The Battle of Takur Ghar was a short but intense military engagement between United States special operations forces and al-Qaeda insurgents and other foreign fighters fought in March 2002, atop Takur Ghar mountain in Afghanistan. For the U.S. side, the battle proved the deadliest entanglement of Operation Anaconda, an effort early in the War in Afghanistan to rout al-Qaeda forces from the Shahi-Kot Valley and Arma Mountains. The battle saw three helicopter landings by the U.S. on the mountain top, each met with direct assault from al-Qaeda forces. Although Takur Ghar was eventually taken, seven U.S. service members were killed and 12 others were wounded. The battle is also known as the Battle of Roberts Ridge, after the first casualty of the battle, Navy SEAL Neil C. Roberts.
Prelude In the evening of 3 March 2002, the Task Force 11 leadership inappropriately ordered the Delta Force AFO commander to pass control of the AFO teams involved in Operation Anaconda to the SEALs of Task Force Blue-who were moving teams in from Bagram to Gardez for this purpose. The SEALs were not involved in the Operation up to this point but the TF11 commander ordered their deployment as well as changing the immediate command in an ongoing operation, possibly so that the SEALs could gain combat experience.Neville, Leigh, Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military), Osprey Publishing, 2015 , p.57
Battle In the late evening of March 3, two SEAL teams from DEVGRU, MAKO 30 & MAKO 21, led by Lieutenant Commander Vic Hyder (MAKO 21) and Senior Chief Petty Officer Britt K. Slabinski (MAKO 30), were to arrive in Gardez for immediate insertion into the Shahi-Kot Valley, contrary to the AFO commander's recommendation. MAKO 21 planned to link up with AFO team Juliet at the northern end of the valley, resupply it and then establish a hide site/observation post on the eastern ridge above Task Force Rakkasan's blocking position; while MAKO 30 planned to establish an observation point on the peak of Takur Ghar, which commanded a view of the Shahi-Kot valley. Due to unnecessary time constraints, a helicopter insertion would be needed for the team to reach the peak before dawn. JSOC suggested insertion at a point east of the peak, but due to a delayed B-52 bomber sortie in the area, the team was told to turn back and land at the airstrip near Gardez. Further complications arose during the second lift off as they were delayed due to an air assault in proximity of the LZ. With the threat of daylight getting near, the SEALs were told to land on the peak itself as the insertion point. Slabinski had requested to roll the operation 24 hours, so his men could prepare, but they were denied. The AFO commander had a 'no helicopter' policy in place for the valley due to the high risk and likelihood of being shot down, which was ignored.Neville, Leigh, Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military), Osprey Publishing, 2015 , p.58
The two teams were picked up by two MH-47 Chinook helicopters of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Razor 03 and Razor 04, at 11:23 PM on March 3. However, Razor 03 experienced engine difficulties, and two new MH-47s were dispatched to replace the original helicopters. This delay meant that the SEALs could not be inserted into the landing zone east of the peak until 2:30 AM on March 4, with not enough time to reach the peak before daylight.
An AC-130H Spectre, Nail 22, flew a hasty reconnaissance mission over the peak prior to the landing and saw no enemy activity, it then left to support other troops before Razor 03 and 04 arrived at the landing zone; MAKO 30 team leader was uneasy at the speed with which the sweep was conducted and wondered whether they had the right mountain but he dismissed his doubts and trusted the Spectre's technology. After this incident concluded and the crew of Nail 22 were interviewed, they said that if they had known they were doing reconnaissance for a potential LZ, they would've loitered instead of skimming over it and leaving right away. Footage of the area captured showed approximately 10 enemy fighters, many of whom were nonchalantly walking around the area. At around 0245 hours, as Razor 03 flared to land at the LZ and was immediately fired upon by machinegun and RPGs, an RPG struck just behind the cockpit, starting a fire in the cabin. As machinegun rounds penetrated the unarmored Chinook, another RPG, seconds after the first, hit the Chinook's right-side radar pod, which blew out all electrical power to the helicopter, particularly its miniguns and navigational systems. The Chinook was hit by a further 2 RPGs and more heavy automatic weapons fire from at least three distinct firing points (particularly from a supposedly abandoned DShK position). The Chinook set down at a slight depression, shielding the pilots from the DShK's fire.
The pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Alan Mack, made the call to take the stricken helicopter off; as he brought the Chinook back into the air, PO1 Neil C. Roberts fell out of the open ramp. SOAR crew chief Sgt. Dan Madden and Electronics Technician Second Class Brett Morganti grabbed hold of his pack but they lost his grip. Razor 03 attempted to return and retrieve him, but the damage prevented proper control and the helicopter was forced to make an emergency landing in the valleyNeville, Leigh, Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military), Osprey Publishing, 2015 , p.58-64 about away. Roberts fell into the snow covering Takur Ghar and activated his standard infrared strobe so he could be seen by air assets.Neville, Leigh, Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military), Osprey Publishing, 2015 , p.59-64 Razor 04, piloted by Chief Warrant Officer Jason Friel picked up MAKO 30 from Razor 03's crash site and then returned to the peak to attempt to rescue Roberts. After the Chinook offloaded MAKO 30 and started flying away, it came under fire from the DShK, though it was relatively unscathed and left the AO. The enemy fighters present on the dark mountain, not equipped with night vision, weren't aware that MAKO 30 had just inserted.
At first, the insurgents didn't spot MAKO 30 in the early morning darkness, MAKO 30 split up into two-man pairs to conduct bounding movements to their preplanned defilade position to conduct recon by fire with an orbiting AC-130. Chapman was ordered by Slabinski to climb to high ground, establish comms, and provide covering fire as needed. The team immediately came under direct fire from multiple locations causing Chapman to stop movement and engage in close contact with Bunker 1. Slabinski and the rest of MAKO 30 engaged the enemy on multiple fronts while Slabinski attempted to link up with Chapman. Chapman conducted a frontal assault on Bunker 1, killing two enemy fighters located inside. The firefight lasted about 20 minutes and resulted inNeville, Leigh, Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military), Osprey Publishing, 2015 , p.64 USAF combat controller Master Sergeant John A. Chapman (then Technical Sergeant) being wounded and thought dead, and one of the SEALs being wounded. MAKO 30 retreated from the site of Bunker 1 after a SEAL was wounded attempting to assault Bunker 2, located just past Bunker 1. Chapman regained consciousness and continued to engage enemy fighters while MAKO 30 was forced off the peak due to its losses and requested the assistance of the quick-reaction force mainly made up of Rangers from the 1st Battalion 75th Ranger Regiment located at Bagram Air Base, led by Captain Nate Self. Master Sergeant Chapman was thought killed prior to MAKO 30 withdrawing from the peak.
The quick reaction force (QRF) consisted of 19 Rangers, Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) Staff Sergeant Kevin Vance, and a three-man USAF special tactics team (PJs and Combat Controllers) carried by two Chinooks, Razor 01 and Razor 02. Due to satellite communications difficulties,"'Space Bubbles' may have aided enemy in fatal Afghan battle" American Geophysical Union, 25 September 2014. Accessed: 2 October 2014. Razor 01 was mistakenly directed by JSOC to the "hot" LZ on the peak at . The Air Force AC-130 aircraft, not wanting to remain in hostile airspace in daylight after the crash of an AC-130 during the Battle of Khafji in the Gulf War, the AC-130 support (callsign GRIM-32), whose supposed to be protecting MAKO 30 left before Razor 01 reached the LZ. During the flight, the Ranger commander was informed that his team was to land and extract a "SEAL sniper team" that was in contact with the enemy, which was false.Neville, Leigh, Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military), Osprey Publishing, 2015 , p.65 The AFO commander received a SITREP from Slabinski over the radio and then ordered GRIM-32 to stay on station for 10 more minutes so they could provide pre-assault fire for Razor 01 to insert their Rangers. In recorded radio traffic from that day, the AFO commander can be heard issuing the order, and informing GRIM-32 that if they left now, Razor 01 was going to get blown out of the sky. At approximately 0610 hours, Razor 01, under the command of Captain Nate Self, reached the landing zone, the same exact location Razor 03 was shot down. The aircraft immediately began taking fire from RPG, DShK and small arms fire, and the right door minigunner, Sergeant Philip Svitak, was killed and the helicopter pilots, Chief Warrant Officers Greg Calvert and Chuck Gant, were seriously wounded by the small arms fire. An RPG then hit the helicopter, destroying the right engine and forcing it to crash land. As the Rangers and special tactics team exited the aircraft, Private First Class Matt Commons (posthumously promoted to Corporal), Sergeant Brad Crose, and Specialist Marc Anderson were killed (Anderson was shot and killed inside the helicopter while Commons and Crose were gunned down on the helicopter ramp). The surviving crew and half of the quick-reaction force took cover behind a hillock and a fierce firefight began. CPT Self decided to suppress the enemy firing points and launch a counterattack against the peak, bounding forward in subteams (one team firing while the other moved forward). They advanced about 20m before the weight of enemy fire forced them into cover.