The Abu Omar case was the abduction and transfer to Egypt of the imam of Milan Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, also known as Abu Omar. The case became one of the best-documented instances of extraordinary rendition carried out in a joint operation by the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Italian Military Intelligence and Security Service (SISMI) during the war on terror declared by the George W. Bush administration.
Nasr was abducted on February 17, 2003, in Milan by agents of SISMI and the CIA, and transported to Aviano Air Base, from which he was flown to Egypt. There he was imprisoned for four years without charges, secluded, interrogated, and, according to journalist Glenn Greenwald, tortured by the Mubarak regime.Glenn Greenwald, "Italy's ex-intelligence chief given 10-year sentence for role in CIA kidnapping", The Guardian, February 13, 2013."I pm di Milano: arrestate gli agenti della Cia", Corriere della Sera, June 24, 2005.
The CIA operation interrupted an Italian surveillance program investigating Nasr's alleged participation in Islamist organizations. Despite the disruption, Abu Omar was indicted on international terrorism charges in Italy in 2005. The Italian government initially denied any role in the abduction, though the Italian press described a "CIA–SISMI concerted operation." Nasr was released by an Egyptian court in February 2007, which ruled his detention "unfounded."
Italian prosecutors Armando Spataro and Ferdinando Pomarici indicted 26 CIA agents, including Rome station chief Jeffrey W. Castelli and Milan chief of base Robert Seldon Lady, as well as SISMI director General Nicolò Pollari, his deputy Marco Mancini, and station chiefs Raffaele Ditroia, Luciano Di Gregori, and Giuseppe Ciorra."Rapimento Abu Omar, a giudizio l'ex capo del Sismi Nicolò Pollari", La Repubblica, February 16, 2007. Prosecutors requested extradition of the indicted Americans through Italy's Ministry of Justice, then headed by Roberto Castelli, who declined to forward the request to Washington.
The case caused controversy inside the CIA after it became public in 2005. CIA director Porter J. Goss ordered the agency's inspector general to review the operation, but Jose A. Rodriguez Jr., then head of the National Clandestine Service, halted that review and said the service would investigate itself. In 2009, Robert Seldon Lady said, "I'm not guilty. I'm only responsible for carrying out orders that I received from my superiors." CIA officer Sabrina De Sousa, sentenced to five years, said the United States "broke the law ... and we are paying for the mistakes right now."Matthew Cole, Avni Patel, and Brian Ross, "Exclusive: Convicted CIA Spy Says 'We Broke the Law'", ABC News, October 4, 2009.
On February 12, 2013, Milan's Court of Appeal sentenced former SISMI director Pollari, his deputy Mancini, former Rome CIA station chief Castelli, and two other CIA employees to up to ten years in prison. Pollari appealed to Italy's Supreme Court of Cassation; on February 24, 2014, following a ruling by the Constitutional Court of Italy on the use of secret evidence, the court acquitted Pollari and Mancini.
Background
Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr
Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (, Ḥassan Muṣṭafā Usāmah Naṣr; born March 18, 1963), known as Abu Omar, is an Egyptian cleric. In 2003 he was living in Milan, from where he was kidnapped and later tortured in Egypt. The case led to Italian criminal convictions, in absentia, of 22 CIA operatives, a U.S. Air Force colonel, two Italian accomplices, and Nasr himself."Italy convicts abducted Egypt cleric Abu Omar", BBC News, December 6, 2013.
Nasr belonged to al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, an organization once dedicated to overthrowing the Egyptian government that renounced violence following the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état. The group was tied to the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat and a 1990s terrorist campaign culminating in the November 1997 Luxor massacre, leading the United States and European Union to designate it a terrorist organization. After Egypt outlawed the group, Nasr sought asylum in Italy, having earlier fought in the Bosnian War during the 1990s. On February 11, 2007, his lawyer Montasser el-Zayat confirmed that Nasr had been released and reunited with his family,"Egypt releases 'rendition' cleric", BBC, February 12, 2007. after an Egyptian court found his four-year detention "unfounded.""Italy indicts 31 linked to CIA rendition case," International Herald Tribune, February 16, 2007.
Surveillance and investigation Nasr fled Egypt after al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya was designated a terrorist organization and was granted political asylum in Italy in 2001, holding an Italian asylum passport. From spring 2002, Italian and American intelligence agencies surveilled him through wiretaps and electronic monitoring. Italian authorities said they believed Nasr was building a network to recruit terrorists with possible links to Al-Qaeda, including Ansar al-Islam and networks sending fighters into Iraqi Kurdistan. Citing reporting by Jason Burke of The Observer, the Italian newspaper La Repubblica argued in June 2005 that the Abu Omar case fit into a broader pattern of intelligence and information operations the Bush and Blair governments used to justify the invasion of Iraq."L'imam rapito a Milano dalla Cia", La Repubblica, June 28, 2005.Adam Liptak, "Experts Say Trial Unlikely for CIA Operatives," The New York Times, June 27, 2005.Stephen Grey and Don Van Natta Jr., "In Italy, Anger at U.S. Tactics Colors Spy Case", The New York Times, June 26, 2005. Some reports also alleged Nasr was involved in plots against the U.S. embassy in Rome and against children of foreign diplomats at the American School of Milan, though sources disagreed on whether such plots existed.John Crewdson and Tom Hundley, "Abducted imam aided CIA ally in war on terror," Chicago Tribune, July 2, 2005.
