During the Vietnam War, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF), and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), used a distinctive land warfare strategy to defeat their South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and American opponents. These methods involved closely integrated political and military strategy – what was called dau tranh – literally "to struggle".
The NLF, also known as the Viet Cong (VC), was an umbrella of front groups, set up by North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)) to conduct the insurgency in South Vietnam. The NLF also included fully armed formations – regional and local guerrillas, and the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF). The PLAF was the "Main Force" – the Chu Luc or full-time soldiers of the NLF's military wing. Many histories lump both the NLF and the armed formations under the term "Viet Cong" or "VC" in common usage. Both were tightly interwoven and were in turn controlled by the DRV.Anderson et al. (1967), pp. 3–195; see also Karnow (1983), pp. 12–239. Others consider the Viet Cong, or "VC" to primarily refer to the armed elements.Lanning & Cragg (1993), pp. 33–56. The term PAVN (People's Army of Vietnam), identifies regular troops of the North Vietnamese Army or NVA. Collectively, both the southern guerrillas and the regulars from the north were part of PAVN.Pike (1986), pp. 37–169.
Terms such as "NLF" and "VC" or "NVA" and PAVN" are used interchangeably due to their widespread popular usage by both South Vietnamese and American military personnel and civilians, and common usage in standard histories of the Vietnam War.
Historical development
Formation of the VC/NLF
The formation of the National Liberation Front (NLF) and People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) lies in the communist dominated resistance to the French and the State of Vietnam – the Viet Minh.Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, (The MIT Press: new ed. 1970) pp. 37–146 The expulsion of the French had still left a clandestine organization behind in the South, reinforced by thousands of Southerners that had gone North after the communist victory ("regroupees"). This clandestine organization initially focused on political organization and propaganda, and came under heavy pressure by the Diem regime. Diem was an implacable enemy of the Communists and his nationalist credentials were comparatively clean, but he had inherited a very fragile situation. From the beginning he faced the threat of military coups, thrusting criminal gangs, a weak bureaucracy and army, and fierce factional fighting within South Vietnam between not only political factions, but religious groups (Buddhists and Catholics) as well.Davidson (1988), pp. 138–244.
Successes and failures of Diem: main NLF opponent Some of Diem's authoritarian methods and nepotism alienated a variety of groups in South Vietnamese society. Diem's "Denounce Communism" campaign for example, indiscriminately persecuted and alienated numerous civilians (including people who helped the anti-French resistance) who may or may not have had strong links or sympathies with Communism. Diem's coldness towards Buddhist sensibilities in some areas also aggravated an already shaky situation.Doyle et al. (1986), pp. 31–157. Nevertheless, Diem's efforts caused substantial damage to the communist apparatus, as attested to by complaints of setbacks in the documents of his Communist opponents.Moyar, Mark (2006). Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965. pp 12-41, 87-278 Some historians argue that Diem was no more corrupt or incompetent than other Third World leaders facing the difficult task of governing a new nation born of conflict, and that he was dealt a very harsh opening hand- including a ruthless communist foe that attacked every initiative he started, opposition from the French and numerous internal enemies, and a number of assassination attempts- both by the communists and his own military. Diem's bravery and calm demeanor during these attempts to kill him often won the esteem of American supporters. In addition, some Buddhist opponents of Diem it is held, were not the innocent religious leaders often portrayed in the press but sometimes collaborated with or were manipulated by that opposition.Moyar, pp 12-41, 87-278 Vigorous communist efforts to destroy his reforms did not only target him personally for murder but singled out government personnel such as hamlet chiefs and school teachers for death.Moyar, 70-82While his administration was not immune from problems, Diem also appeared to have some success in social development during his tenure. His land reform measures for example, while not going to the extent urged by American advisers (such as more sharply limiting the number of hectares one farmer could own), in the words of one historian, "did succeed in breaking up the vast estates in the delta, and it changed the landless peasants in the South from the large majority to a minority. The Communists would later lament that this redistribution of land "seriously interfered" with their subsequent efforts to win over the peasantry through land reform."Mark Moyar, 2006. Triumph Forsaken.. 70-82 Ironically, Diem's American backers also failed to provide him with adequate funding to help buy land for redistribution to small peasants. Diem's other reforms emphasized agriculture rather than the forced-draft industrial development of the north, and the general restoration of order under his regime saw rising indicators of prosperity. Rice production for example which had fallen below pre-World War II production levels in 1954, surpassed the previous level by 1959. Production of rubber rose from 54,917 tons in 1954 to 75,374 in 1950, and cattle and pigs registered a threefold jump over the same period. Diem also placed limits on foreign capitalists and the amount of control they could exercise in various sectors. Per one study:
The agricultural boom, combined with the opening of hundreds of new primary and secondary schools and new hospitals staffed by American-trained nurses and physicians, raised South Vietnamese living standards at a pace that would have been impressive in any underdeveloped country, not to mention a country that was simultaneously bracing for a massive attack on its homeland.Mark Moyar, 2006. Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-65, 70-82
Death of Diem and expansion of northern takeover campaign
Diem also experienced several failures during his tenure. Harsh methods to suppress dissent, and abrasive personalities in his administration alienated a number of South Vietnamese, particularly Buddhists. His large scale resettlement of the peasantry, a key component of his rural strategy, floundered due to communist infiltration, poor planning and arbitrary implementation. While dependent on US aid, Diem was not afraid to disagree with or stand up to his American sponsors when he felt their demands were unworkable, incurring the enmity of the new US Ambassador Henry Lodge (1963–64) and certain US media figures that kept up a steady drumbeat of negative press, undermining his efforts.Moyar, 87-182 In an interview some months before his death, the South Vietnamese President again criticized what he claimed was American naivete at the difficult situation and American interference, including threats to cut US aid unless he kowtowed to opponents like the Buddhists. Said Diem:
Am I merely a puppet on Washington's string? Or – as I had hoped – are we partners in a common cause?.. If you order Vietnam around like a puppet on a string, how will you be different – except in degree – from the French?Moyar, 229-244
Diem was assassinated with the connivance of his erstwhile American allies- with coup plotters maintaining "contact with Ambassador Lodge over a direct wire installed between their officers' club and the US Embassy.. Ambassador Lodge boasted privately to Kennedy that "the ground in which the coup seed grew into a robust plant was prepared by us.."Taylor Branch, 1998. Pillar of Fire, p. 159 Ho Chi Minh on hearing of Diem's assassination reportedly considered the US role foolish, as Diem was the most effective opponent to communist plans, and predicted subsequent years of instability for South Vietnam.Moyar, pg 286
Diem's successful initial campaign provoked increasing assistance from the Communist North to the clandestine southern formations. As early as 1959, the Central Committee of the Party had issued a resolution to pursue armed struggle. Thousands of regroupees were re-infiltrated south, and a special unit was also set up, the 559th Transport Group, to establish way-stations, trails, and supply caches for the movement of fighting men and material into the zone of conflict.Karnow (1983), pp. 181–239. In 1960 the Central Committee formed the National Liberation Front (NLF). Its military wing was officially called the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) but became more popularly known as the Viet Cong (VC). The NLF/VC took in not just armed guerrillas but served as a broad front for a variety of groups opposed to Diem. While much propaganda was expended in presenting armed elements opposed to Diem as independent and spontaneous, all communist forces in the field - from village guerrillas, to Main Force Units and PAVN regulars were under a single command structure set up in 1958, and controlled by Hanoi.Military History Institute of Vietnam,(2002) Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, translated by Merle L. Pribbenow. University Press of Kansas. p. 68
Northern build-up of early southern insurgent forces The North stiffened the early NLF effort in four ways:Davidson (1988), pp. 312–316.
Sending thousands of northern cadres into the south as leaders and trainers, sometimes aggravating a regional culture clash within revolutionary ranks. Standardizing the polyglot VC inventory of fighting arms, including rifles (the AK-47) and machine guns using a common caliber round. Other excellent arms included the RPG-2 and various recoilless rifles. Organization of VC units into larger formations, from battalions to regiments, to the first VC division, the famous 9th VC. Deployment of PAVN regulars to build up logistical networks for later infiltration, (the 559th Transport Group) and insertion of complete regular units such as the 325th Division in remote border areas.Davidson (1988), pp. 312–32.9
Early effectiveness of the Viet Cong
By 1964 the VC, supported by smaller numbers of PAVN, were increasingly effective, conducting attacks up to regimental strength. The Battle of Binh Gia (also known as The Battle of Ap Bac in many Western histories), where the victorious VC held the battlefield for 4 days rather than simply melt away as in earlier times is a vivid example of their confidence and effectiveness. Their operations regularly drubbed Diem's troops, and although Diem's forces controlled a number of urban areas and scattered garrisons, the security situation had become critical.