The First Battle of Balikpapan took place on 23–25 January 1942, off the major oil-producing town and port of Balikpapan, on Borneo, in the Netherlands East Indies. After capturing mostly-destroyed oilfields at Tarakan, Japanese forces sent an ultimatum to the Dutch that they would be executed if they destroyed the oilfields there, to no avail.

After destroying the oilfields, Dutch forces retreated inland, taking up positions in and around Samarinda II Airfield, while the Japanese landed and seized the also-destroyed refineries. Shortly thereafter, an American naval task force ambushed the invasion convoy and sank multiple transport ships, but they ultimately failed to stop Japan from swiftly occupying Balikpapan.

Background Before the war, Balikpapan was a crucial center for Dutch economic enterprises in Borneo. Within the city were two crude oil processing plants, a paraffin and lube oil plant, a cracking plant, a sulfuric acid plant and a precious petroleum refining plant, a tin and drum factory and several workshops.Koninklijke Nederlands Indische Leger (1948), p. 582 Most importantly, Balikpapan had an oil refinery with a complex of petroleum tanks that could hold eight times as much those at Tarakan, employing up to 7,000 native workers and 100 European employers, who produced up to one millions tons of oil annually before the war.De Jong (1984), p. 823Remmelink (2018), p. 17

As the Dutch contemplated the possibility of a Japanese military aggression, they began to bolster defenses to protect the facilities. In 1924, a detachment of six infantry brigades was stationed to defend the oilfields of Balikpapan, as well as that of Semboja and Sanga Sanga (supported by three additional brigades from Samarinda).

Just as the detachment at Tarakan, troops from Java would reinforce the Balikpapan detachment if a threatening situation occurred. In 1933, a battalion staff and two companies were sent to strengthen Balikpapan's defenses, as tensions in the Pacific were rising at the time. After four months, the reinforcement returned to Java. Afterwards, the detachment at Balikpapan was reduced to a single infantry battalion.

In Japan's plan to conquer the Dutch East Indies, Balikpapan held both strategic and tactical significance as a target. Strategically, its oil refinery was vital for Japan's own petroleum production; by occupying it, Japan could have direct access to the large oilfields in Borneo's interior. Tactically, the city also possessed both a harbor and an airfield (Manggar) that would be critical for Japan's occupation of southern Borneo and the capture of Java itself.Womack (2016), p. 121Remmelink (2018), p. 25

Order of battle

Japan

Ground forces Sakaguchi Detachment (Commander: Maj. Gen. Shizuo Sakaguchi)Remmelink (2015), p. 354Raid Unit (Commander: Col. Ken’ichi Kanauji

of 2nd Battalion)Airfield Seizure Unit (Commander: Lt. Col. Motozō Kume of 1st Battalion)Assault Unit (Commander: Col. Kyōhei Yamamoto

of 146th Infantry Regiment)Other Units - 2nd Battalion (minus 7th Company)

- One regimental gun squad

- Three radio squads

- One engineer platoon

- One element of the medical unit - 1st Battalion (minus 2nd and 4th Companies)

- One radio squad

- One armored car platoon

(Until the seizure of the airfield)

- One field artillery battery - 146th Infantry Regiment (minus 1st {minus 4th Company} and 2nd Battalion)

- 2nd Kure Special Landing Force

- Armored car unit (minus one platoon)

- 1st Field Artillery Battalion

(minus one battery)

- One engineer platoon

- One platoon from the Airfield Seizure Unit and the Samboja Seizure Unit each (After capturing the airfield and Samboja respectively)- Samboja Seizure Unit 2nd Infantry Company (one armored car platoon and one artillery section shall be attached after the seizure of the airfield) - Battlefield Resources Salvage Unit

Naval forces Western Attack Unit (Commander: Rear. Adm. Shoji Nishimura, based in the cruiser Naka)Remmelink (2015), pp. 179, 3514th Destroyer Flotilla (Commander: Rear. Adm. Shoji Nishimura)Air Group (Commander:

Capt. Takamasa Fujisawa)Base Force (Commander: Rear. Adm. Sueto Hirose,

based on the minelayer Itsukushima) - 2nd Destroyer Division (Harusame, Samidare, Yudachi)

- 9th Destroyer Division

(Asagumo, Minegumo, Natsugumo)

- 24th Destroyer Division

(Umikaze, Kawakaze, Yamakaze, Suzukaze)

- Transport Unit

1st Echelon: Tsuruga Maru, Liverpool Maru, Hiteru Maru, Kumagawa Maru, Ehime Maru, Asahisan Maru, Nittei Maru and Sumanoura Maru 2nd Echelon: Havana Maru, Hankow Maru, Teiryū Maru, Kuretake Maru, Kanayama Maru, Toei Maru, Nissho Maru and Nana Maru - Seaplane tenders Sanyo Maru and Sanuki Maru - 2nd Base Force (P-36, P-37 and P-38) - 11th Minesweeper Division (W-15, W-16)

- 30th Minesweeper Division (W-17, W-18)

- 21st Submarine-chaser Division (CH-4, CH-16)

- 31st Submarine-chaser Division (CH-10, CH-11, CH-12)

Netherlands Balikpapan Garrison (6th KNIL Infantry Battalion, Commander: Lt. Col. Cornelis van den Hoogenband):Koninklijke Nederlands Indische Leger (1948), p. 585InfantryArtilleryOther Units - 2 infantry company (1st and 2nd Company)

- 1 machine gun company

(with 8 mortars, 2 AT-guns and

3 overvalwagen armored cars) - Coastal:

2 x 120 mm L/40 guns 4 x 75 mm L/35 guns 2 x 75 mm L/25 guns

- Mobile: 6 x 75 mm L/30 guns (transported with trucks) - Anti-Aircraft: 2 x 40 mm guns 9 x 12.7 mm machine guns - A demolition detachment of 20 personnel, supported by ca. 130 conscripted Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij (BPM; "Batavian Petroleum Company") employees - 5-man medical team, supported by 40 stretcher-bearers

United States 59th Destroyer Division (Commander: Paul H. Talbot):

USS John D. Ford USS Parrott USS Paul Jones USS Pope

Dutch plans The Dutch garrison in Balikpapan was ordered to defend the city, particularly its oil refineries, against a coup de main and to engage in a delaying action to provide time to destroy the facilities. Once it seemed clear that the city was about to fall into enemy hands, the troops would have to wage a guerilla war in the hinterlands. For the facility destruction, the Dutch demolition detachment allotted three hours and eight hours for Balikpapan and Sambodja, respectively. However, a demolition exercise showed that it would take much more time if the destruction was to be carried out accordingly.Koninklijke Nederlands Indische Leger (1948), p. 586

For the defensive preparations, van den Hoogenband established a defensive position at Klandasan to block the road from Manggar Airfield to the city. A second defensive line surrounded the radio station (Radio position), with a third line (Rapak position) constructed to cover the retreat into the hinterlands for the guerrilla campaign.

To prevent enemy landings, Dutch Navy (Koninklijke Marine) minelayers Gouden Leeuw, Eland Dubois and Soemenep laid out a barrier of 290 mines around the approaches to Balikpapan Bay between September 1939 and December 1941.Womack (2016), p. 59

Finally, to prepare for the guerrilla campaign, van den Hoogenband set up evacuation camps that could accommodate about 3,000 people around 6 to 9 km from Balikpapan. Shortly after the fall of Tarakan, he evacuated Balikpapan civilians to these camps. In addition, food depots were also constructed on the river banks every 10 km from the city and near the oil pumping stations in Wain River and Mentawir to sustain the troops during the guerrilla campaign.Koninklijke Nederlands Indische Leger (1948), p. 587De Jong (1984), p. 824

Japanese plans

As the capture of Tarakan went faster than their predicted timetable, the Sakaguchi Detachment and Western Attack Unit moved up their date to occupy Balikpapan. Their orders were:

The enemy will be contacted and destroyed while every possible effort will be exerted to prevent destruction of the oil refinery installations. The airfield, after its capture, will be used for the invasion of Java. The assault unit will cooperate in the maintenance of the airfield. The main force immediately upon landing in the vicinity of the airfield will capture it. Simultaneously, a part of the group will secretly go up the river below the port and make a surprise attack at the enemy's rear in order to break the organized resistance of the enemy garrison. As far as possible, they will prevent the destruction of the oil refinery installations. After the capture of the Balikpapan, the Sanga Sanga Oilfield region will be mopped up and secured. Preparations will be made to make Balikpapan the center of military administration in South Borneo.

Despite being already ahead of schedule, the debarkation and construction activity to ensure the readiness of Tarakan airfield made little progress. Delaying the airfield's capacity to be used a staging ground for the attack on Balikpapan, Nishimura and Sakaguchi eventually postponed the landing in Balikpapan from 21 January to 24 January. Still, as the postponement did not provide enough time to ready the Tarakan airfield for transport planes, the plan to attack Balikpapan using paratroopers were scrapped.Remmelink (2018), p. 177Remmelink (2015), p. 349

Concerned that the Dutch defenders intended to destroy the oilfields in Balikpapan, the Japanese planned to release several Dutch POWs with a warning that swift reprisal would fall on defenders and civilians alike should they destroy the refineries.

Battle

Ultimatum and demolition (16-20 January) To carry the aforementioned ultimatum to the defenders, Sakaguchi tasked Capt. Gerard Reinderhoff, former chief of staff to the Tarakan garrison commander, Lt.-Col. Simon de Waal and Capt. Anton Colijn, manager of the BPM oil company on Tarakan, KNIL reservist and son to the former Dutch prime minister Hendrikus Colijn. On the morning of 16 January, they steamed to Balikpapan aboard the captured BPM motor schooner Parsifal with an Indonesian captain and three Japanese interpreters (other sources say two Japanese naval lieutenants and two sailors;De Jong (1984), p. 821 others mentioned three Japanese interpreters and two Indonesian police officers).Womack (2006), p. 85

Two Dornier Do 24 seaplanes of MLD's GVT.4 Squadron sighted Parsifal, flying a Japanese flag on 19 January. Differing sources indicate that Colijn and Reinderhoff either overpowered or deceived their captors — some accounts claim the Japanese were drunk — and managed to lock them inside a cabin.Kehn (2017), p. 80 Colijn then immediately tore down the Japanese ensign, while Reinderhoff waved a Dutch flag. As the seas were too rough for a landing, the Dorniers flew off and returned the next day. The Dorniers returned and landed the following morning, picked up Colijn and Reinderhoff and flew them to Balikpapan, where they delivered the ultimatum directly to van den Hoogenband.

van den Hoogenband wasted no time and immediately gave the order for the demolition team to began destroying all the wells, refineries and port facilities in Balikpapan. The destruction had actually already begun ahead on 18 January. In the Louise oilfields located north of Balikpapan, Dutch demolition teams dismantled the well tubing, cut off to a depth of 15 meters, which were then dropped down the holes together with pump plungers and accessory rods. To complete the work, materials such as bolts, nuts, and heavy drilling bits was thrown after them. Finally, a tin containing four pieces of TNT was thrown in to destroy the casing strings. Within a few days "all motors, pumps, dynamos and turbines were blown up."Kehn (2017), p. 81