Air Force was re-designated the subordinate Combat Command. In the major reorganization of the Army by War Department Circular 59, effective March 9, 1942, the newly created Army Air Forces gained equal voice with the Army and Navy on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and complete autonomy from the Army Ground Forces and the Services of Supply, serving as a separate service in all but name. The reorganization also eliminated both Combat Command and the Air Corps as organizations (the latter remained a combat branch of the Army until 1947) in favor of a streamlined system of commands and numbered air forces for decentralized management of the burgeoning Army Air Forces.
The reorganization merged all aviation elements of the former Air Corps into the Army Air Forces. Although the Air Corps still legally existed as an Army branch, the position and Office of the Chief of the Air Corps was dissolved.
Major General Carl A. Spaatz took command of the Eighth Air Force in London in 1942; with Brigadier General Ira Eaker as second in command, he supervised the strategic bombing campaign. In late 1943, Spaatz was made commander of the new U.S. Strategic Air Forces, reporting directly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Spaatz began daylight bombing operations using the prewar doctrine of flying bombers in close formations, relying on their combined defensive firepower for protection from attacking enemy aircraft rather than supporting fighter escorts. The doctrine proved flawed when deep-penetration missions beyond the range of escort fighters were attempted, because German Luftwaffe fighter planes overwhelmed U.S. formations, shooting down bombers in excess of "acceptable" loss rates, especially in combination with the vast number of flak anti-aircraft batteries defending Nazi Germany's major targets. American fliers took heavy casualties during the Operation Tidal Wave raids on the oil refineries of Ploiești, Romania, and the ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt and Regensburg, Germany, and it was the loss rate in crews and not materiel that brought about a pullback from the strategic offensive in the autumn of 1943.
The Eighth Air Force had attempted to use both the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt and the Lockheed P-38 Lightning as escorts, but while the Thunderbolt was a capable dog-fighter it lacked the range, even with the addition of drop tanks to extend its range, and the Lightning proved mechanically unreliable in the frigid altitudes at which the missions were fought. Bomber protection was greatly improved after the introduction of North American P-51 Mustang fighters in Europe. With its built-in extended range and competitive or superior performance characteristics in comparison to all existing German piston-engine fighters, the Mustang was an immediately available solution to the crisis. In January 1944 the Eighth Air Force obtained priority in equipping its groups, so that ultimately 14 of its 15 groups fielded Mustangs. P-51 escorts began operations in February 1944 and increased their numbers rapidly, so that the Luftwaffe suffered increasing fighter losses in aerial engagements beginning with Big Week in early 1944. Allied fighters were also granted free rein in attacking German fighter airfields, both in pre-planned missions and while returning to base from escort duties, and the major Luftwaffe threat against Allied bombers was severely diminished by D-Day.
In the Pacific Theater of Operations, the AAF provided major tactical support under General George Kenney to Douglas MacArthur in the South West Pacific theater. Kenney's pilots invented the skip-bombing technique against Japanese ships. Kenney's forces claimed destruction of 11,900 Japanese planes and 1.7 million tons of shipping. The first development and sustained implementation of airlift by American air forces occurred between May 1942 and November 1945 as hundreds of transports flew more than half a million tons of supplies from India to China over the Hump.