The McMahon–Hussein correspondence is a series of letters that were exchanged during World War I, in which the government of the United Kingdom agreed to recognize Arab independence in a large region after the war in exchange for the Sharif of Mecca launching the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. The correspondence had a significant influence on Middle Eastern history during and after the war; a dispute over Palestine continued thereafter.

The correspondence is composed of ten letters that were exchanged from July 1915 to March 1916 between Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca and Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner to Egypt. Whilst there was some military value in the Arab manpower and local knowledge alongside the British Army, the primary reason for the arrangement was to counteract the Ottoman declaration of jihad ("holy war") against the Allies, and to maintain the support of the 70 million Muslims in British India (particularly those in the Indian Army that had been deployed in all major theatres of the wider war). The area of Arab independence was defined to be "in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca" with the exception of "portions of Syria" lying to the west of "the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo"; conflicting interpretations of this description were to cause great controversy in subsequent years. One particular dispute, which continues to the present, is the extent of the coastal exclusion.

Following the publication of the November 1917 Balfour Declaration (a letter written by British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Baron Rothschild, a wealthy and prominent leader in the British Jewish community), which promised a national home for the Jews in Palestine, and the subsequent leaking of the secret 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement in which Britain and France proposed to split and occupy parts of the territory, the Sharif and other Arab leaders considered the agreements made in the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence to have been violated. Hussein refused to ratify the 1919 Treaty of Versailles and, in response to a 1921 British proposal to sign a treaty accepting the Mandate system, stated that he could not be expected to "affix his name to a document assigning Palestine to the Zionists and Syria to foreigners". A further British attempt to reach a treaty failed in 1923–24, with negotiations suspended in March 1924; within six months, the British withdrew their support in favour of their central Arabian ally Ibn Saud, who proceeded to conquer Hussein's kingdom.

The correspondence "haunted Anglo-Arab relations" for many decades thereafter. In January 1923, unofficial excerpts were published by Joseph N. M. Jeffries in the Daily Mail and copies of the letters circulated in the Arab press. Excerpts were published in the 1937 Peel Commission Report and the correspondence was published in full in George Antonius's 1938 book The Arab Awakening, then officially in 1939 as Cmd. 5957. Further documents were declassified in 1964.

Background

Initial discussions The first documented discussions between the UK and the Hashemites took place in February 1914, five months before the outbreak of World War I. Discussions were between the Consul-General in Egypt Lord Kitchener and Abdullah bin al-Hussein, the second son of Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca. Hussein had grown uncomfortable with the newly appointed Ottoman governor in his Hejaz Vilayet, Wehib Pasha, reflecting on rising tensions since the 1908 completion of the Hejaz railway, which threatened to support increased Ottoman centralization in the region. Discussions culminated in a telegram sent on 1 November 1914 from Kitchener—who had recently been appointed as Secretary of War—to Hussein wherein Great Britain would, in exchange for support from the Arabs of Hejaz, "...guarantee the independence, rights and privileges of the Sharifate against all external foreign aggression, in particular, that of the Ottomans". The Sharif indicated he could not break with the Ottomans immediately but the entry of the Ottomans on Germany's side in World War I on 11 November 1914 brought about an abrupt shift in British political interests concerning an Arab revolt against the Ottomans. According to historian David Charlwood, the failure in Gallipoli led to an increased desire on the part of the UK to negotiate a deal with the Arabs. Lieshout gives further background on the reasoning behind the shift in British thinking.

Damascus Protocol

On 23 May 1915, Emir Faisal bin Hussein—the third son of Hussein—was presented with the document that became known as the Damascus Protocol. Faisal was in Damascus to resume talks with the Arab secret societies al-Fatat and Al-'Ahd that he had met in March/April; in the interim he had visited Istanbul to confront the Grand Vizier with evidence of an Ottoman plot to depose his father. The document declared the Arabs would revolt in alliance with the United Kingdom and in return the UK would recognize Arab independence in an area running from the 37th parallel near the Taurus Mountains on the southern border of Turkey, to be bounded in the east by Persia and the Persian Gulf, in the west by the Mediterranean Sea and in the south by the Arabian Sea.

