In 1974, Turkey invaded the northern portion of the Republic of Cyprus in response to a military coup taking place on the island, in attempt to annex the island to Greece. Turkey claimed that this was an intervention in accordance to Treaty of Guarantee. The invasion consisted of two major Turkish offensives, and involved air, land and sea combat operations. The war resulted in a ceasefire which persists until the present day.
Events leading up to the 1974 invasion of Cyprus
The junta in Greece and political unrest
The rule by the military in Greece started in the morning of 21 April 1967 with a coup d'état led by a group of colonels of the military of Greece, with the government-in-exile and ended in July 1974.Matt Barrett, The Rise of the Junta in Greece
The Makarios era The period of 1964 to 1974 was a turbulent era for the island, with the apparent breakdown of relations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides right across the spectrum of social and political ties. In 1963, the Turkish Cypriots had abandoned, both voluntarily and by external pressure, their constitutional presence in the Cyprus Government. Violence in Nicosia followed soon after. In 1964, the Cyprus National Guard intervened militarily against a Turkish Cypriot militant threat in the north-west of the island, in and near to the Kokkina enclave, leading to direct confrontation with Turkey, who responded militarily but stopped short of invasion. During the unrest, the island began to incubate fanaticism on both Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides of enosis and taksim respectively, these being polar opposite ideologies. Enosis was an effort to unify the island with Greece, while Taksim simultaneously called for the partition of the island between Greeks and Turks.Cyprus 1974 – The Greek coup and the Turkish invasion, Makarios Drousiotis, Hellenic Distribution Agency
Military coup against Makarios III On 15 July 1974, the Cyprus National Guard, under the command of the Greek junta in Athens, launched a coup against the democratically elected president, Archbishop Makarios III. A large force of troops and tanks descended on the Archbishopric in Nicosia and laid siege to it, though Archbishop Makarios himself was able to escape. Troops defending the Presidential Palace resisted, and fighting in the area between pro-Makarios supporters and junta supporters continued for much of that day. A former EOKA member, Nikos Sampson, was promptly placed in power as de facto President of the Republic, though he later resigned on 23 July after support for his regime collapsed. The coup represented both a provocation against Turkey and an opportunity for Turkey to invade, citing concerns for the safety of the Turkish Cypriot community as its main goal.
Operational situation and balance of forces on the eve of the war Turkish-Cypriot forces Following the 1963–1964 intercommunal violence, a relatively stable situation had ensued on the island. The Turkish-Cypriot population had retreated into enclaves, each comprising several villages, and having its own armed force.
The biggest Turkish-Cypriot enclave was the Nicosia – St.Hilarion enclave, also called Günyeli enclave, with a 25,000-strong population, out of a total of 117,000 Turkish-Cypriots on the island,Sergis, p.254 and included the northern district of Nicosia and spanned north to the Pentadaktylos mountain range, but had no access to the sea. In 1964 Turkish-Cypriot fighters from Agirdag had occupied the Bogaz pass without a fight. Greek-Cypriot efforts to dislodge them by force were unsuccessful. As a result, the Turkish-Cypriot forces had control of the Nicosia – Kyrenia highway, and access to the coastal area north of the Pentadaktylos. With the Bogaz pass in Turkish hands, the Greek forces had to use longer routes to access the north coast, namely the Panagra pass, on western Pentadaktylos.
Other significant Turkish-Cypriot enclaves were that of Famagusta, of Lefka, of Tziaos (Serdarli), of Limasol, of Larnaka, of Pafos, of Limnitis, of Kokkina and of Louroutzina.Sergis, p.256
The total of the Turkish-Cypriot forces were 27 infantry battalions, grouped into 8 regiments, and a strength of potentially up to 20,000 men. The Turkish-Cypriot battalions were lightly armed and understrength, and they were generally limited to defensive capabilities. They also trained for unconventional operations, such as sabotage, ambushes etc. The Turkish forces included the Turkish Regiment in Cyprus (KTKA), of 1,000 men (nominal 650), organized in two groups, one in Günyeli and one in Ortakoy.
Greek-Cypriot forces The main force of the Greek Cypriots was the National Guard, created in the aftermath of the 1963–1964 intercommunal violence. The National Guard was equipped with surplus equipment from Greece, mainly of British origin, reinforced by a purchase of Soviet weapons in 1965. The National Guard comprised 15 active and 19 reserve infantry battalions, 3 active and 1 reserve commando battalions, 1 tank, 1 mechanized and 1 reconnaissance battalions, 6 field artillery battalions, 1 engineer battalion and other smaller units (such as AT artillery and AAA). They were grouped into 5 military areas called High Tactical Commands (ATD), one Commando command, one artillery command etc. Its nominal total wartime strength was 40,000 men, of whom about 30,000 were to be mobilised reservists, with 32 tanks and 80 field artillery pieces, as well as about 100 armoured vehiclesSergis, p.257-258
The National Guard, controlled by officers sent from Greece (as Cyprus lacked trained officers), was seen as an instrument of Athens in the political tension between Athens and Nicosia. As a result, the Cypriot government neglected the reinforcement of the National Guard, with the single exception of the 1965 purchase, resulting in the mechanical equipment suffering badly of maintenance issues, and ammunition stocks being low and old. The Makarios government founded in 1972 the "Efedrikon Soma" (which translates as "Reserve Corps"), with police personnel. Officially, the Efedrikon was a heavy police force to reinforce the National Guard in wartime, in fact however it was Makarios’ trusted counterweight against the Athens-controlled National Guard. The Efedrikon was lightly equipped with modern Czechoslovak-supplied weapons and well trained in military style. It comprised 3 battalions.Karkaletsis, p.12 Another paramilitary force was EOKA B, which in 1974 had about 5,000 members with 1,000 firearms.Sergis, p.152 Smaller paramilitaries also existed, under political leaders and their lieutenants.