Abduction and rendition On February 17, 2003, Nasr was abducted as he walked to noon prayers at his mosque in Milan."Auditions sur le rapt d'un imam par la CIA," Le Figaro, February 24, 2006. According to court documents, he was forced into a minivan on Via Giuseppe Guerzoni and driven four to five hours to the joint Italian–U.S. air base at Aviano, where he was tortured. He was then flown by a Learjet using the call sign SPAR 92 to Ramstein Air Base in Germany. German prosecutors opened an investigation into false imprisonment and coercion but dropped it after failing to identify the CIA agents involved.Frederik Obermaier and Paul-Anton Krüger, "Millionen Schuss Munition für Kalaschnikows," Süddeutsche Zeitung, September 20, 2017.Christian Rath, "CIA-Agenten bleiben unbehelligt," Die Tageszeitung, November 6, 2009. SPAR ("Special Priority Air Resource") is a call sign used for U.S. military and VIP transport.John Hooper, "CIA methods exposed by kidnap inquiry", The Guardian, July 2, 2005."US military planes criss-cross Europe using bogus call sign," The Sunday Times, February 19, 2006. A second flight took Nasr to Cairo, where he says he was imprisoned and tortured.
In April 2004, while under house arrest, Nasr telephoned family and friends and described being held by Egypt's State Security Intelligence at Tura prison, about twenty miles south of Cairo. He said he had been beaten, subjected to electric shocks, and raped, and eventually lost hearing in one ear."Abu Omar: 'In Egitto fui stuprato, Berlusconi lo sappia,'" La Repubblica. He was briefly released by order of an Egyptian judge for lack of evidence but was soon rearrested. Nasr was not freed again until February 11, 2007. In 2006 his lawyer, Montasser el-Zayat, said Nasr appeared underfed but showed "no signs of torture.""Abducted imam seeks return to Italy," ANSA, April 7, 2006.
Investigation and arrest warrants Milan police reconstructed the movements of the CIA team during the nine days it operated in the city using extensive cellphone records, since the agents apparently never removed their phone batteries. The agents also placed numerous calls to the U.S. consulate in Milan, to Northern Virginia (home of CIA headquarters), and to family in the United States. The operation was led by Robert Seldon Lady, then CIA base chief in Milan operating under diplomatic cover as U.S. consul, and was carried out by the CIA's Special Activities Division.Tracy Wilkinson and Greg Miller, "Italy Says It Didn't Know of CIA Plan", Los Angeles Times, July 1, 2005. Lady later said he had opposed the abduction but was overruled;"Italy orders CIA kidnapping trial," BBC, 2007. after retiring from the CIA, his diplomatic immunity status became uncertain.
In December 2005, CIA director Porter Goss ordered a review of the agency's field operations, citing what he called the "sloppiness" of the Milan rendition.John Crewdson, "The CIA's bungled Italy Job," Chicago Tribune, December 25, 2005. In June 2005, Italian judge Guido Salvini issued arrest warrants for 22 people identified as CIA agents or operatives, including Jeffrey W. Castelli, and for Nasr himself on charges of association with terrorists. Salvini found the abduction illegal because it violated Italian sovereignty and international law and had disrupted an ongoing police investigation. In November 2005, Italian prosecutors asked the Justice Ministry to seek extradition of the suspects; the government declined. On December 20, 2005, an Italian court issued European arrest warrants for 22 CIA agents, including Lady, Eliana Castaldo, and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Romano III."Italy warrants for 22 purported CIA operatives," CNN, 2005. Some names on the warrants may have been pseudonyms; reporters were unable to confirm the identity of "Eliana Castaldo" through the phone number listed in the affidavit.
A "concerted CIA–SISMI operation" The abduction took place without the knowledge of Italian officials working directly on the Nasr investigation, who initially suspected Egyptian involvement. American counterparts told Italian investigators that Nasr had voluntarily traveled to the Balkans. Italian minister Carlo Giovanardi told parliament that Italy's intelligence services had not known of the operation, but former CIA officials said the agency had secured consent from SISMI, and that Rome station chief Castelli had received explicit permission from his Italian counterpart.
Investigators noted that the CIA team made little effort to conceal its movements: most stayed in Milan's best hotels for days afterward, few used aliases, and members used their real passports, credit cards, and cellphones both before and after the operation, later speeding in Milan traffic. Some observers took this as evidence of Italian complicity. On July 5, 2006, two senior Italian intelligence officers, Marco Mancini and Gustavo Pignero, were arrested for their roles in the kidnapping — the first official acknowledgment of Italian involvement.Tracy Wilkinson, "Italian Probe Broadens Beyond Abduction", Los Angeles Times, July 7, 2006. Italian wiretaps recorded Mancini admitting he had lied about his involvement. Former SISMI Milan chief Colonel Stefano D'Ambrosio said he was removed from his post, and replaced by Mancini, after objecting to the plot.