The Hwasong-7 () is a single-stage, mobile liquid propellant medium-range ballistic missile developed by North Korea. Developed in the mid-1980s, it is a scaled-up adaptation of the Soviet R-17 Elbrus missiles, more commonly known by its NATO reporting name "Scud". The inventory is estimated to be around 200–300 missiles. US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimates that as of June 2017 fewer than 100 launchers were operationally deployed.
It influenced the design of Pakistan's Ghauri-1 missile, as well as the Iranian Ghadr-110.
Description
Hwasong-7 is a larger variant of the R-17, scaled up so its cross-sectional area is about doubled, with a diameter of and a length of . The precise capabilities and specifications of the missile are unknown; even the fact of its production and deployment are controversial.
Its aerodynamic design is stable, reducing the need for modern active stabilization systems while the missile is flying in the denser lower atmosphere. The Hwasong-7 uses the liquid propellant combination of TM-185 (20% gasoline and 80% kerosene) and AK-27I (27% and 73% ). Unlike modern missiles, Hwasong-7 can only be fueled when vertical, meaning it cannot be fueled before transport. With a warhead, its range is estimated to be . Further range analysis includes a range of to a high-end estimation of , meaning all South Korean territories, as well as Japan, Russia and China are covered by Hwasong-7's range.
It has an estimated circular error probable (CEP) of , but it can be reduced to between and with GPS guidance. North Korea is believed to possess some 300 Hwasong-7 missiles and fewer than 50 mobile launchers.
To enable interception at higher altitudes, South Korea is indigenously developing the long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM), and on 8 July 2016 the U.S. agreed to deploy one Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system in Seongju County, in the south of South Korea, by the end of 2017.
Naming The "Hwasong-7" is the North Korean internal designation for the missile. The missile is also known by external designations from Western analysts, including Rodong-1, No Dong-1, Rodong, Nodong, Scud-D, Scud Mod-D and Nodong-A.
Variant for reconnaissance satellite testing
Hwasong-7 has a variant with white livery for reconnaissance satellite cameras testing. On 18 December 2022, North Korea launched two medium-range ballistic missiles from Sohae Satellite Launching Station, flying with an apogee of . According to North Korea, the test was organized by the National Aerospace Development Administration to evaluate reconnaissance satellite components, including camera and data transmission system. For images, see 1 and 2. Released images included an photo indicating the missiles appeared to be a derivation from Hwasong-7 or Scud missile.
History
It is believed North Korea obtained R-17 designs from Egypt, and possibly modified designs from China, allowing them to reverse-engineer them into a larger and longer-distance weapon. United States reconnaissance satellites first detected this type in May 1990 at the Musudan-ri test launch facility, in northeastern North Korea. A test launch happened at the same time, but likely failed, since burn marks were captured by photographs at the launch site. Later, low-rate production started in January 1991 and North Korea conducted another test-fire of Hwasong-7 in May 1993. Also, between 1993 and 1994, North Korea had produced a sufficient number of Hwasong-7 missiles to be considered operational, and five years later, Hwasong-7 became deployed.
North Korea test-fired Hwasong-7 missiles in 2006, 2009, as well as 2014, in which North Korea fires two missiles that flew .
Although it has an estimated range of , launches in March 2014 flew only , as the missiles flew to an altitude of because of lofted trajectory. The missiles achieved a maximum speed of . U.S. and South Korean Patriot PAC-2/3 interceptors are more specialized to hit ballistic missiles up to .
On 5 September 2016, North Korea fired three missiles into the Sea of Japan, these missiles achieved about range. Initially, these missiles were believed to be Hwasong-7, however, it was later revealed that the missiles used for this launch were Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER). The United States strongly condemned the launch.
Exporting The Hwasong-7's technology has been exported to foreign nations (such as Iran and Pakistan) in secrecy on the basis of mutual exchange of technologies, with Iran being one of the largest beneficiaries of such technology. Successful variants were tested and deployed by Iran after developing the Shahab-3 which is roughly based on Hwasong-7. The May 1993 test of Hwasong-7 is believed to be observed by Iranian and Pakistani delegations. Some press reports (including The Sunday Telegraph, Jerusalem Post, and Janes) claimed that Libya signed a contract for a total of 50 Nodong systems in October 1999, with the first batch delivered in July 2000, however such rumors proved to be false when Libya voluntarily dismantled its weapons of mass destruction programs in December 2003 and invited foreign inspectors to verify the disarmament process. In that same year, US inspectors learned that Iraq attempted to buy Nodong missiles, but the North Koreans never delivered the missiles and refused to refund the $10 million down payment.
Operators Current
− Ghadr-110 used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force. − Used by the Korean People's Army Strategic Force. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2025, North Korea is possessing about 10 Hwasong-7 launchers. − Hatf 5 Ghauri used by the Army Strategic Forces Command.
Unconfirmed
− Reportedly was interested in buying Nodong missiles, but photographic evidence only shows Scud-Bs or possibly Scud-Cs in use. − Developed a localized version of the Nodong missile. Reportedly received 50 missiles and seven TELs from North Korea in 2000. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Syrian Arab Army doesn't operate MRBMs as of 2024.
Failed bids − Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Baghdad placed an order for Nodong missiles and made a $10 million down payment, but North Korea never delivered the missiles.
See also Strategic Rocket Forces (North Korea) North Korean missile tests North Korean defense industry Military of North Korea
References
Bibliography
External links CSIS Missile Threat - No-Dong 1 CNS report North Korea's Ballistic Missile Capabilities 2006 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program National Threat Initiative, Nodong: Overview and Technical Assessment