The Greek regiment in Cyprus (ELDYK) was not under the National Guard’s direct control. It was two infantry battalions, with 1,200 men (nominal 950).Sergis, p.260 It was well trained and organized but equipped with light and old weapons.Sergis, p.652. In July 1974 ELDYK was in the process of re-equipping with more modern equipment Together with the Commando regiment it was considered the best unit on the Greek-Cypriot side.Vlassis, Aporritos Attilas, p.111
Opposing plans The prospect of an invasion of Cyprus had already been considered in 1964. Definitive plans were created in 1967, which were subsequently renewed to accommodate any changes in the operational situation.Απόφαση - Απόβαση, Μεχμέτ Αλί Μπιράντ, Εκδόσεις Ιωάννης Φλώρος, Athens 1984, page 49 (Greek translation of the Turkish original: "30 sicak gün", Birand Mehmet Ali, Millyet, Istanbul 1976)
According to the Turkish plan, the ultimate goal was the "Sahin" and "Attila" lines, namely the capturing of a large part of north Cyprus. The operation would be divided in two phases. The first objective, was the creation of a beachhead that would give access to the sea the Turkish-Cypriot enclave of Gönyeli. In order to give it a safe depth, it was planned that a triangle with a base of 18 km along the coast and 22 km depth should be secured. Following that, the Turkish planned to stop operations and seek a diplomatic solution. If diplomacy failed, they would forcefully pursue their second main objective, the "Attila" line. The first phase was expected to take 3 days, and the second 3–4 days, for a total of 6–7 days.
Although the operation was considered hard, it was also considered simple, because the Turkish General Staff expected total supremacy in the Mediterranean. The biggest worry for the Turkish side was the Aegean, and the possibility of a Greek attack there. The Greek-Turkish border in Thrace was considered secure as it was heavily fortified and garrisoned.Απόφαση - Απόβαση, Μεχμέτ Αλί Μπιράντ, Εκδόσεις Ιωάννης Φλώρος, Athens 1984, pages 49-50 (Greek translation of the Turkish original: "30 sicak gün", Birand Mehmet Ali, Millyet, Istanbul 1976)
The operation would include air, naval and ground forces. A naval armada of 5 destroyers and 31 landing ships would carry the amphibious forces,Απόφαση - Απόβαση, Μεχμέτ Αλί Μπιράντ, Εκδόσεις Ιωάννης Φλώρος, Athens 1984, page 97 (Greek translation of the Turkish original: "30 sicak gün", Birand Mehmet Ali, Milliyet, Istanbul 1976) while the Air Force would drop paratroopers and supplies and provide air support to the entire operation.
The ground forces detailed for the operation were put under the command of the 6th Corps/Second Army. They included the "Cakmak Special Strike Force", a brigade level unit which would conduct the amphibious landing, the Commando brigade, the Parachute brigade, the 39th infantry division, the 28th motorised infantry division and elements of the 5th armoured brigade and the Jandarma. About 6,000 Turkish-Cypriot fighters were stationed inside the Gönyeli enclave.Απόφαση - Απόβαση, Μεχμέτ Αλί Μπιράντ, Εκδόσεις Ιωάννης Φλώρος, Athens 1984, page 52 (Greek translation of the Turkish original: "30 sicak gün", Birand Mehmet Ali, Millyet, Istanbul 1976)
Attila 1 landing and offensive, Aphrodite Two defence plan and counter-offensive
The Cyprus National Guard High Command had planned a massive island-wide assault on the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves of Cyprus, in the event of a Turkish invasion, so as to quickly eliminate these enclaves as potential footholds for a bridgehead. The initial plan (drawn up by Georgios Grivas in 1964) was given the codename "Aphrodite One" and relied upon the presence of a full Greek division of 10,000 troops with heavy weapons. This division however, had been withdrawn from the island in 1967, and so a new plan was drawn up prior to 1974, named Aphrodite Two, and was to take the form of a major ground offensive against the enclaves, instigated at the initiative of the Greek Cypriots rather than the Greeks. This offensive should not be confused with the so-called "Aphrodite Three / Hephaestus Plan", which was drawn up in March 1974 by the EOKA-B coup-conspirators as a follow-up to Aphrodite Two, but never put into action.
20 July 1974 Kyrenia and Pentemilli beachhead In the early hours of the 20 July 1974, the Turkish armed forces launched an amphibious invasion of Pentemilli (Five Mile Beach) located on the northern coastline, approximately 8 km west of the main harbour town of Kyrenia. The Turkish naval force involved in transporting the amphibious forces originated from Mersin port and had first attempted to land at the beach of Glykiotissa, but this site proved inappropriate for a beachhead. Turkish frogmen transported by a gunboat searched Pentemilli for mines before the landing took place there.Savvas D. Vlassis, O Aporritos Attilas, Athens 2004