On 1 May 1960, a United States U-2 spy plane, having taken off from Peshawar in Pakistan, was shot down by the Soviet Air Defence Forces in Sverdlovsk, Russia. It was conducting photographic aerial reconnaissance inside Soviet territory while being flown by American Central Intelligence Agency pilot Francis Gary Powers, as it was hit by a surface-to-air missile. Powers parachuted to the ground and was captured.

Initially, American authorities claimed the incident involved the loss of a civilian weather research aircraft operated by NASA, but were forced to admit the mission's true purpose a few days later after the Soviet government produced the captured pilot and parts of the U-2's surveillance equipment, including photographs of Soviet military bases.

The incident occurred during the tenures of American president Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, around two weeks before the scheduled opening of an east–west summit in Paris, France. Khrushchev and Eisenhower had met face-to-face at Camp David in Maryland in September 1959, and the seeming thaw in US-Soviet relations had raised hopes globally for a peaceful resolution to the Cold War. The U-2 incident shattered the amiable "Spirit of Camp David" that had prevailed for eight months, prompting the cancellation of the summit in Paris and embarrassing the US on the international stage. The Pakistani government issued a formal apology to the Soviet Union for its role in the mission.

After his capture, Powers was convicted of espionage and sentenced to three years of imprisonment plus seven years of hard labour; he was released two years later, in February 1962, in a prisoner exchange for Soviet intelligence officer Rudolf Abel.

Background

In July 1958, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower requested permission from the Pakistani prime minister Feroze Khan Noon for the US to establish a secret intelligence facility in Pakistan and for the U-2 spy plane to fly from Pakistan. The U-2 flew at altitudes that could not be reached by Soviet fighter jets of the era; it was believed to be beyond the reach of Soviet missiles as well. A facility established in Badaber (Peshawar Air Station), from Peshawar, was a cover for a major communications intercept operation run by the United States National Security Agency (NSA). Badaber was an excellent location because of its proximity to Soviet central Asia. This enabled the monitoring of missile test sites, key infrastructure and communications. The U-2 "spy-in-the-sky" was allowed to use the Pakistan Air Force section of Peshawar Airport to gain vital photo intelligence in an era before satellite observation.Amjad Ali, the Pakistani ambassador to the US at the time, narrated in his book Glimpses (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992) that the personal assistant of Suhrawardy advised embassy staff of the Prime Minister's agreement to the US facility on Pakistan soil.

Eisenhower did not want to fly American U-2 pilots over the Soviet Union. He believed that if one of these pilots were to be shot down or captured, the flight could be seen as an act of aggression that might spark open conflict. Someone suggested using British pilots from the Royal Air Force fly these missions instead of US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pilots, which would allow Eisenhower to deny US involvement. The British government consented to the proposal under the codename Project Oldster.

After the success of the first two British pilots and because of desire to determine the number of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles more accurately, Eisenhower allowed the flying of two more missions before the Four Power Paris Summit, scheduled for 16 May. The final two missions before the summit were to be flown by American pilots.Brugioni, Dino A., and Doris G. Taylor. Eyes in the Sky: Eisenhower, the CIA, and Cold War Aerial Espionage (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 2010), pp. 343–346.

On 9 April 1960, a U-2C spy plane of the special CIA unit "10-10", piloted by Bob Ericson, crossed the southern national boundary of the Soviet Union in the area of Pamir Mountains and flew over four Soviet top-secret military objects: the Semipalatinsk Test Site, the Dolon Air Base where Tu-95 strategic bombers were stationed, the surface-to-air missile (SAM) test site of the Soviet Air Defence Forces near Saryshagan, and the Tyuratam missile range (Baikonur Cosmodrome).

The aircraft was detected by the Soviet Air Defense Forces when it had flown more than over the Soviet national boundary; it avoided attempts at interception by a MiG-19 and a Su-9. The U-2 left Soviet air space and landed at an Iranian airstrip at Zahedan, completing an extraordinarily dangerous but productive intelligence operation. The next flight of the U-2 spy plane from Peshawar airport was planned for late April.

Event

Dubbed "Grand Slam", the flight was to leave the base in Peshawar and overfly the Soviet Union. The photographic targets included the Soviet's ICBM launch pads: two at Baikonur Cosmodrome and four at Plesetsk Cosmodrome. Another target was Chelyabinsk-65 (today, Mayak), an important industrial center of plutonium processing. The flight would end with a landing at Bodø in Norway.

On 28 April 1960, a US Lockheed U-2C spy plane, Article 358, was ferried from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey to the US base at Peshawar airport by pilot Glen Dunaway. Fuel for the aircraft had been ferried to Peshawar the previous day in a US Air Force C-124 transport. An Air Force C-130 followed, carrying the ground crew, mission pilot Captain Francis Powers, and backup pilot Bob Ericson. On the morning of 29 April, the crew in Badaber was informed that the mission had been delayed by one day. As a result, Ericson flew Article 358 back to Incirlik and John Shinn ferried another U-2C, Article 360 56–6693, from Incirlik to Peshawar. On 30 April, the mission was delayed one day further because of bad weather over the Soviet Union.

