The Battle of Pressburg (), or Battle of Pozsony (), or Battle of Bratislava () was a three-day-long battle fought between 4 and 6 July 907, during which the East Francian army, consisting mainly of Bavarian troops led by Margrave Luitpold, was annihilated by Hungarian forces.
The exact location of the battle is not known. Contemporary sources say it took place at "Brezalauspurc", but where exactly Brezalauspurc was remains unclear. Some specialists place it in the vicinity of Zalavár (Mosapurc); others in a location close to Bratislava (Pressburg), the traditional assumption.
An important result of the Battle of Pressburg was that the Kingdom of East Francia could not regain control over the Carolingian March of Pannonia, including the territory of the later Marchia Orientalis (March of Austria), which was lost in 900.
The most significant result of the Battle of Pressburg is that the Hungarians secured the lands they gained during the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin, prevented a German invasion that jeopardized their future, and established the Kingdom of Hungary. This battle is considered one of the most significant battles in the history of HungarySzabados György, 907 emlékezete , Tiszatáj 61, (2007)/12, p. 69 and marks the conclusion of the Hungarian conquest.Bóna István 2000 p. 34
Sources The Battle of Pressburg is mentioned in several annals, including the Annales iuvavenses, Annales Alamannici,Werra, Joseph: Über den Continuator Reginonis; Gressner & Schramm, Leipzig, 1883, p. 68 Continuator Reginonis,Werra, Joseph 1883, p. 68 Annales Augienses,Werra, Joseph 1883, p. 70 and in the necrologies of important people such as kings, dukes, counts, and spiritual leaders. The most important source for the battle is the 16th-century chronicle of the Bavarian Renaissance humanist, historian, and philologist Johannes Aventinus (Annalium Boiorum VII), (1477–1534), which contains the most comprehensive descriptions. Despite being written 600 years after the events, it is based on manuscripts written at the time of the battle that have since been lost.
Background
In 900, the advisors to the new king of East Francia, Louis the Child, led by his regent, Hatto I, Archbishop of Mainz, refused to renew the East Francian (German)–Hungarian alliance, which ended upon the death of Arnulf of Carinthia, the prior king.Bóna István 2000 p. 33 Consequently, in 900, the Hungarians took over Pannonia (Transdanubia) from the Duchy of Bavaria, then a part of East Francia.Bóna István 2000 p. 33 This started a war between the Hungarians and Germans that lasted until 910. Prior to the Battle of Pressburg (Brezalauspurc), most fighting was between the Hungarians and the Bavarians, with the exception of the Hungarian campaign in Saxony in 906.
After losing Pannonia, Luitpold, the Margrave of Bavaria, allied with Bavaria's former enemy, Mojmir II of Moravia.Vajay Szabolcs, Der Eintritt des ungarischen Staemmebundes in die Europaeische Geschichte (862-933) Ungarisches Institut München. V. Hase & Koehler Verlag. Mainz, 1968, p. 33 In 902, the Hungarian armies, probably led by Kurszán, defeated Great Moravia and occupied its eastern area, followed by Hungarian suzerainty over the rest of Moravia and Dalamancia (territory in the surroundings of Meissen). This interrupted Bavaria's trade routes to Northern and Eastern Europe.Vajay Szabolcs 1968, p. 41 This was an economic blow and was one of the reasons that caused Luitpold to believe a campaign against the Hungarians was necessary. He also could not reconcile the loss of Bavarian control over Pannonia, Moravia, and Bohemia.Vajay Szabolcs 1968, p. 42
Several events strengthened Luitpold's resolve to start a campaign against the Hungarians. During the last Hungarian attacks against Bavaria, Luitpold's forces defeated some of their units in minor battles, including Laibach (901) and Fischa River (903).Baják László: A fejedelmek kora. A korai magyar történet időrendi vázlata. II. rész. 900-1000 ("The Era of the Princes. The chronological sketch of the early Hungarian history. II. part. 900-1000"); ÓMT, Budapest, 2000 p. 9 In 904, the Bavarians assassinated Kurszán after feigning a desire for a peace treaty, which they invited him to negotiate.Bóna István 2000 p. 33 After these setbacks, for a time, the Hungarians did not attack Bavaria. These events and the belief that the Hungarians were afraid of his forces convinced Luitpold that the time was right to expel the Hungarians from the territories formerly belonging to Bavaria.
