The attack on the Sui-ho Dam was the collective name for a series of mass air attacks during the Korean War on thirteen hydroelectric generating facilities by United Nations Command air forces as part of the North Korean bombing campaign on June 23–24 and June 26–27, 1952. Primarily targeting the hydroelectric complex associated with the Sui-ho Dam in North Korea, the attacks were intended to apply political pressure at the stalled truce negotiations at Panmunjeom.
Heavily defended by Soviet, Chinese and North Korean Air Forces, as well as major anti-aircraft guns, the hydroelectric targets were subjected to attacks totaling 1,514 sorties. These were conducted jointly by fighters and fighter-bombers of the United States Air Force, US Navy, US Marine Corps, and South African Air Force, the first time in 21 months that the separate air arms had worked together on a massive scale. The attack on the facilities was followed seventeen days later by another series of large-scale joint attacks on the capital city of Pyongyang.Hermes, Chapter 12, Part 2.On July 11, FEAF began a two-month politically motivated campaign, "Operation Pressure Pump," with 1,254 sorties against 30 targets at Pyongyang. In four attacks over a 24-hour period, with the Fleet Air Arm, Royal Australian Air Force, and the Republic of Korea Air Force also participating, 28 of the 30 targets were heavily damaged, with three completely destroyed, for a loss of three fighter-bombers and eight others receiving major damage. The mass attacks were repeated on August 29, with 1,403 sorties against 31 targets, establishing a single-day record, again with a loss of three fighter-bombers. (Futrell, USAF in Korea 1950-1953, p. 517 and 529)
The attacks destroyed 90% of the facilities targeted and completely knocked out power in North Korea for two weeks, as well as reducing available power to northeast China by 23%. North Korea built new facilities but did not restore its previous capacity until after the armistice in 1953. Politically, the attacks failed to sway the truce talks, as highly publicized repercussions in both the UK and the United States Congress undermined their impact.
Four attacks on a much more limited scale occurred between September 12, 1952, and June 7, 1953, causing only minor damage and little impact on the outcome of the truce talks. UN forces also exerted pressure on the North Korean infrastructure by attacking the smaller power-generating plants of the North Korean power grid during the summer of 1952 to prevent them from filling the void in power generation.Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, Chapter 18.
Background and plans
North Korea's power systems
The Sui-ho Dam (now Supung Dam or sometimes Shuifeng Dam) on the Yalu River (), at the time the fourth largest in the world, had been constructed in 1941 by Japan. The concrete dam was long, thick at the base, wide at the crest, and high. Its reservoir storage capacity was more than 20 billion cubic meters, and the Japanese had built six turbine generators each with a capacity of 100,000 kilowatts. The dam's generating facilities provided power for much of western North Korea and for the Port Arthur and Dairen regions of northeast China.Cressey (1955), p. 1
Three of the five other hydroelectric systems were located near each other in South Hamgyong Province north of Hungnam. Each consisted of four plants apart along a stretch of river, numbered by planners as 1 through 4, with plant 1 closest to its respective reservoir. The northernmost, the Kyosen (P'ungsan) system, was on the Namdae Ch'on with its terminus at Tanch'on. The Fusen (Pujǒn) system was due north of Hungnam on the Songch'on-gang, with its four plants close together but in mountain gorges. The Choshin (Changjin) ran south and then east in the mountain canyons from the Chosin Reservoir and connected with the Songch'on-gang south of Fusen Plant No. 4.Series L552 Maps.
Planning history North Korea had six hydroelectric systems and six small thermoelectric plants at the outbreak of the war, and all were on the list of strategically important targets compiled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). B-29 Superfortresses of the United States Air Force had begun bombing industrial targets in North Korea soon after the invasion of the South in the summer of 1950 but had not attacked any part of the power transmission grid. As early as August 23, 1950, while UN forces were still struggling to hold the Pusan Perimeter and well before the UN landing at Inchon, planners of the USAF FEAF (Far East Air Forces) had asked if the hydroelectric system should be attacked; no decision had yet been made as to whether North Korea was to be occupied.
On September 21, 1950, FEAF attacked a plant of the Fusen system near Hungnam, completely destroying its transformers, and recommended that all the plants be destroyed. General Douglas MacArthur directed the attacks to proceed, but before that happened the JCS authorized MacArthur to enter North Korea and advised that targets of "long-term importance" including the hydroelectric plants should not be destroyed.Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 193–194 A ban on bombing the Sui-ho (Sup'ung) Dam was put in place on November 6, 1950, at the direction of the U.S. State Department, to avoid providing a provocation for entry in the war by China. Even after China's massive intervention in the following month the ban was never rescinded, and it was reiterated by the UN Command when the truce talks began in July 1951.Hermes, pp. 320–321.
On March 3, 1952, when the peace talks appeared to be near stalemate, FEAF commander, General Otto P. Weyland, recommended to UN commander General Matthew Ridgway that the hydroelectric plants be attacked to "create psychological and political effects to our advantage."Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, p. 481. Ridgway rejected the plan and also informed the JCS that he was unwilling to use force except as the last resort.
On April 28, President Harry Truman announced that Ridgway was being replaced as commander in Korea by General Mark Clark, and UN negotiators at Panmunjom made a compromise proposal on the stalemated issues. The next day the JCS asked Weyland to provide target information and recommendations in the event of complete stalemate, and he repeated his recommendation to bomb the hydroelectric plants. Ridgway objected to the JCS on May 1, stating that no attack should be made except on his recommendation, to which the JCS agreed. The next day the communists totally rejected the UN proposal, and while the talks continued, the UN took the stance that their position was irrevocable.Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, p. 482.