Letters, July 1915 to March 1916

Following deliberations at Ta'if between Hussein and his sons in June 1915, during which Faisal counselled caution, Ali argued against rebellion and Abdullah advocated action and encouraged his father to enter into correspondence with Sir Henry McMahon, over the period 14 July 1915 to 10 March 1916 ten letters—five from each side—were exchanged between Sir Henry McMahon and Sharif Hussein. McMahon was in contact with British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey throughout; Grey was to authorise and be ultimately responsible for the correspondence.

Historians have used an excerpt from a private letter sent on 4 December 1915 by McMahon halfway through the eight-month period of the correspondence as evidence of possible British duplicity: [I do not take] the idea of a future strong united independent Arab State ... too seriously ... the conditions of Arabia do not and will not for a very long time to come, lend themselves to such a thing ... I do not for one moment go to the length of imagining that the present negotiations will go far to shape the future form of Arabia or to either establish our rights or to bind our hands in that country. The situation and its elements are much too nebulous for that. What we have to arrive at now is to tempt the Arab people into the right path, detach them from the enemy and bring them on to our side. This on our part is at present largely a matter of words, and to succeed we must use persuasive terms and abstain from academic haggling over conditions—whether about Baghdad or elsewhere.

The ten letters are summarised in the table below, from the letters published in full in 1939 as Cmd. 5957:

No. From, To, Date Summary 1. Hussein to McMahon,14 Jul 1915 Boundaries: Consistent with the Damascus Protocol, requested "England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the North by Mersina and Adana up to 37 degrees of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jerizat (Ibn `Umar), Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the South by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina." Caliphate: Requested England to "approve of the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam." Other: In return, England to have economic preference in Arab countries, with other foreign privileges in Arab countries being abolished. Both sides to agree to a mutual defense pact and to remain neutral should the other party begin a conflict of aggression. 2. McMahon to Hussein,30 Aug 1915 Confirmed British "desire for the independence of Arabia and its inhabitants, together with our approval of the Arab Khalifate" 3. Hussein to McMahon,9 Sep 1915 Reiterated the importance of agreeing the "limits and boundaries", such that the negotiations "are dependent only on your refusal or acceptance of the question of the limits and on your declaration of safeguarding their religion first and then the rest of rights from any harm or danger." 4. McMahon to Hussein,24 Oct 1915 Boundaries: Acknowledged the importance of agreeing limits, stating "The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded... As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France... Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca." Other: Promised to protect the Holy Places, provide advice and assistance on government, with an understanding that only Britain will play such a role. Stipulated an exception for the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra allowing "special administrative arrangements" for Britain. 5. Hussein to McMahon,5 Nov 1915 "Vilayets of Mersina and Adana": "we renounce our insistence on the inclusion" "[T]wo Vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut and their seacoasts": refusing the exclusion since they "are purely Arab Vilayets, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab" "Iraqi Vilayets": noted that "we might agree to leave under the British troops ... against a suitable sum paid as compensation to the Arab Kingdom for the period of occupation." Other: The remainder of the letter discusses Arab apprehension over the speed of any revolt, in the context of the risk that the allies were to sue for peace with the Ottomans. 6. McMahon to Hussein,14 Dec 1915 "Vilayets of Mersina and Adana": Acknowledged agreement. "Vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut": "as the interests of our ally, France, are involved in them both, the question will require careful consideration and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course." "Vilayet of Bagdad": Proposed to postpone discussion Other: Responds to apprehension on timing with confirmation that Britain "has no intention of concluding any peace in terms of which the freedom of the Arab peoples from German and Turkish domination does not form an essential condition." 7. Hussein to McMahon,1 Jan 1916 "Iraq": proposes to agree compensation after the war "[T]he northern parts and their coasts": refuses further modifications, stating "it is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions." 8. McMahon to Hussein,25 Jan 1916 Acknowledged Hussein's prior points. 9. Hussein to McMahon,18 Feb 1916 Discussed initial preparations for the revolt. Appealed to McMahon for £50,000 in gold plus weapons, ammunition and food claiming that Feisal was awaiting the arrival of ‘not less than 100,000 people’ for the planned revolt. 10. McMahon to Hussein,10 Mar 1916 Discussed initial preparations for the revolt. Confirmed British agreement to the requests and concluded the ten letters of the correspondence. The Sharif set a tentative date for armed revolt for June 1916 and commenced tactical discussions with the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon.

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