Commanders of the armies The nominal leader of the Bavarian army was Louis the Child, the King of East Francia. Since he was under the age of majority, the actual commander was Luitpold. An experienced military leader, Luitpold successfully fought the Moravians and achieved some military success against raiding Hungarian units, but lost the March of Pannonia to them.Baják László 2000 p. 9
Many historians believe the commander of the Hungarian forces was Árpád, Grand Prince of the Hungarians, but there is no proof of this.Kristó Gyula: Levedi törzsszövetségétől Szent István Államáig; Magvető Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1980, p. 237 It is more likely they were led by the same unknown but brilliant commander who led them during the battles of Brenta, Eisenach, Rednitz, and Augsburg. These battles, part of the Hungarian invasions of Europe, were their greatest triumphs, and they inflicted the heaviest losses on enemy forces, including, in most cases, the enemy commander. This conclusion is supported by an analysis of these battles using existing sources. In these cases, the following principles of warfare were used with great success:
Psychological warfare, for example, involves terrorizing and demoralizing the enemy with constant attacks, inflating the enemy's confidence and lowering his vigilance with deceptive maneuvers or false negotiations, then striking and destroying him by surprise attack (Battle of Brenta,Lipp Tamás: Árpád és Kurszán; Kozmosz Könyvek, Budapest, 1988, p. 99 Battle of Augsburg in 910, Battle of Rednitz); Feigned retreat (Battle of Brenta,Bóna István 2000, p. 31 Battle of Augsburg in 910)Bóna István 2000, p. 37 Effective use of military intelligence, preventing surprise attacks and attacking before the German forces could combine (Battle of Augsburg in 910); Rapid deployment and movement of units, surprising enemy troops (Battle of Augsburg in 910)Györffy György 2002 p. 214 From Antapodosis of Liutprand of Cremona. Hungarian translation from the original Latin: "Lajos király már megérkezett összetoborzott sokaságával Augsburgba, amikor jelentik azt a nem remélt, vagy inkább nem óhajtott hírt, hogy e nép ott van a szomszédságukban." English translation from the Hungarian: "King Louis with his recruited crowd [huge army] arrived to Augsburg, when he was informed of the unhoped, better to say unwished news that this people [the Hungarians] is in his neighborhood" Covertly crossing geographical obstacles thought by the enemy to be impassable, then attacking unexpectedly (the Danube in 907, the River Brenta in 899, the Adriatic Sea to reach Venice in 900);Bóna István 2000, p. 32 Using nomadic battlefield tactics such as feigned retreat, swarming, hiding troops on the battlefield, and ambushing the enemy emphasis on surprise attacks; dispersing units and then concentrating them at vital points; fluid, ever-changing battle formations; exploiting the superior mobility of cavalry; the predominance of horse archers; Extraordinary patience to wait days or even weeks for the right moment to engage the enemy and win the battle (Battle of Brenta, Battle of Augsburg in 910); Maintain superlative discipline among one's own troops in respecting and perfectly executing orders; Targeting and killing the enemy commander (Pressburg, Eisenach, Augsburg, Rednitz.) This was a tactic also used by the Mongols, weakening the enemy by "cutting his head off", and was also psychologically effective in causing surviving enemy leaders to be afraid of fighting them again.
While the Hungarians won many battles against European forces after 910 (915: Eresburg; 919: Püchen, somewhere in Lombardy; 921: Brescia; 926: somewhere in Alsace; 934: W.l.n.d.r.; 937: Orléans; 940: Rome; 949),Baják László 2000 p. 14-27 they killed the enemy commander in only one battle, the Battle of Orléans (937), where Ebbon of Châteauroux was wounded and died after the battle. Despite this feat, some historians claim the Hungarians lost this battle.Bóna István 2000 p. 49 After 933, it became clear that the Hungarians no longer had a great, unnamed commander. They made serious mistakes, which resulted in defeats, such as the Battle of Riade, when the Hungarians did not learn of Henry the Fowler's military reforms, only finding out in the course of the battle,Györffy György: A magyarok elődeiről és a honfoglalásról; Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2002 p. 234-235 which was too late. Another example that shows how the previous leadership was lacking is the Battle of Lechfeld (955).Györffy György 2002 p. 228 The Hungarian commanders, Bulcsú and Lél, did not maintain discipline and order. Thinking they had won the battle, soldiers plundered the German army's supply caravan without noticing the counter-attack led by Duke Conrad, showing that Bulcsú and Lél catastrophically misjudged the course of the battle. After the successful counterattack resulted in their defeat, the commanders could not prevent their troops from fleeing and dispersing. The German troops and inhabitants captured the fleeing Hungarian troops and executed them by hanging them in Regensburg.Györffy György 2002 p. 238-239 These defeats were caused by the loss of military discipline and the Hungarian commanders' lack of authority and competence. The commanders resorted to draconian measures to motivate the soldiers to fight; for example, during the Siege of Augsburg in 955, the Hungarian warriors were driven to attack the walls with scourges.Bóna István 2000 p. 54
Prelude In 907, Luitpold called for the creation of a large Bavarian-German army (Heerbann) from all over Bavaria,Aventinus, Johannes: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 480 which concentrated around Ennsburg. He hoped to score a decisive victory against the Hungarians, who had formed an important principality in the Pannonian Basin. Based on Aventinus' chronicle, the Bavarian political, military, and clergy gathered on June 15, 907, at Ennsburg to plan the campaign, concluding that "the Hungarians must to be eliminated from Bavaria".Johannes Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum VII, 1554 p. 480. Original Latin text: "Ibi decretum omnium sententia Ugros Boiariae regno eliminandos esse." English translation from the Latin: "The order for all was: The Hungarians must be eliminated from the land of the Bavarians". At this time, Bavaria included Pannonia, Ostmark, east from the river Enns, and probably the old lands of the Great Moravia (now the western part of Slovakia). According to some historians, Bavaria possibly included the area between the Danube and the Tisza rivers,Püspöki-Nagy Péter: Nagymorávia fekvéséről ("On the location of Great Moravia"); Tudományos Ismeretterjesztő Társulat, Valóság/XXI, p 60-82 territories that belonged to or depended on Bavaria prior to the Hungarian conquest in 900, meaning the Western region of the Pannonian Basin. This shows the crucial importance of this campaign for the Hungarians.