The weather improved and on 1 May, 15 days before the scheduled opening of the east–west summit conference in Paris, Powers took off for Grand Slam in Article 360.

The U-2 flight was expected, and all units of the Soviet Air Defence Forces in the Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Siberia, Ural, and later in the USSR European Region and Extreme North, were placed on red alert. Soon after the aircraft was detected, Lieutenant General of the Air Force Yevgeniy Savitskiy ordered the air-unit commanders "to attack the violator by all alert flights located in the area of foreign plane's course, and to ram if necessary".

Because of the U-2's extreme altitude, Soviet attempts to intercept the aircraft using fighter aircraft failed. The U-2's course was out of range of several of the nearest SAM sites, and one SAM site failed to engage the aircraft since it was not on duty that day.

Powers' account of the flight shows that one of the last targets he overflew was the Chelyabinsk-65 plutonium production facility.

His U-2 was shot down near Kosulino, Ural Region, by the first of three S-75 Dvina surface-to-air missiles"Таким образом, всего по Lockheed U-2 и двум МиГ было выпущено семь ракет. Еще одну (восьмую) ракету выпустил зенитный ракетный дивизион соседнего полка под командованием полковника Ф. Савинова." Юрий Кнутов, Олег Фаличев. Бой в небе над Уралом Retrieved 13 January 2012 fired by a battery commanded by Mikhail Voronov. The S-75 site had been supposedly identified previously by the CIA, using photos taken during Vice President Richard Nixon's visit to Sverdlovsk the previous summer.Surface-to-Air Missile Site Near Sverdlovsk USSR, Central Intelligence Agency Photographic Intelligence Brief B-1009-59, 13 August 1959. p.86

Powers bailed out but neglected to disconnect his oxygen hose and struggled with it until it broke, enabling him to separate from the aircraft. After parachuting safely onto Soviet soil, Powers was quickly captured. Powers carried a modified silver dollar which contained a lethal, shellfish-derived saxitoxin-tipped needle, but he did not use it.

The SAM command center was unaware for more than 30 minutes that the aircraft was destroyed. One of the Soviet MiG-19 fighters pursuing Powers was also destroyed in the missile salvo, and the pilot, Sergei Safronov, was killed. The MiGs' IFF transponders were not yet switched to the new May codes because of the 1 May holiday.Khrushchev, Sergei (September 2000) "The Day We Shot Down the U-2: Nikita Khrushchev's son remembers a great turning point of the Cold War, as seen from behind the Iron Curtain". American Heritage magazine. Volume 51, Issue 5.

American cover-up and exposure

US officials initially believed that Powers had died and his plane was destroyed. They decided to try a cover-up,Brugioni and Taylor (2010), p. 346. which failed, enabling Nikita Khrushchev to embarrass President Eisenhower and his administration.

On 5 May, four days after Powers' disappearance, NASA issued a detailed press release noting that an aircraft had "gone missing" north of Turkey. The press release speculated that the pilot might have fallen unconscious while the autopilot was still engaged, even falsely claiming that "the pilot reported over the emergency frequency that he was experiencing oxygen difficulties". To bolster this, a U-2 was quickly painted in NASA colors and shown to the media.

That same day, the Senate made its first comments on the U-2 incident and began a domestic political controversy for Eisenhower. Mike Mansfield, the Senate Majority Whip, stated, "First reports indicate that the President had no knowledge of the plane incident. If that is the case, we have got to ask whether or not this administration has any real control over the federal bureaucracy."Congressional Record, 5-5-60, pp. 9493–9494; quoted in Barrett (2005), p. 384. Mansfield, more than any other person, highlighted the dilemma Eisenhower faced—Eisenhower could admit responsibility for the U-2 flight, and likely ruin any chances for détente at the Paris Summit, or he could continue to deny knowledge and indicate that he did not control his own administration.David M. Barrett, CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), p. 384.

When Khrushchev heard about America's NASA cover story, he developed a political trap for Eisenhower. He announced that a spy plane had been shot down in Soviet territory, but he did not reveal that the pilot of this aircraft had been found and that he was alive. This led US officials to believe they could continue with their cover story that the crashed U-2 was a weather research aircraft. Building on the lie that the pilot had experienced oxygen difficulties while flying over Turkey, they declared that the pilot may have passed out and the aircraft continued on autopilot into Soviet airspace. To bolster the story, they grounded all U-2 aircraft for inspection of oxygen systems.Brugioni and Taylor (2010), pp. 346–347.

On 7 May, Khrushchev sprang his trap and announced: To buttress his claims, Khrushchev released photos of U-2 systems.Tucker, Spencer C. The Encyclopedia of the Cold War: A Political, Social, and Military History. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008) pp. 1319–1320