Clark took command on May 12, the first of a series of key changes in the military command in Korea. On May 19 Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark became commander of the Seventh Fleet, on May 30 Lieutenant general Glenn O. Barcus took over the Fifth Air Force, and on June 4 Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe became commander of Naval Forces Far East. All brought a new aggressiveness to their commands and were desirous of attacking the hydroelectric plants. Briscoe made the recommendation to Clark on June 6, followed by Weyland the next day.
At Clark's direction, FEAF prepared two attack plans on the system, one of which included bombing the Sui-ho Dam while the other did not. The three systems in South Hamgyong were targeted, while two smaller systems—one near the border with the Soviet Union and the other immediately behind the battleline—were excluded. The plans, submitted to Clark on June 11, included both FEAF and Task Force 77 units, and Clark approved the lesser plan on June 17, naming Weyland as "coordinating agent".Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, p. 485. However, in reviewing the plans, the JCS recommended to Truman that the Sui-ho Dam also be attacked and he approved. The JCS authorized the attack on June 19, and the alternate plan was put into effect with a tentative date of June 23 or June 24, which would allow Briscoe to use four aircraft carriers in the operation. The operations plan was finalized when Clark proposed to Weyland that naval aircraft, originally slated only for the eastern complexes, be added to the attack on Sui-ho.
UN air order of battle, June 1952
The following air combat units were assigned to the attacks on the North Korean hydroelectric plants:Futrell, USAF Operations in the Korean Conflict, p. 17 Far East Air Forces – Lt. Gen. Otto P. Weyland Fifth Air Force – Lt. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus 4th Fighter-Interceptor Group – Col. Royal N. Baker 334th FIS, 335th FIS, 336th FIS 51st Fighter-Interceptor Group – Lt. Col. Albert S. Kelly 16th FIS, 25th FIS, 39th FIS 8th Fighter-Bomber Group – Col. Levi R. Chase 35th FBS, 36th FBS, 80th FBS 18th Fighter-Bomber Group – Col. Sheldon S. Brinson 12th FBS, 67th FBS, 2 Sqd SAAF 49th Fighter-Bomber Group – Lt. Col. Gordon F. Blood 7th FBS, 8th FBS, 9th FBS 136th Fighter-Bomber Group -Lt. Col. Donald F. Sharp 111th FBS, 154th FBS, 182nd FBS 1st Marine Aircraft Wing – Maj. Gen. Clayton C. Jerome Marine Aircraft Group 12 VMA-121, VMA-212, VMA-323 Marine Aircraft Group 33 VMF-115, VMF-311 Naval Forces Far East – Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe Seventh Fleet – Vice Adm. Joseph J. Clark Task Force 77 – Rear Adm. Apollo Soucek Carrier Division One – Rear Adm. Herbert E. Regan Carrier Air Group Seven, embarked on – Cmdr. G. B. Brown VF-71, VF-72, VF-74, VA-75 Carrier Air Group Eleven, embarked on – Cmdr. J.W. Onstott VF-112, VF-113, VF-114, VA-115 Carrier Division Three – Rear Adm. Soucek Carrier Air Group Two, embarked on – Cmdr. A.L. Downing VF-24, VF-63, VF-64, VA-65 Carrier Air Group Nineteen, embarked on – Cmdr. William Denton Jr. VF-191, VF-192, VF-193, VA-195
Soviet air order of battle, June 1952 The defending Soviet Air Forces (VVS) were represented on June 23, 1952, by the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps employing two of its three Soviet Air Defence Forces fighter aviation divisions (USAF wing-equivalent)Krylov and Tepsurkaev, Appendices, pp. 87–88 on forward air bases of the Antung airfield complex in Northeast China, totaling six regiments with 246 MiG-15/MiG-15bis, of which 210 were rated combat-ready.The two forward-based PVO fighter aviation divisions opposing the Fifth Air Force had arrived on January 4, 1952 for a combat tour of duty that would last until August 10, 1952. A third fighter aviation division of four regiments, the 133rd IAD, had arrived in May 1952 and was in Corps Reserve in the Mukden area, although one of its regiments, the 485th IAP, had recently moved into a new airfield at Dapu near Antung and was available for combat as shown. In addition, six full-strength fighter aviation divisions of the Unified Air Army (UAA),These were the 3rd, 4th, 12th, 15th, 17th, and 18th IAD of the Unified Air Army. a joint command of the People's Liberation Army Air Force and Korean People's Army Air Force, were also combat operational in Northeast China with 275 MiG-15s.Seidov and Britton, p. 382
64th Fighter Aviation Corps – Major General Georgii A. Lobov 97th Fighter Aviation Division PVO 16th IAP (Fighter Aviation Regiment) 148th GIAP (Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment) 190th IAD (Fighter Aviation Division) PVO 256th Fighter Aviation Regiment (256 IAP) 494th IAP (Fighter Aviation Regiment) 821st IAP (Fighter Aviation Regiment) 351st NIAP (Night Fighter Aviation Regiment) VVS351st NIAP was a "separate" nightfighter unit attached directly to 64th IAK and equipped with MiG-15 and Lavochkin La-11. 485th IAP (Fighter Aviation Regiment) (133rd IAD)