Shaba I was a conflict in Zaire's Shaba (Katanga) Province lasting from 8 March to 26 May 1977. The conflict began when the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FNLC), a group of about 2,000 Katangan Congolese soldiers who were veterans of the Congo Crisis, the Angolan War of Independence, and the Angolan Civil War, crossed the border into Shaba from Angola. The FNLC made quick progress through the region because of the sympathizing locals and the disorganization of the Zairian military (Forces Armées Zaïroises, or FAZ). Travelling east from Zaire's border with Angola, the rebels reached Mutshatsha, a small town near the key mining town of Kolwezi.
Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko accused Angola, East Germany,Zaire Says East Germany Supplies Arms to Rebels – New York Times, May 1, 1977. Retrieved on April 8, 2017. Cuba and the Soviet Union of sponsoring the rebels. Motivated by anticommunism and by economic interests, both the Western Bloc and China sent assistance to support the Mobutu regime. The most significant intervention, orchestrated by the Safari Club, featured a French airlift of Moroccan troops into the war zone. The intervention turned the tide of the conflict.Chris Cook and John Stevenson. The Routledge Companion to World History Since 1914, 2005. 321–322. US President Jimmy Carter approved the shipment of supplies to Zaire but refused to send weapons or troops and maintained that there was no evidence of Cuban involvement. However, he did provide transportation for 416 Pan African Peacekeepers to the area, the evacuation of 809 French troops, and Belgian supplies.
The FAZ terrorized the population of the province during and after the war. Bombing and other acts of violence led 50,000 to 70,000 refugees to flee into Angola and Zambia. Journalists were prevented from entering the province, and several were arrested. However, Mobutu won a public relations victory and ensured continuing economic assistance from governments, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and a group of private lenders led by Citibank.
The FAZ and outside powers clashed again with insurgents in a 1978 conflict, Shaba II.
Background
Zaire
A former Belgian colony, the Congo gained independence during the Year of Africa. The State of Katanga, led by Moise Tshombe, soon announced secession, supported by Belgian business interests, the Belgian military and indirectly by France."France Is Again Strengthening Ties With Zaire", New York Times, 17 April 1977, p. E1; accessed via ProQuest. "Although France did not officially support the secessionists, their leader, Moise Tshombe, employed French advisers and mercenaries and received support from the neighboring Government of Congo, a former French colony. Economic interests: After the Kantanganese rebellion ended in 1963, France expended considerable aid and effort to improve relations with Zaire. French companies now have important mining interests in the country, producer of copper, cobalt and industrial diamonds."
The country was soon plunged into crisis after the assassination of its Pan-Africanist leader, Patrice Lumumba. After six years of war, power was seized by Joseph Mobutu, with help from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and support from the Western Bloc. Mobutu changed the name of Katanga Province to Shaba Province, after the Swahili word for copper.
Mobutu's Zaire maintained good relations with Western powers. Belgium had the largest investments in the country (worth $750 million to $1 billion), followed by the United States ($200 million) and France ($20 million). Franco-Zairian relations were improving, and the Zaire government had recently been snubbing Belgium for France by awarding the country a $500 million telecommunications contract in 1975. The contract, negotiated by French President Giscard d'Estaing, went to Thomson-CSFInternational with finances from the Banque Française du Commerce Extérieur, both institutions headed by members of Giscard d'Estaing's family. When Mobutu asked for international assistance, it was France that organised the military response.Odom, Shaba II (1993), pp. 27–28.
Zaire received more military aid from the United States than any other sub-Saharan nation, the $30 million of annual assistance representing half of all military aid to the area.
Zaire was the world's primary exporter of cobalt and sourced 60% of the global supply."A Cobalt Undercurrent in Zaire", New York Times, 20 March 1977; accessed via ProQuest. The country also exported 7% of world copper and 33% of industrial diamonds. Many of the mines for these resources were in Shaba,"Getting Involved: The U.S. Aid for Zaire Was Small But Significant", New York Times, 20 March 1977; accessed via ProQuest. and the copper mines in the area provided 65–75% of the country's overall wealth from imports.Gerald Bender, "Zaire: Is There Any Rationale for U.S. Intervention?", New York Times, 27 March 1977, p. G2; accessed via ProQuest.
FNLC The FNLC had mostly Lunda people, the ethnicity of many people in Katanga which was renamed Shaba in 1972. In 1976, it began to recruit youth in Katanga to join its fighting force.
Formation Included in the invading force was a small remnant of the Katangan gendarmes that had supported the secession of Katanga from 1960. When Joseph Kasa-Vubu recalled the Katanganese leader Moise Tshombe from exile in 1964, elements of the force had been incorporated into the Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC) to help fight the insurrections simmering throughout the country. After Tshombe disappeared from the political scene, the Katangan contingent mutinied in 1966 and again in 1967. When the uprisings failed, most of the contingent left for Angola under Nathaniel Mbumba's leadership. During the late 1960s, the former gendarmes began to congregate in Angola along Zaire's southern border, and in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, they fought for the Portuguese against Angolan nationalist movements.
