Science and technology in the People's Republic of China have developed rapidly from the 1980s to the 2020s, with major scientific and technological progress over the last four decades. From the 1980s to the 1990s, the government of the People's Republic of China successively launched the 863 Program and the "Strategy to Revitalize the Country Through Science and Education", which greatly promoted the development of China's science and technological institutions.
As per the Global Innovation Index in 2025, China was considered one of the most innovative in the world, ranking 10th globally, third in the Asia & Oceania region after South Korea and Singapore, China remained in the same position according to the index of 2026.
History
China was a global scientific and technological leader up until the early years of the Ming dynasty. Ancient and medieval Chinese discoveries and Chinese innovations such as papermaking, printing, the compass, and gunpowder (the Four Great Inventions) contributed to the economic development of ancient and medieval East Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Chinese scientific activity began to neuter and wane around the fourteenth century. Unlike in Europe and other parts of the Western World, Chinese engineers and scientists did not attempt to reduce observations of nature to mathematical laws, nor did they form a scholarly community with criticisms and progressive research. In the Chinese Confucian cultural ethos dating back to the Han dynasty, Confucian philosophers held a strong focus by placing an overemphasis on literature, the arts, and public administration, while scientific and technological pursuits were looked down upon in terms of prestige and respectability and regarded to be unworthy endeavors that were fell far beneath their social pay grade as such domains of inquiry were seen as trivial or restricted to limited practical applications. One contributing factor is believed to be the imperial examination system, which deprived the incentives that encouraged up-and-coming Chinese intellectuals to actively engage in scientific and technological endeavors. The absence of motivating factors rooted in the imperial examinations stifled the development of scientific and technological innovation and resulted in a stagnation of Chinese scientific and technological creativity and development over the last several centuries. By the 17th century, Europe and the Western world surpassed China in scientific and technological advancement. The causes of this early modern Great Divergence continue to be debated by scholars to this day.
After being defeated repeatedly by Japan and Western nations in the 19th century, Chinese reformers began promoting modern science and technology as part of the Self-Strengthening Movement. After the Communist victory in 1949 science and technology research was organized based on the model of the Soviet Union. It was characterized by a bureaucratic organization led by non-scientists, research according to the goals of central plans, separation of research from production, specialized research institutes, concentration on practical applications, and restrictions on information flows. Researchers should work as collectives for society rather than as individuals seeking recognition. Many studied in the Soviet Union which also transferred technology. The Soviet Union provided 10,000 experts to China to facilitate its development.
China began a formal computing development program in 1956 when it launched the Twelve-Year Science Plan and formed the Beijing Institute of Computing Technology under the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
From the 1950s until the end of the Mao era, China emphasized self-reliance in scientific and technological development. This resulted from its relative international isolation and its ideological stance.
Beginning in 1964, China through the Third Front construction built a self-sufficient industrial base in its hinterlands as a strategic reserve in the event of war with the Soviet Union or the United States. The Third Front construction was primarily carried out in secret, with the location for Third Front projects following the principle of "close to the mountains, dispersed, and hidden" (). From 1964-1974, China invested more than 40% of its industrial capacity in Third Front regions. After Nixon's China trip in 1972, investment to the Third Front region gradually declined. Rapprochement between the United States and China decreased the fear of invasion which motivated the Third Front construction. Through its distribution of infrastructure, industry, and human capital around the country, the Third Front created favorable conditions for subsequent market development and private enterprise.
The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), which sought to remove perceived bourgeois influences and attitudes, caused large negative effects and disruptions. Construction of the Third Front slowed during its early stages. Among other measures it saw the scientific community and formal education attacked, intellectuals were sent to do manual labor, universities and academic journals were closed, most research ceased, and for nearly a decade China trained no new scientists and engineers.
In 1966, China transitioned from vacuum-tube computers to fully transistorized computers. In the mid-1960s through the late 1960s, China began a semiconductor program and was producing third-generation computers by 1972.
After Mao Zedong's death, S&T was established as one of the Four Modernizations in 1976. The new leader Deng Xiaoping, and architect of the reform and opening up, was a strong promoter of S&T and reversed the policies of the Cultural revolution. The Soviet inspired system was then gradually reformed. Media began promoting the value of S&T, scientific thinking, and scientific achievement. The third and fourth generations of leaders came almost exclusively from technical backgrounds.