After the Portuguese left in 1975, the Katangan gendarmes fought for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the Angolan Civil War. The MPLA won control of the country and provided the gendarmes with relative autonomy in their area on the border with Zaire. The group, about 4000 people total of whom 2000 were deemed able to fight, formed the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FNLC) and styled itself as left-wing.Gleijeses, "Truth or Credibility" (2010), pp. 71–72.
Cuban involvement The FNLC had earlier asked Cuba directly for assistance but it declined since it was already seeking to withdraw from Angola and was not convinced of the FNLC's sincerity.Gleijeses, "Truth or Credibility" (2010), pp. 73–74, 93–94. The extent of the MPLA's support for the invasion is unclear; it did not seem to provide much direct assistance but also did not act to prevent the attack.Gleijeses, "Truth or Credibility" (2010), pp. 99–100. Cuba did not support the FNLC in the invasion.Ogunbadejo, "Conflict in Africa" (1979), p. 225. "All these points show that Angola was never deeply involved in the invasion. Not even the American Central Intelligence Agency was able to prove any serious involvement, and it is unlikely that, given President Neto's numerous internal problems (political and economic), his government or even his Cuban allies would have dissipated their forces in an attack on Shaba."
Invasion
The invaders launched a three-pronged attack on 8 March 1977, crossing the Angola–Zaire border on bicycles.Odom, Shaba II (1993), p. 17. No casualties were reported in the first week after their arrival."Zaire preparing major push to confront Shaba guerrillas", Baltimore Sun (AP), 14 March 1977; accessed via ProQuest.
Zaire's response Mobutu condemned the invasion and said on 10 March that Kissenge, Dilolo and Kapanga had been "bombed" by "mercenaries"."Zaire Reports Invasion of South by Mercenaries", Los Angeles Times, 10 March 1977; accessed via ProQuest. He accused the Cuban government of involvement and requested assistance from Western powers.Gleijeses, "Truth or Credibility" (2010), p. 75. The US embassy confirmed that the towns had been captured and announced that eight American missionaries in Kapanga were under house arrest."Angolan troops hit Zaire, take 3 towns", Chicago Tribune (Tribune Wire Services), 11 March 1977; accessed via ProQuest.
The actions of Zaire's armed forces, the FAZ, were largely ineffective. The first unit to make contact, the 11th Brigade of the Kaymanyola Division, was newly trained, and it fell apart soon after it had met the FNLC force.Odom, Shaba II (1993), pp. 17–18. However, the popular uprising hoped for by the FNLC also did not materialize. Although most towns preferred the FNLC forces to the government army,Robin Wright, "Zaire Peasants, Friendly to Invaders, Spurn Government Troops", Washington Post, 24 March 1977; accessed via ProQuest. people were generally afraid of violence and stayed home.Odom, Shaba II (1993), p. 28.
International response United States
On 15 March, the United States sent 35 tons of communications equipment and medical supplies, and other materials, worth a total of $2 million, by using chartered DC-8s."U.S. Flies Communication, Medical Supplies to Zaire: Responds to Appeal for Aid in Invasion", Los Angeles Times (AP), 15 March 1977; accessed via ProQuest.Norman Kempster and Oswald Johnson, "U.S. Flies 35 Tons of Supplies to Zaire Defenders", Los Angeles Times, 16 March 1977; accessed via ProQuest. President Jimmy Carter, in his first year of office, was less enthusiastic about Mobutu than his predecessors had been and decided against sending weapons or troops.Odom, Shaba II (1993), pp. 23–24. He also stated that there was no evidence to substantiate Cuban involvement and maintained that position throughout the conflict. Officials of NATO agreed.John Palmer, "NATO doubts on Cubans' role", 15 April 1977; accessed via ProQuest. The State Department accused the Angolan government of providing the rebels with "logistic support"Oswald Johnston, "State Dept. says Angola helps Zaire attackers", Boston Globe, 19 March 1977, p. 1; accessed via ProQuest. but maintained that there was "no hard evidence" of Cuban support.Nelson Goodsell, "Pushing new African countries toward Communist world?", Christian Science Monitor, 21 March 1977.
The U.S. House Committee on International Relations questioned the importance of aid and moved to halve Zaire's arms credits from $30 million to $15 million.Ogunbadejo, "Conflict in Africa" (1979), p. 226. Americans were evacuated from the area. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance sought to justify the aid based on the importance of copper and cobalt mining.Bernard Gwertzman, "Vance Says Invaders in Zaire Threaten Vital Copper Mining: Calls Situation 'Dangerous': He Tells House Panel That Conflict Endangers the Commodity That Sustain's Nation's Economy", New York Times, 17 March 1977; accessed via ProQuest.Jane Rosen, "Concern in US on Zaire", The Guardian, 17 March 1977; accessed via ProQuest.
Announcements seeking to hire American mercenaries to fight in Zaire appeared in California. A man, David Bufkin, was identified as doing the recruiting. The announcements were later traced to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)Ernest Volkman, "CIA backs mercenary recruiting", Boston Globe, 17 April 1977, p. 49; accessed via ProQuest. "Officially, the sources say, both Bufkin and the British mercenaries are recruiting on behalf of Mobutu, who is providing the money for the operation. However, the CIA is actually bankrolling the operation, the sources say."CIA Held Having Mercenaries Role", Hartford Courant, 17 April 1977; accessed via ProQuest.
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