In March 1986, China launched the large-scale technology development plan, the 863 Project.
The State Council of the People's Republic of China in 1995 issued the "Decision on Accelerating S&T Development" which described planned Science & Technology development for the coming decades. It described S&T as the chief productive force and affecting economic development, social progress, national strength, and living standards. S&T should become closely associated with market needs. Not only Soviet style institutes should do research but also universities and private industries. State institutions should form joint ventures with Chinese or foreign venture capital in order for S&T developments to reach the industry. S&T personal should become more occupationally mobile, pay should be linked to economic results, and age and seniority should become less important for personal decisions. Intellectual property rights should be respected. Information exchange should improve and there should be competition and open bidding on projects. The environment should be protected. Chinese indigenous S&T in certain key areas should be especially promoted. Public officials should improve their understanding of S&T and incorporate S&T in decision making. Society, including Communist Party youth organizations, labor unions and the mass media, should actively promote respect for knowledge and human talents.
Since the 1990s, China has concentrated on building physical infrastructure such as roads and ports. During the 2010s, a policy was implemented requiring technology transfer as a condition for foreign companies wanting entry into the Chinese market. However, China has shifted its growing focus towards prioritizing indigenous innovation to meet its national scientific and technological requirements. During this period China has succeeded in developing an innovation infrastructure, founded on the establishment of over 100 science and technology parks in many parts of the country, along with encouragement of entrepreneurship outside the state-owned sector. Yip and McKern argue that Chinese firms have evolved through three phases as their innovation capabilities have matured and that by 2017 many of them are of world standard. They are now strong competitors in the China market and increasingly in foreign markets, where they are establishing local operations.
Techno-nationalism While the term "techno-nationalism" was originally applied to the United States in the 1980s, it has since been used to describe nationalistic technology policies in many countries, particularly in Asia. Chinese techno-nationalism is rooted in the country's humiliation at the hands of more advanced countries in the 19th century. Indeed, China's leaders (like those of other countries) have long seen scientific and technological development as vital for achieving economic affluence, national security, and national prestige. Lacking indigenous technological intellectual property and innovation are seen as key national problems. The 21st century has thus seen a series of central government initiatives designed to promote "indigenous innovation" and technological development more generally in China. These include the National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006–20), the Strategic Emerging Industries initiative, the Internet Plus initiative, and the Made in China 2025 Program, among others.
Through these initiatives, the Chinese state has intervened in the economy in a variety of ways to promote national technological development and reduce reliance on other countries. Prioritized industries and firms are protected and guided. There are systematic efforts to replace foreign technology and intellectual properties with indigenous technology. Foreign companies are given many incentives for technology transfer and for moving R&D to China. At the same time the technological abilities of domestic companies are supported in various ways. Such policies have generated considerable conflict between China and developed countries, particularly the United States, although China has often proven flexible when its policies have been challenged.
Nationalism and nationalistic achievements have been seen as becoming the main ideological justifications and societal glue for the regime as Marxism loses influence. Some science and technology mega-projects have been viewed as questionable trophy projects done for propaganda purposes with Chinese state-controlled media being filled with reports of Chinese achievements. In 2019, reports surfaced stating that the Chinese government has ordered all foreign PC hardware and operating systems that are installed in government offices to be replaced in the next three years. Other reports stated that the Chinese government would be increasing subsidies for tech firms.
Gross domestic expenditure on research and development In its Medium and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006–2020), China fixed itself the target of devoting 2.5% of GDP to research and development by 2020. Between 2003 and 2012, gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD) rose from 1.13% to 1.98% of GDP, suggesting that the country was on track to meet its target.
The research firm Battelle estimates that China's GERD will exceed that of the United States by 2023. However, several convergent factors cast doubt over the accuracy of Battelle's prediction: the deceleration in China's rate of economic growth in 2014, the considerable drop in industrial production since 2012 and the major stock market slide in mid-2015. After progressing rapidly for a decade, GERD stabilized at 2.07% of GDP in 2015.